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I. INTRODUCTION
Day after day, across this country, ordinary people are summoned
to court for a selection process that ultimately leaves them in a room
deciding, with other jurors, whether a criminal defendant should be
killed. The task handed to these jurors is an awesome, personal, moral
decision, encased within the complex legal standards and procedures that
constitute modern capital jurisprudence.' The doctrine that created and
1. See, e.g., California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("Mhe sentence imposed... should reflect a reasoned moral response to the
defendant's background, character, and crime.") (emphasis in original). Justice Scalia,
for one, profoundly mistrusts the morality at the core of capital decisionmaking. See,
1346
HeinOnline -- 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 1346 1994
1994:1345 Deciding to Kill 1347
sustains this moment of conscience reflects an ongoing struggle of rule
against uncertainty, reason against emotion, justice against mercy, and
thus, at one level, male against female. Capital jurisprudence-the law
for deciding whether to kill-is also a hidden battleground of gender.'
We all know what it means to use masculine or feminine to describe
a person's behavior' or a piece of clothing; we know what it means to
describe a piece of furniture in those terms, or a job,' or even a poem.
But what about legal doctrine and method? Masculine and feminine are
modifiers that have meaning not only in our choices as individuals,
struggling to come to terms with personal identity,5 but also in our
institutions6 and intellectual systems," which in their construction
embody concepts of gender, of a perceived fundamental, hierarchical
dichotomy between masculine and feminine, or male and female. Frances
Olsen explains:
e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The moral decision
at the heart of capital punishment law implicates a fundamental dichotomy between
morality and law. See generally DAviD LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW (1984);
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593
(1984).
2. I use "gender" to refer to the social and cultural interpretation of what it
means to be male or female. See, e.g., KATHERINE T. BARTLETT, GENDER AND LAW:
THEORY, DOCrRINE, COMMENTARY, at xxviii (1993); ZILLAH EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE
BODY AND THE LAw 2 (1988); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method,
and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 635 n.1 (1983).
3. See, e.g., Elizabeth Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of
Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 520, 565
n.191 (1992) (describing criticism of Professor Anita Hill as "unfeminine").
4. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1750 (1990) (discussing gendered constructions of jobs on both sides in EEOC
v. Sears, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 937 (N.D. Ga. 1980)).
5. See, e.g., Kenneth Karst, Judging and Belonging, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1957,
1957 (1988) ("Boys must not be feminine, girls must not be masculine.").
6. For examples of legal commentary describing constructions of masculinity and
femininity in institutions, see Marc Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?
Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men,
46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 511 (1992) (describing the masculine construction of several
institutions, including the military); Kenneth Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the
Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REv. 499 (1991) (describing the
masculinity of the military).
7. See, e.g., ANNE FAUSTO-STERLINO, MYTHS OF GENDER 12 (1985) ('Scientists
who do deny their politics-who claim to be objective and unemotional about gender while
living in a world where even boats and automobiles are identified by sex-are fooling both
themselves and the public at large."); Nancy Jay, Gender and Dichotomy, in A READER
IN FEMINIST KNOWLEDGE 89 (Sneja Gunew ed., 1991) (discussing gendered nature of
apparently neutral binary polarizations).
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[M]ost of us have structured our thinking around a complex
series of dualisms, or opposing pairs: rational/irrational;
active/passive; thought/feeling; reason/emotion; culture/nature;
power/sensitivity; objective/subjective; abstract/contextualized;
principled/personalized ....
. . . In each pair, the term identified as "masculine" is
privileged as superior, while the other is considered negative,
corrupt, or inferior
As participants in an entrenched system of legal thought, we
organize our thinking about law within this series of dichotomies, which
include reason versus emotion,9 distance versus connection, and rule
versus context. The dichotomous choices are not complementary, but
rather conflict with and challenge each other.'0 Those dualisms have a
hierarchy; maleness is associated with the top end of the hierarchy,
.8. Frances Olson, Feminism and CriticalLegal Theory:AnAmerican Perspective,
18 INT'L J. Soc. L. 199 (1990); see also ALISON M. JAOGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND
HUMAN NATURE 28 (1983) (describing "normative dualism" of liberal thought); Donna
Wilshire, The Uses of Myth, Image, and the Female Body in Re-visioning Knowledge, in
GENDERJBODY/KNOwLEDGE: FEMINIST RECONSTRUCTIONS OF BEING AND KNOWING 92,
95-96 (Alison M. Jaggar & Susan R. Bordo eds., 1989) (charting core dualisms associated
with male and female); Lucinda Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma
of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 894 (1989)
("Men have had the power to privilege ... the side of the dichotomies that they associate
with themselves."); Susan Williams, Feminist Legal Epistemology, 1993 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 63, 73 ("[Clharacteristics associated with the knower-objectivity, reason,
universality, intellect--are associated with men. ... [Plarticularity, emotion,
physicality-are associated with women.").
9. See, e.g., Alison M. Jaggar, Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist
Epistemology, in GENDER/BODY/KNowLEDoE, supra note 8, at 145, 145 ("Not only has
reason been contrasted with emotion, but it has also been associated with the mental, the
cultural, the universal, the public, and the male, whereas emotion has been associated with
the irrational, the physical, the natural, the particular, the private, and, of course, the
female."); Finley, supra note 8, at 899 ("[Llaw adopts the values of the privileged side
of the dualisms, such as .. . the shunning of emotion.").
10. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1576 (1983) ("Mhe inferior half ... is often seen to
pose a constant danger to the stronger half."); Williams, supra note 8, at 74 ("Mhe
feminine halves of the dichotomies are seen not only as different, but also as
threatening.").
1348
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female with the bottom. 1 Thus law is a gendered structure of power
and meaning.
12
These hierarchical gendered dichotomies have hurt women, who have
been characterized as too emotional, 13  too close, 4  or too
unstructured 5 to perform in worlds that require reason, distance, and
certainty. Similar gendered associations are made today in a different
way by relational feminists seeking to reclaim the authority and power of
what they identify as a female capacity for emotion, connection, and
contextual thinking.16 These gendered dichotomies are all too real
in legal thought. But they are also fundamentally false, for they
oversimplify our world.. Reasoned, principled, distanced, and thus
objective, decisionmaking is masculine in the same way that constructing
steel buildings or fighting wars is masculine; the fact that women build
11. See, e.g., Finley, supra note 8, at 899 ("Law is associated with the male and
higher valued side of each of these dualisms."); see also EISENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 42
("[Llaw is engendered, that is, structured through the multiple oppositional layerings
embedded in the dualism of man/woman, ... "); id. at 53 ("Law does not exist alongside
the privilege but inside it. It establishes a gendered series of hierarchical differences.");
CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 85-87 (1989) (discussing how law
is infused with masculinity; that is, the masculine side of the dualities); David Cole,
Strategies of Difference: Litigating for Women's Rights in a Man's World, 2 LAW &
INEQUALITY 33, 45 (1984) ("Law privileges objectivity, individualism, and rights over
their binary opposites, subjectivity, collectivity, and responsibility, and this privilege is
identified with the more general male privilege over females."); cf. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS
(Benjamin Jowett trans., Oxford, Clarendon Press 1885).
12. See, e.g., NOAiRE NAFFINE, LAW & THE SEXES: EXPLORATIONS IN FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE 3 (1990) ("Mhe concepts invoked by law to demonstrate its essential
justness-concepts such as 'impartiality,' 'objectivity,' and 'rationality,' are gender-
biased in their very construction."); Finley, supra note 8, at 892 ("Thus, legal language
and reasoning is gendered, and that gender matches the male gender of its linguistic
architects.").
13. E.g., MATTHEW ARNOLD, MEROPE 21 (n.p., 1858) ("With women the heart
argues, not the mind."); William M. Thackeray, The Virginians, in THE WORKS OF
WILLIAM MAKEPEACE THACKERAY 1, 49 (Kensington ed. 1904) ("The book of female
logic is blotted all over with tears, and Justice in their courts is for ever in a passion.");
see also THE EFFECTS OF GENDER IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: THE FINAL REPORT OF
THE NINTH CICUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE 57 (1993) (reporting criticisms of women
lawyers said to be too emotional); Report of the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study
Commission, 42 FLA. L. REV. 803, 921-22 (1990) (same).
14. E.g., HENRI-FREDERIC AMIEL, JOURNAL 59 (Mrs. Humphrey Ward trans.,
n.p., MacMillan 1887) ("To men belong law, science and philosophy, all that is
disinterested, universal and rational. Women, on the other hand, introduce into everything
favour, exception, and personal prejudice."); 4 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, JOURNAL OF
RALPH WALDO EMERSON 1820-1832, at 81 (Houghton-Mifflin Co. 1910) (1836) ("How
rarely can a female mind be impersonal.").
15. E.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, The Rape of Lucrece, in THE RIVERSIDE
SHAKESPEARE 1720, 1736 (1974) ("[Mien have marble, women waxen minds.").
16. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982); NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE
APPROACH TO ETHICS & MORAL EDUCATION (1984); Robin West, Jurisprudence and
Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988).
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steel skyscrapers, fight wars, and make principled, distanced, reasoned
judgments has not yet dislodged the masculinity from these activities. 7
Masculinity or maleness is a social construction, to which some women
have access and from which some men are excluded. Similarly, both men
and women can and do exhibit "female" qualities of emotionality, intense
interrelatedness, and contextual reasoning."8 But just as countless
businessmen can wear pink button-down shirts without eradicating the
gender from pink and blue, women who are unemotional, hard-driving,
and distant are described as masculine.
A serious feminist project for the theory of law is not simply to
embrace the "female" side of these dualisms, the task undertaken by
relational feminists, but further to strip away the false male cover to
reveal the messier reality-that is, to reject the basic dichotomies. 9 Our
intellectual systems in fact incorporate both sides of the dichotomies, and
much in between, but the "female" side is hidden.' Thus the law
embodies reason and emotion, but is said to be reasonable. It moves
between distance and connection, but is called disinterested. It embodies
principles and context, but masquerades as the rule of law. The legal
system is "male" in that it privileges the male side of the dichotomies in
its descriptions of itself and its aspirations, and hides the feminine side.
In moments great and small, legal decisionmaking uses both sides, in fact
requires both sides, but aspires to the masculine virtues of certainty,
objectivity, and reason.
I test these premises by examining one awesome moment in law, the
decision of a jury to punish someone by death. The power of the law is
manifest in this moment. If gendered structures in fact operate within
apparently neutral legal principles and procedures, they will be deeply at
work in the legal procedures that give the ultimate task-deciding life or
death-to a person, a juror.2 In addition, under current doctrine, the
17. Thus my claim is not that men are in fact more reasonable than women, but
rather that the social construction of masculine includes principled, reasoned
decisionmaking and the social construction of feminine means, among other things,
emotionality, attention to details, and profound connection with others.
18. See GILLIGAN, supra note 16, at 2 (different voice describes theme, not
gender); NODDINOS, supra note 16, at 44; West, supra note 16.
19. See EISENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 4-5; see also Mari Matsuda, When the First
Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REP. 7 (1989).
20. See, e.g., NAFFINE, supra note 12, at 13 ("The various epithets
conventionally used to describe law, such as 'rational,' 'autonomous' and 'principled,'
are in fact male legal ideals. They describe a set of qualities to which men might aspire
but they are not, and could not be, the truth of law because nothing in life is ever
organized in this way. Vital dimensions of human existence, dimensions conventionally
associated with women, are missing from law's depiction of itself."); see also Olson,
supra note 8, at 208 (law in fact is "as irrational, subjective, concrete and contextualized
as it is rational, objective, abstract and principled").
21. MacKinnon suggests-that "law will most reinforce existing distributions of
power when it most closely adheres to its own highest ideals of fairness." MacKinnon,
supra note 2, at 645; cf. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601,
.1350
HeinOnline -- 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 1350 1994
Deciding to Kill
capital penalty decision is a moment when jurors step out of their normal
fact-finding roles and become moral agents. The jury's decision to
impose death "rests on not a legal but an ethical judgment,"' giving it
unusually direct lines to the study of moral decisionmaking conducted by
psychologist Carol Gilligan and philosopher Nel Noddings, the sources
of much relational feminist legal theory. Finally, capital sentencing has
no apparent connection to the more limited understanding of women's
issues that a narrower version of feminism would address. Using feminist
theory to address a type of legal violence overwhelmingly directed at
men' tests my claims for the breadth of feminist theory.'
I focus on three aspects of the task of capital jurors. Part II
addresses the death qualification voir dire procedure, through which
potential jurors who indicate unwillingness or unreadiness to impose a
death sentence are removed from the panel of prospective capital jurors.
I assess death qualification in light of feminist commentary on moral
decisionmaking that contrasts a (male) ethic of justice with a (female)
ethic of care.' Death qualification' is a moral inquiry that reveals
aspects of both modes of decisionmaking. This supports my conclusion
that the prime benefit of the relational feminist identification of the ethic
of care is to highlight an important aspect of moral decisionmaking that
is present in the law, but kept hidden because it is too identified with
women, too feminine.
Part III addresses the death penalty decision, the highly discretionary
conclusion that a certain defendant should be executed. The Eighth
Amendment squeezes the capital sentencing task from two opposite
directions. On one hand, any automatic death sentence is impermissible;
the decision to kill must be individualized, taking into account the unique,
particular circumstances of each capital defendant.' On the other hand,
1623 (1986) ("Capital cases . . . disclose far more of the structure of judicial
interpretation than do other cases.").
22. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 481 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part & dissenting in part).
23. My argument elsewhere that feminists should oppose executions includes a
discussion of why relatively few women are sentenced to be executed. See Joan W.
Howarth, Review Essay: Feminism, Lawyering, and Death Row, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 401 (1992).
24. See Robin West, Feminism, Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
59, 62 ("[Feminist legal theorists should keep our focus on patriarchal violence ....");
Howarth, supra note 23.
25. See generally GILLIGAN, supra note 16; NODDINGS, supra note 16.
26. "States must confer on the sentencer sufficient discretion to take account of
the 'character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the
particular offense' to ensure that 'death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.'"
Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 898 (1993) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.)). In
Woodson, the Court struck down North Carolina's mandatory provision for the death
penalty for all first degree murderers because of its "failure to allow the particularized
consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant
before the imposition upon him of a sentence of death." Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303.
1994:1345 1351
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the required discretion must be exercised without arbitrariness, which
means that clear limits and standards must frame the sentencer's
discretion. 7 Gendered dualisms are central to this core tension in
constitutionally-required guided discretion. Capital sentencing is a
conflicting amalgam of rules and context, deemed rules. It is a
whiplashed process that bounces between distance and connection, but is
said to be removed. It is a confused mixture of emotion and reason,
passing as reason. The rule-based, removed, reasoned decision is
applauded as reliable. The legal doctrine describes a struggle and victory
of "male" over "female" values: reason over emotion, reliability over
confusion, objectivity over context. The language hides the troublesome
feminine side, giving it a masculine cover.'
Part IV considers the gender in the peculiar choice of a jury, rather
than a judge, for the capital sentencing decision." Jurors are given this
moral task so that it will be a personal, human decision made by people
who reflect the emotions and values of the community. In many ways,
these explanations reinforce the suggestion that the jury represents female
decisionmaking, a judge, male.' Capital jurors are locked within a
feminine institution, allowed to be emotional, unpredictable, and
mysterious, but required to be passive, hidden, and subservient. Once the
gendered nature of the romance and condescension surrounding the jury
is acknowledged, multiple benefits from allowing the jury more authority
and control-that is, allowing it to be more masculine-are possible.
Mandatory death penalty statutes are unconstitutional because they consider "all persons
convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but as
members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the
penalty of death." Id. at 304.
27. "States must limit and channel the discretion of judges and juries to ensure
that death sentences are not meted out 'wantonly' or 'freakishly.'" Graham, 113 S. Ct.
at 898 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), decided the same day as Woodson, 428 U.S.
280, held that a state could impose capital punishment if the sentencer's discretion was
directed and limited so as to minimize the risk that the death penalty would be applied
arbitrarily. Id. at 198. Of the vast commentary on capital jurisprudence, especially
helpful discussions of guided discretion are found in WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH
PENALTY IN THE EIoHTIEs: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT (1987), and Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SuP. CT. REV.
305.
28. C. NAFFINE, supra note 12, at 13; see also Olson, supra note 8, at 208
("[Llaw is as irrational, subjective, concrete and contextualized as it is rational, objective,
abstract and principled.").
29. Of the 37 states with capital punishment statutes, only Arizona, Idaho,
Montana, and Nebraska give the jury no role in capital sentencing. See ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-703 (1989 & Supp. 1993) (pre-sentence hearing before the court alone); IDAHO
CODE § 19-2515 (1987) (court conducts pre-sentence hearing); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-
18-301 (1993) (hearing conducted before court alone); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1989)
(determination made by judge or panel of judges). See generally Spaziano v. Florida, 468
U.S. 447, 463-64 n.9 (1984).
30. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a
Woman's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 49 (1985).
1352
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Finally, I have attempted in this Article to use what I understand to
be feminist methodology. 1 For example, my research has included
interviews with a dozen actual capital jurors32 in order to ground my
theories in experience. 3 My choice to examine this moment in law is
based in part on the feminist choice to examine a particular setting of
power.' Yet using these dichotomies as my organizing structure risks
reinforcing rather than weakening the grip of these dichotomies. 5
As a law clerk, William Rehnquist wrote to Justice Clark that the
"highest court of the nation" was handling death penalty cases "like a
bunch of old women."' The fact that we have a good idea what he
meant, and that we know for certain that it was not praise, reminds us of
31. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 829 (1990); Mary Jane Mossman, Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference It
Makes, 3 AUSTL. J. L. & SOc'Y 30 (1986).
32. I interviewed 12 people who had participated in California death penalty
juries, nine of whom sat on juries that resulted in death verdicts, and three of whom sat
on juries that resulted in life without possibility of parole. I selected jurors from six
different cases. I conducted these interviews, not unaware of potential problems,
including bias, self-enhancing memory distortions, and inability to report complex
processes. See, e.g., Mark Costanzo & Sally Costanzo, Jury Decision Making in the
Penalty Phase, 16 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 185, 190 (1992). In order to eliminate any
possibility of impacting ongoing litigation, I interviewed jurors only in closed cases.
Since capital litigation generally continues until the death of the condemned, my
interviews of jurors who sat on juries that rendered verdicts of death were confined to
cases where the defendant had died in prison, during the pendency of his appeal or habeas
litigation. In every case, I was the first person to tell the juror that the person he or she
had sentenced to death had died prior to execution.
33. See NODDiNGS, supra note 16, at 101.
We must ask, then, after the effects of capital punishment on jurors, on
judges, on jailers, on wardens, on newspersons "covering" the execution, on
ministers visiting the condemned, on citizens affirming the sentence, on
doctors certifying first that the condemned is well enough to be executed and
second that he is dead.
Id.
34. See, e.g., EISENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 18-19 ("Mhe male body takes its
engendered privilege with it to particular sites; the privilege is not uniquely and
independently constituted in each instance."); SMART, supra note 11, at 68 ("Feminist
work has a growing affinity with the idea of analyzing the micro-politics of power
35. Cf EISENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 9 ("The challenge to duality is still
(historically) structured by duality."); Sara Ruddick, Remarks on the Sexual Politics of
Reason, in WoMEN AND MORAL THEORY 237, 239 (Eva Feder Kittay & Diana T. Meyers
eds., 1987) ("[I]t is difficult even to state women's difference without adopting the
dichotomies that male reason has invented. To say that women are intuitive, personal,
emotional, particularistic is not a critique of male reason, but an endorsement of its
categories."); Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
254, 308 (1992) (most important "limitation bounding feminist discourse" is that
"criticism of existing practices must issue from within those very practices"). My hope
is to explode the categories. But see AUDRE LORDE, The Master's Tools Will Never
Dismantle the Master's House, in SISTER OUTSIDER 100 (1984).
36. DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST
SUPREME COURT 34 (1992).
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the grip of gender. We know that Rehnquist did not choose the metaphor
of old women to suggest that the Court's handling of capital cases was
marked by wisdom, endurance, and strength. More likely he meant that
the Court was too nervous about executions, perhaps too fussy, and
certainly too weak. Rehnquist wanted the capital doctrine produced by
the most authoritative court to be clear, forceful, and more-well, manly.
That today Chief Justice Rehnquist would choose a gender-neutral
metaphor does not mean that the aspirations to address the death penalty
in a masculine way have disappeared; they are simply more hidden.
Although the work of revealing the gender in a legal doctrine is more
difficult than separating the lace and frills from the tool belts and leather,
those of us trying to understand the law must not allow the myth of
gender blindness to continue to obscure our vision. Law is gendered; we
need only to look carefully. 7 This Article is such a look at one
especially forceful moment in law; the moment-which actually stretches
into days, weeks, and even months-that ordinary people must decide
whether some other person, usually not ordinary, will be killed.
II. DEATH QUALIFICATION: Too MUCH CARING, OR
NOT ENOUGH?
A capital juror confronts conscience twice: ultimately, the moral
engagement occurs during deliberations on penalty, at the very end of the
proceedings; but penalty deliberations are foreshadowed at the outset of
the trial during death. qualification, the part of voir dire in which the
conscience of an individual juror is probed on his or her willingness to
impose death. Under well-established doctrine, 8  people who are
conscientiously opposed to the death penalty in all cases are not qualified
to sit on juries in cases in which the prosecutor seeks death.39  A
37. For such careful looks, see NAFFINE, supra note 12, at 26-27 (reviewing
feminist critiques of "the dichotomous view of the world advanced by liberal philosophy,"
including legal reasoning); EISENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 20; Karl Johnson & Ann Scales,
An Absolutely, Positively True Story: Seven Reasons Why We Sing, 16 N.M. L. REv. 433,
447 (1986).
The discourse regarding law-its objectivity, its neutrality, its fairness-is
constructed through political discourse concerning sex and gender premised
on the duality of man/woman. Therefore, the usual politics of liberal law(s)
is presented as though it were neutral, and thinking about the law as though
it were objective and fair allows this presentation.
Id.
38. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (no constitutional violation in
excusing jurors whose attitudes against death penalty would substantially impair
performance of their duty); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968) (created
death qualification, excludingjurors who would invariably or "automatically" vote against
the death penalty, but not if they simply "voiced general objections" or "expressed
conscientious or religious scruples").
39. Similarly, jurors who insist on imposing a death sentence in every case are
excludable for cause. See Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992). The Court has
consistently upheld death qualification in spite of data that suggest death qualification
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principled, conscientious objection to killing is officially a disqualification
from service.' ° The inquiry requires a person to search her conscience
regarding her own participation in capital punishment; 1 as such, it
implicates the relational feminist theories of contrasting modes of moral
decisionmaking: the female ethic of care and the male ethic of justice.
A. Care or Justice
Drawing on the work of developmental psychologist Carol
Gilligan,' 2 relational feminists posit two modes of moral decisionmaking:
the dominant ethic of justice and the devalued ethic of care.' 3 As
described by Gilligan, the ethic of care is a "different voice" in moral
decisionmaking that "requires for its resolution a mode of thinking that
is contextual and narrative rather than formal and abstract."' Unlike
the autonomous individuals who inhabit the world of justice, deeply
interrelated and connected people inhabit the world of caring. 5 Justice
is associated with rules, hierarchy, and disinterested decisionmaking, as
undertaken by autonomous individuals; care is associated with contextual,
connected, and relational modes of solving moral problems.'
creates a conviction-pronejury. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
40. For a thoughtful discussion of the Supreme Court's diminished respect for
conscientious objection to the death penalty, see Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court:
The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1741, 1746-48,1788 (1987).
41. 1 interviewed two jurors who had rendered a death verdict against a defendant
who served as his own attorney. Some of their strongest memories of the trial involved
his questioning them about their willingness to sentence him to death. The foreman
recounted: "The defendant said, 'would you like to see me fry?' I looked him in the eye
and said 'yes.'" Interview with Gilbert W. Hofeller, Foreman in People v. Fuller, No.
A085235 (Los Angeles Cty. Super. Ct. 1982), in Pacific Palisades, Cal. (Aug. 2, 1991)
[hereinafter Hofeller Interview]. Anotherjuror remembered: "He asked me and I looked
him in the eye and I said '[you'll] never do it again.'" Interview with Florence K. Stark
in Beverly Hills, Cal. (Oct. 18, 1991) [hereinafter Stark Interview].
42. Gilligan's work, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE, supra note 16, has been especially
influential.
43. See NAFFINE, supra note 12, at 11-12 (describing "second-phase" feminists
who draw on Gilligan's work); Eva Feder Kittay & Diana T. Meyers, Introduction to
WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY, supra note 35, at 3 (describing ethics of care and justice);
Joan M. Shaughnessey, Gilligan's Travels, 7 LAW AND INEQUALITY 1 (1988) (assessing
limited application of ethic of care to reform legal system).
44. GILLIGAN, supra note 16, at 19.
45. Gilligan explains:
As a framework for moral decision, care is grounded in the assumption that
self and other are interdependent, an assumption reflected in a view of action
as responsive and, therefore, as arising in relationship rather than the view of
action as emanating from within the self and, therefore, "self-governed."
GILLIGAN, supra note 16, at 31; see also West, supra note 16.
46. Robin West, Feminism and Social Theory, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59. "We
might conclude that moral ideals and moral inclinations derive from the quiet love of the
mother, rather than from the discursive guidance of the father." Id. at 82. "[Olur moral
1994:1345 1355
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The ethic of justice is associated with men; the ethic of care with
women. 7 The ethic of care shifts the moral question from "'What is
justT' to 'How to respond? ' "" Gilligan has suggested:
The strength of women's moral perceptions lies in the refusal of
detachment and depersonalization, and insistence on making
connections that can lead to seeing the person killed in war or
living in poverty as someone's son or father or brother or sister,
or mother, or daughter, or friend.'
Feminist legal scholars have drawn upon these concepts of the ethics
of care and justice to critique conventional legal methodology, which is
said to reflect the ethic of justice,' and to suggest specific legal reforms
that could come from incorporating caring into law."' The unusually
stark, nonhypothetical52 confrontation with conscience at the heart of
death qualification invites assessment, using these contrasting modes of
moral decisionmaking.
inclinations are rooted not in our uttered "principles" of any sort, but rather, in
distinctively life-giving and entirely non-verbal feelings and actions." Id. at 83; see also
Judith Resnick, On the Bias, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1911 (1988) (describing Gilligan's
ethic of care).
47. Carol Gilligan, Moral Orientation and Moral Development, in WOMEN AND
MORAL THEORY, supra note 35, at 25-26; GILLIGAN, supra note 16, at 2.
48. Gilligan, supra note 47, at 23.
49. Id. at 32.
50. E.g., Ellen Dubois et al., Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A
Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11, 47 (1985) [hereinafter Conversation]; see also
Deborah Rhode, Feminist Perspectives on Legal Ideology, in WHAT Is FEMINISM? (Juliet
Mitchell & Ann Oakley eds., 1986) (calling to "build on broader feminist values that
transcend the legal individualist legacy"); Ann Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence,
56 IND. L.J. 375 (1986) (drawing on Gilligan to contrast female ethic of care with male
rights-based approach).
51. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38
J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988); Trina Grillb, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for
Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1601 (1991); Kenneth Karst, Women's Constitution, 1984
DUKE L.J. 447 (using Gilligan's dichotomy of rights and care-based systems of moral
development to imagine and describe a reconstituted and feminized constitutional
doctrine); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 30; Resnik, supra note 46; Suzanna Sherry, Civic
Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986).
52. Marilyn Friedman has criticized Gilligan's reliance on answers to merely
hypothetical moral questions:
Nobility of moral concern is especially easy to affect when one is merely
responding to a test interviewer or, for some other reason, when real
commitment is not measured and deeds need not follow upon words. Of
course, some individuals in our world really do steal to save the lives of
strangers. But most people who judge that "one" should do so are not in fact
displaying a genuine readiness to act. Most such judgments are cut off from
any link with practice.
Marilyn Friedman, Care and Context in Moral Reasoning, in WOMEN AND MORAL
THEORY, supra note 35, at 199-200.
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B. Death Qualification: Triumph of Justice
Death qualification could be explained as a classic (and predictable)
victory of the ethic of justice over the ethic of caring. Jurors are
disqualified if they are unable to set aside their own personal,
conscientious squeamishness about voting to execute. In order to serve,
they must have the ability to follow the law, rather than conscience, as to
killing another person. The disqualified, former potential jurors are
responding to the individual circumstances of their own personalized
morality, rather than the ruled system that they confront. The disqualified
are unwilling to subjugate conscience to the principle of law that permits
an execution; such people are excluded because adherence to principle-a
hallmark of the ethic of justice53-is required. The person who
adamantly insists that death is never justified, or that she would never
vote to impose death, is lawless, and must be expelled.' Thus, the
death qualification doctrine appears very much in the justice mode, where
hard and fast obedience to principle is validated and required.
This apparent "justice" mode of death qualification suggests that
disqualified jurors could be operating from the alternative caring
perspective. This claim is not simply that "caring" people are less likely
to support the death penalty. Two people with similar positions on the
policy or legality of capital punishment will reach different results on
death qualification if they have different reactions to personal
participation.55 Perhaps the potential jurors excluded are people who
more easily see the defendant in question as some mother's son,' or
53. See NODDINGS, supra note 16, at 44.
54. In Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176 (1986), Justice Rehnquist,
speaking for the Court, characterized those with conscientious scruples against the death
penalty as neither "willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the
rule of law," nor to "conscientiously obey the law with respect to one of the issues in a
capital case." Id. at 176.
55. For example, one juror described this tension in two fellow jurors: "mhese
two women were torn. They thought he should get the death penalty but they didn't want
to be responsible for giving him the penalty." Hofeller Interview, supra note 41; see
Kenneth C. Hass & James A. Inciardi, Lingering Doubts About a Popular Punishment,
in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACHES 11
(1988) ("This great reluctance to impose the death penalty in particular cases provides
strong evidence that people's willingness to endorse capital punishment in the abstract is
not necessarily an accurate measure of their willingness to put it into practice."); see also
Valerie P. Hans, Death by Jury, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra, at 153-
54 ("It is one matter to tell friends or an interviewer that one is for or against capital
punishment, and another affair entirely to speculate in the formal setting of the courtroom
about whether or not one could render a death sentence.") (endnote omitted). Of course,
for many people the realization that one would not want to impose a death sentence is one
reason not to support the death penalty as public policy.
56. For one female juror, the "one thing that probably bothered me the
most ... [was] when I heard how old [the defendant] was. I have a son the same age,
and I'm sitting there thinking, oh my god, my son is the same age as him and look what
has happened to him. Oh god, that would be awful to happen to your son. It would be
1994:1345 1357
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believe that voting to execute is voting to end that person's web of
connection.57 Demographic data appears to support the claim that death
qualification excludes people who use the female ethic of caring; women
of all races are disproportionately disqualified." (Thus, the feminist
insistence on noticing where women are excluded from laws supports
scrutiny of death qualification.)
This disparate disqualification of women based on their refusal to kill
implicates controversies raging on several fronts engendered by or related
to Gilligan's work. Although the caring voice is certainly feminine, in
that it is associated with women, any claim that it accurately describes or
distinguishes women is problematic. Indeed, the apparent association
between exclusion of a "female" mode of moral decisionmaking and the
exclusion of women means less than it seems; women are not the only
ones disproportionately disqualified through this process. Black men are
as well.' In fact, death qualification also knocks out the poor, non-
terrible. I mean I could identify with the age .... [My son] is the same age and so [11
can look at it a little more personally than somebody else might." Stark Interview, supra
note 41.
57. Cf Deborah Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and
Cultural Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731, 1749 (1991) (issue of women in the military raises
questions about women's greater willingness to see targets as people and men's greater
willingness to kill impersonally).
58. See, e.g., Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 231 n.9 (8th Cir. 1985) (not
reaching claim raised pursuant to district court finding that death qualification resulted in
"systematic disproportionate removal" of women), overruled sub nom. Lockhart v.
McCree, 474 U.S. 162 (1986); People v. Fields, 673 P.2d 680, 690 n.7 (Cal. 1983)
(recognizing that death qualification causes disproportionate exclusion of women but
finding that potential problem alleviated by practice of also excluding automatic voters for
the death penalty, assumed to be more male and white), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892
(1984); Hovey v. Superior Court, 616 P.2d 1301, 1337-39 (Cal. 1980) (describing data
showing that more women than men are excludable through death qualification); Michael
Finch & Mark Ferraro, The Empirical Challenge to Death Qualified Juries: On Further
Examination, 65 NEB. L. REV. 21, 44-49 (1986) (summarizing five studies, each of which
showed that more women than men were excluded pursuant to death qualification); Bruce
Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An Empirical
Study and ConstitutionalAnalysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (1982) (finding that women
venirepersons were slightly more likely than men to have voiced opposition to the death
penalty).
59. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 227-39 (1990); Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism
in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 595-601 (1990); Abbe Smith, Rosie
O'Neill Goes to Law School, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1993); Heather
Wishnik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist Jurisprudence, 1 BERKELEY
WoMEN's L.J. 64, 68 (1985); West, supra note 46, at 66. "Patriarchy has mostly
produced silence from women . . . . We ought instead [of discourse to] study the
production of silence." Id.
60. See, e.g., Grigsby, 758 F.2d at 231 n.9 (Blacks subject to "systematic
disproportionate removal"); Fields, 673 P.2d at 692 n.7 (same); Hovey, 616 P.2d at 1338-
39 (same); Finch & Ferraro, supra note 58, at 44-49 (Blacks disproportionately excluded).
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Christians, and Democrats." Identifying death disqualification as caring
and the caring mode as female erases a variety of other factors, especially
including race, that are also operating to change the face of the capital
juries through death disqualification.' Is the different voice of caring
used by all women, as well as men who are poor, Black, non-Christian,
or registered Democrats?
Assuming that death qualification expels those using the ethic of
caring, these demographic data seem to support the charge that the ethic
of caring is not so much a female mode of moral decisionmaking as it is
a mode of powerlessness.' Many of the categories of people
disproportionately excluded consist of people with relatively little power
in society. Death qualification compounds whatever powerlessness they
bring to the selection process, in that they are disproportionately excluded
from the most powerful role given to jurors, the choice to kill or not. Is
death qualification a telling example of men of color and all women using
the caring voice, acting out of powerlessness to give up more power?
61. "Jews, agnostics, atheists, the poor, and Democrats are also disproportionately
eliminated. Jurors who survive death qualification are demographically distinctive: They
are more likely to be male, to be white, to be well-off financially, to be Republican, and
to be Protestant or Catholic." Hans, supra note 55, at 151 (endnote omitted).
Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992), upheld the exclusion of potential jurors
who acknowledge that they will automatically vote for death, which might serve to
exclude disproportionate numbers of white men. See Fields, 673 P.2d at 690 n.7
(potential disproportionate exclusion of women and Blacks alleviated by practice of also
excluding automatic voters for the death penalty, assumed to be more male and white).
Perhaps this explains the vehemence of Justice Scalia's dissent in Morgan. Scalia offers
the author of Exodus and Immanuel Kant as examples of the kind of people who would
be (unfairly) excluded under Morgan, but makes no explicit reference to the silencing of
white men implicit in the decision. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
62. Caring has been associated with an Afrocentric standpoint. See PATRICIA
HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDOE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE
PoLITIcs OF EMPOWERMENT 215-19 (1990). "The convergence of Afrocentric and
feminist values in the ethic of caring seems particularly acute." Id. at 217; see Sandra
Harding, The Curious Coincidence of Feminine and African Moralities: Challenges for
Feminist Theory, in WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY, supra note 35, at 296; see also Robert
S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-
Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1241 (1993). Ascribing a set of
qualities to .women ignores differences among women and reinforces dominant, unstated
and unexamined assumptions that womanhood is the same thing as white womanhood.
See, e.g., Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581 (1990). Dominant constructions of masculine and feminine, male and female,
and men and women embody class and race bias. I have written elsewhere, for example,
that the assertion "women are not executed" mistakenly uses white, middle-class women
to (mis)represent all women. See Howarth, supra note 23. My fundamental premise here
is that dominant, dichotomous constructions of "masculine," "feminine," "female,"
"male," "man," and "woman" are not accurate reflections of the diverse lives of real
women and men. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
63. See, e.g., Joan Tronto, Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care, 12
SIONS 644, 649 (1987); Conversation, supra note 50, at 25-30. The ethic of care has also
been associated with Afrocentric and Asian moral theories. See supra note 62.
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Gilligan acknowledges that the ethic of care includes a reluctance to
judge, but she identifies that reluctance with moral maturity, not political
powerlessness: "The reluctance to judge remains a reluctance to hurt, but
one that stems not from a sense of personal vulnerability but rather from
a recognition of the limitation of judgment itself." 6" Does death
qualification remove those with a caring-based general reluctance to make
any moral judgment'?' If so, death qualification-and the ethic of
care-is as much a failure of agency or autonomy as a triumph of
conscience.
The disproportionate disqualification of women in death qualification
also implicates other problems related to valorizing women's distinct
virtue.' Is there (female) virtue in refusing to participate in a capital
case? Is this an example of a "higher" feminine morality?"7  The
relational feminist valorizing of a (woman's) caring voice echoes early
arguments for bringing women onto juries in order to civilize the juries,
and make them more humane,' which in turn sound very much like
traditional arguments for keeping women off all juries. Is refusing to
consider killing a convicted murderer caring for the wrong person, the
main error within the ethic of care acknowledged by Gilligan?
64. GILLIGAN, supra note 16, at 102.
65. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 52, at 191-203.
66. Moral philosophers Kittay and Meyers describe the "insidious" potential "trap
in the assignment of distinct and positive virtues to women: the altruism considered more
characteristic of women conflicted with the possibility of autonomy." Kittay & Meyers,
supra note 43, at 8-9 (citing Larry Blum et al., Altruism and Women's Oppression, in 5
THE PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM: WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY 222 (1974) (special issue)); see
MARGARET ADAMS, The Compassion Trap, in WOMEN IN SEXIST SOCIETY (Vivian
Gornick & Barbara Morgan eds., 1972). But see CAROL MCMILLAN, WOMAN, REASON,
AND NATURE: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS WITH FEMINISM (1982) (arguing that "it
is their failure to accept the human condition that moves feminists to want to suppress sex
difference, and that women have distinct virtues that are not self-victimizing and do not
destroy agency").
67. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 57, at 1739 ("Female jurors' elevating and
refining influence" might similarly enhance the quality of justice available to all citizens)
(citing WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW 330 (Marlene Wortman ed., 1984)); see also Garfinkle
et al., Women's Servitude Under Law, in LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE: ESSAYS TO
DEMYSTIFY LAW, ORDER AND THE COURTS 105 (Robert Lefcourt ed., 1971). "Given
women's moral sensibilities and nurturing values, their involvement could 'purify'
politics." Rhode, supra note 57, at 1739 (citation omitted). For historical references
related to the special morality that women might bring to the jury, see generally Carol
Weisbrod, Images of the Woman Juror, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 59, 62, 64, 70, 71
(1986).
68. Carol Weisbrod quotes a 1891 suffragist: "Mhe feminine heart, the maternal
influence, are needed in the court-room as well as in the home." Weisbrod, supra note
67, at 71. Weisbrod quotes from a 1936 article written by a judge: "The presence of
women jurors ...has stopped the sneering of the unfeeling and the kindly motherly
sympathy of women in the jury box has drawn from witnesses the necessary details of
testimony which made conviction possible." Id. at 72 n.43.
69. See Gilligan, supra note 47, at 19, 32.
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C. Death Qualification: Victory for Caring
These many questions raised by associating the excluded with the
ethic of caring are eclipsed by the larger question of whether the excluded
should be linked to the ethic of care at all. Death qualification may be
fairly characterized as bringing the different voice of caring into the
capital trial, rather than expelling it. Death qualification requires a
person to place herself into the moral dilemma, just as does the caring
mode. The juror is not asked whether the death penalty is ever
appropriate, but instead is asked whether she could ever impose a death
sentence. This question reflects personalized responsibility. The question
is not simply "do you support the death penalty?" or "is the death penalty
just?"; the questioning places the potential juror within the problem,
asking her the core question of caring, "How will you respond? " '
Beyond that, the disqualified jurors might be cast away precisely
because of their justice mode of moral decisionmaking. We can fairly
characterize the person who refuses to bend her conscience to the capital
punishment law as a person who rests on a hard and fast principle of
refusal to even consider whether an execution would be correct in a
particular situation. The person who refuses to impose a death sentence,
no matter what the circumstances, adheres to an overreaching principle
that negates the need to examine (at all, let alone carefully) the individual
circumstances of the particular crime and defendant. In the caring mode,
of course, much depends on the particular circumstances. The caring
mode would not permit a juror to refuse to impose an execution in all
cases, as a matter of principle: "While I must not kill in obedience to law
or principle, I may not, either, refuse to kill in obedience to principle.
To remain one-caring, I might have to kill."71 If voting to execute
would indeed save someone else, voting to execute could be a caring
decision. Thus, death qualification arguably represents a moment of
caring in the law, in that it requires the triumph of contextualization over
rule or principle. Death qualification allows into the group of
decisionmakers only people who are able to make a determination based
on the individualized context surrounding the defendant and his crime.
Death qualification protects the caring, individualized, contextual
deliberations that will follow.' What then do we make of the
disproportionate exclusion of women?
70. Id. at 23 (suggesting that the ethic of care asks "How to respond?").
71. NODDINGS, supra note 16, at 102.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 116-25 (discussing discretionary nature of
capital decision).
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D. Care, Justice, and Gender in Death Qualification
This inquiry leads to three related conclusions: at first glance, death
qualification appears to exclude the caring and reward the just; closer
scrutiny reveals aspects of both caring and justice on both sides of death
qualification; thus, the female, caring side is present in death
qualification, but somewhat hidden.
My conclusion that aspects of justice and care are found on both
sides of death qualification invites a larger criticism, namely, that the
ethic of care and ethic of justice posed by relational feminists merely
replicate an overly simplistic dichotomy, reinforcing dualistic thinking and
the reassuringly uncomplicated female/male dichotomy.' Gilligan
attempts to sidestep this criticism by claiming that the ethics of care and
justice are not opposites, but rather like the "figure ground shift in an
ambiguous figure perception."74 Indeed, the metaphor of a figure
ground shift fits the death qualification analysis quite well; depending on
one's focus, either the caring or justice mode can be found in those who
are kicked off the jury, as well as those who survive.
Perhaps the ethics of caring and justice do not accurately describe
men and women, but more accurately reveal one aspect of conventional
aspirations to masculinity and femininity.75 Thus, death qualification can
be deeply gendered in a way that is not closely related to either the caring
73. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Bartlett, Beyond EitherlOr: Justice and Care in the
Ethics ofAlbert Camus, in EXPLORATIONS IN FEMINIST ETHICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE
82 (Eve B. Cole & Susan Coultrap7McQuin eds., 1992) (using the work of Camus to
show the interrelatedness ofjustice and care perspectives); Eve B. Cole & Susan Coultrap-
McQuin, Toward a Feminist Conception of Moral Life, in EXPLORATIONS IN FEMINST
ETHICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra, at 1, 6; Berenice Fisher & Joan Tronto, Toward
a Feminist Theory of Caring, in CIRCLES OF CARE: WORK AND IDENTITY IN WOMEN'S
LIVES 35, 39 (Emily K. Abel & Margaret K. Nelson eds., 1990) ("[Olur experience of
caring is not reflected in the related moral claim that 'justice' and 'caring' constitute
different perspectives on human life."); Friedman, supra note 52, at 203 ("Thus,
contextual detail matters overridingly to matters of justice as well as to matters of care
and relationships."); Patricia Ward Scaltsas, Do Feminist Ethics Counter Feminist Aims?,
in EXPLORATIONS IN FEMINIST ETHICS, supra, at 15, 23 ("The danger is that these female
values, ways of thinking, and experiences will degenerate into the traditional dichotomies
between male and female capacities and characteristics which have been used to try to
justify excluding women from educational, professional, and political opportunities and
locking them into roles of irrational love-givers or love-giving simpletons.").
74. Gilligan explains that justice and caring are not
opposites or mirror-images of one another, with justice uncaring and care
unjust. From a justice perspective, the self as moral agent stands as the figure
against a ground of social relationships, judging the conflicting claims of self
and others against a standard of equality or equal respect (the Categorical
Imperative, the Golden Rule). From a care perspective, the relationship
becomes the figure, defining self and others.
Gilligan, supra note 47, at 22-23; see also id. at 30-31.
75. These constructions are powerful, although they also reflect racial and class
exclusions. See, e.g., Howarth, supra note 23, at 417 (describing construction of
womanhood that excludes women of color).
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or justice modes of moral decisionmaking. For example, one explanation
for women's disparate exclusion from death penalty juries is that the
concept of "feminine" to which many women aspire does not include
readiness to do violence.76 Many jurors described voting to execute as
tough, difficult, fearsome work. "I think [a juror who voted for life] took
the easy way out . . . . It is a very difficult thing."' One juror
vehemently discounted people who claimed to be too sensitive for such a
task: "[lit isn't that you're too tender-hearted; you're chicken shit."'
Willingness to publicly back away from such an experience would be
inevitably impacted by personal identities or aspirations of femininity and
masculinity. The fact that women are disproportionately disqualified
could reflect a feminine reluctance to dirty oneself with the nasty aspects
of violence, contrasted to the perceived masculinity in the readiness to
kill.' The disqualified may simply be more willing to publicly
acknowledge what can be perceived to be a feminine discomfort with
violence; the disqualified may be simply more willing to publicly appear
soft. Death qualification is the first way that the capital juror's
experience differs from other jurors; it foreshadows the moral work that
follows during penalty deliberations.
III. THE DECISION
The law used to determine whether a criminal defendant should be
killed operates within three central, gendered dualisms: rules against
context; distance against connection; and reason against emotion. All of
these are at work in the decision to kill. Capital jurisprudence, like other
areas of law, aspires to a masculine version of itself, which consists of
rule-based, distanced, and reasoned decisionmaking. The ever-present
contextual, proximate, and emotional aspects of the decision to kill are
vehemently hidden and disowned within the doctrine.
76. See Karst, supra note 6 (ascribing readiness to use violence as part of
masculine (aspirational) gender).
77. "[S]ome people, even though they said one thing [in death qualification], were
not able to do it." Interview with Rich Neider, Juror in People v. Jackson, No. 074222
(Alameda County Super. Ct. 1983), in San Francisco, Cal. (Apr. 2, 1991) [hereinafter
Neider Interview]. Not all jurors experienced the task as difficult; one reported: "We
knew that we were right and we had no discussion or argument whatsoever. All we
wanted to do was get rid of the guy." She evaluated the experience: "It was quite nice,
good food, we just really enjoyed ourselves." Interview with Eleanor Manchester, Juror
in People v. Guzman, No. 38466 (El Dorado Cty. Super. Ct. 1981), in S. Lake Tahoe,
Cal. (Aug. 5, 1992) [hereinafter Manchester Interview].
78. Interiew with Carole Anne Boisvert, Foreperson in People v. Craine, No.
A645780 (Los Angeles Cty. Super. Ct. 1989), in Carson, Cal. (Aug. 1, 1991) [hereinafter
Boisvert Interview]. She continued, 'You don't believe [in] the system in which you live.
I think if you were really tough then you would figure that they should a/ hang." Id.
79. "Capital punishment is warfare writ small." Burt, supra note 40, at 1764.
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A. Rules vs. Discretion
1. THE CHAOS OF DISCRETION AS FEMALE
Misogynist thinkers have long blamed women for being incapable of
making decisions on the basis of neutral, overarching principles.'
Similarly, the (female) ethic of care identified and promoted by relational
feminists81 addresses moral decisions by using the specific factual
context of the situation, rather than by applying neutral principles or
rules.' Nel Noddings claims that women reject the rule-based
decisionmaking of traditional moral reasoning: "Instead of proceeding
deductively from principles superimposed on situations, women seek to
'fill out' hypothetical situations in a defensible move toward
concretization."' Recognition of the ethic of caring as a neglected
(female) mode of moral decisionmaking has led many feminist legal
scholars to call for increased attention to contextual reasoning! in
addressing a variety of legal dilemmas:85 "Is the search for facts a
80. Consider Schopenhauer:
The weakness of [women's] reasoning faculty also explains why is it that
women show more sympathy for the unfortunate than men do, and so treat
them with more kindness and interest; and why it is that, on the contrary, they
are inferior to men in point of justice, and less honourable and conscientious.
For it is just because their reasoning power is weak that present circumstances
have such a hold over them, and those concrete things which lie directly
before their eyes exercise a power which is seldom counteracted to any extent
by abstract principles of thought, by fixed rules of conduct, firm resolutions,
or, in general, by consideration for the past and the future, or in regard of
what is absent or remote.
Kittay & Meyers, supra note 43, at 14 (quoting ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, On Women,
in PHILOSOPHY OF WOMAN 146 (Mary B. Mahowald ed., 1978)).
81. See generally GILLIGAN, supra note 16; NODDINGS, supra note 16.
82. See Cole & Coultrap-McQuin, supra note 73, at 2 ("In feminist ethics,
thinkers emphasize that the particular context, not abstract principles of right and wrong,
must shape and inform morally appropriate choices."); supra text accompanying notes 42-
48.
83. NODDINGS, supra note 16, at 36. The attributes which Noddings ascribes to
women, I would describe as feminine; that is, a false, over-simplified social construction
of what it is to be female.
84. See, e.g., KatherineT. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV.
829, 849-63 (1990); Emily Calhoun, The Breadth of Context and the Depth of Myth:
Completing the Feminist Paradigm, 4 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 87 (1993); see Grillo,
supra note 51, at 1557 (principles versus context as basis for decisionmaking); Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 30, at 57-58; Smith, supra note 59, at 9; Paul J. Spiegelman,
Integrating Doctrine, Theory and Practice in the Law School Curriculum: The Logic of
Jake's Ladder in the Context of Amy's Web, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 243, 255-61 (1988);
Catherine Wells, Situated Decisionmaking, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1728 (1990).
85. E.g., Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love,
Compassion, and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1011, 1051 (1989) (discussing importance
of judicial attention to the individual facts of plaintiffs' lives in the context of abortion);
Ruth Colker, Abortion & Dialogue, 63 TuL. L. REV. 1363, 1377-79 (1989) (same);
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the
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feminine search for context and the search for legal principles a masculine
search for certainty and abstract rules?"' Thus traditionally and within
relational feminism, masculine rules bring order to female
contextuality 87
The caring mode provides a different approach to punishment: "The
traditional approach, that of the father, is to ask under what principle the
case falls. But the mother may wish to ask more about the culprit and his
victims. She may begin by thinking, What if this were my child? " "
Noddings retells the story of Manlius to illustrate how female caring
differs from what she calls the "devotion to principle" of "traditional
masculine ethics." Manlius ordered the execution of his own son, who
happened to be one of the first to disobey Manlius' prior warning that
anyone who left camp to engage in individual combat would be executed.
Manlius' ethic of justice required obedience to the principle he had set,
rather than attention to context or individualized circumstances, however
dramatic." Such complex factual circumstances merely distract within
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589, 606-10 (1986) (describing efforts in State
v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977), to include a Native American woman's
perspective into the instructions by which the jurors were asked to determine her
culpability).
86. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 30, at 49. "When we value 'objectivity,' or a
'right' answer, or a single winner, are we valuing male goals of victory, exclusion,
clarity, predictability?" Id. at 49.
87. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 8, at 66.
Nature represents all that is physical, moved by emotion or instinct rather than
by reason, sunk in subjectivity and particularity. Culture is the triumph of
mind and reason, imposing objective and universal constraints (perhaps most
clearly, although not exclusively, in the form of law) over these forces of
chaos, danger and ignorance.
Id. at 66-67.
88. NODDINOS, supra note 16, at 36-37; see West, supra note 46, at 82; supra
note 56 (juror Stark's comments about sentencing to death a young man the same age as
her son).
We might conclude that morality is grounded in the experience of being cared
for in symbiosis with a protective and nurturant other, rather than in our later
experiences of disciplined, disciplining and verbose authority. We might
conclude that moral ideals and moral inclinations derive from the quiet love
of the mother, rather than from the discursive guidance of the father .... In
other words, we need to understand the possibility that our moral inclinations
are rooted not in our uttered "principles" of any sort, but rather, in
distinctively life-giving and entirely non-verbal feelings and actions.
West, supra note 46, at 83; see also Resnik, supra note 46, at 1911 (describing Gilligan's
ethic of care).
89. Nodding asks:
Why, then, did [Manlius] not think concretely before establishing the
rule? ... For [a woman, by contrast,] the hypothetical is filled with real
persons, and thus, her rules are tempered a priori with thoughts of those in
her inner circle. A stranger might, then, be spared death because she would
not visit death upon her own child. She does not, in whatever personal
agony, inflict death upon her child in devotion to either principle or abstract
entity.
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the justice mode, but they are necessary for caring.' This feminist "call
to context""' implicates the central tension in capital jurisprudence: how
to eliminate arbitrariness from the discretion to impose or refrain from
imposing death, without imposing rules or mandatory sentences. If
individualized capital sentencing is an example of (feminine) contextual
adjudication, then the central theme of modem capital jurisprudence is
how to tame the wild female side of capital decisionmaking 2
2. CAPITAL DOCTRINE: CONTAINING THE CHAOS OF DISCRETION
Historically, death sentences were imposed in this country by juries
granted absolute discretion. Such discretion was probably built into the
death penalty law in part to permit racist use of the death penalty." In
1971, in McGautha v. California," the Supreme Court rejected a Due
Process challenge to untamed discretion in the imposition of death
sentences. Although McGautha upheld the constitutionality of unbridled
discretion," the decision was based on Justice Harlan's deep skepticism
that any alternative was possible:
To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal
homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death
penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which
can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing
authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present human
ability.96
NODDINGS, supra note 16, at 44.
90. Noddings notes:
The [traditional approach] moves immediately to abstraction where its thinking
can take place clearly and logically in isolation from the complicating factors
of particular persons, places, and circumstances; the [approach of the mother]
moves to concretization where its feeling can be modified by the introduction
of facts, the feelings of others, and personal histories.
Id. at 36-37 (contrasting male and female decisionmaking modes).
91. Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Story-Telling, and the Rule of Law: New
Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MIcH L. REV. 2099, 2099 (1989) ("The rebellion against
abstraction has, of late, been characterized by a 'call to context.'"). Professor Massaro
attributes the phrase to Professor Frederick Schauer. Id.
92. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 30, at 58 n.97.
93. HuGo A. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 11 (3d ed. 1982); see
Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 903 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
94. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
95. Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court in McGautha held that neither
substantive standards to control juror discretion nor a bifurcated trial was constitutionally
mandated.
96. 402 U.S. at 204.
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Justice Harlan was not endorsing discretion; he simply despaired that the
rule of law was attainable.Y Even in upholding discretion, McGautha
substantiates the preference in the law for the certainty of rules and
principles, rather than the chaos of details and context.
The following year, the Court returned to the problem of discretion
in capital sentencing, this time holding in Furman v. Georgia" that the
unbridled discretion then allowed violated the Eighth Amendment because
of the freakish and arbitrary way it was imposed. The discretion led,
according to Justice Stewart's famous metaphor, to a pattern whereby
being sentenced to death was as cruel and unusual as being struck by
lightning.' Four years later, the Court purported to solve the problem
identified in Furman with a series of decisions that included Woodson v.
North Carolina'® and Gregg v. Georgia."1 The solution became the
modern theme of guided discretion, by which the chaos of individualized
discretion mandated by Woodson was bounded and channelled as required
by Gregg. These "two competing commandments of the Eighth
Amendment " "° are now accommodated through a bifurcated process in
which a trial on guilt of a capital crime, which narrows the group of
death-eligible defendants, is followed by a separate and more
discretionary penalty trial, in which individualized considerations are
recognized.'0
The requirement that death be imposed only on a person who has
been considered as an individual, in all her uniqueness, reached its zenith
in Lockett v. Ohio." Lockett recognized the Eighth Amendment right
of a capital defendant to have the decisionmaker hear individualized
97. Justice Harlan complained that "[the infinite variety of cases and facets to
each case would make general standards either meaningless 'boilerplate' or a statement
of the obvious that no jury would need." Id. at 208. Justice Brennan's dissent in
McGautha forecast his subsequent conclusion that the death penalty is inconsistent with
our Constitution: "[E]ven if I shared the Court's view that the rule of law and the power
of the States to kill are in irreconcilable conflict, I would have no hesitation in concluding
that the rule of law must prevail." Id. at 249-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan
recognized unguided juror discretion to kill as an "unbridled, unreviewable exercise of
naked power." Id. at 252. Excellent discussions of McGautha are found in Burt, supra
note 40, at 1751-55, and Weisberg, supra note 27, at 308-13.
98. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
99. Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
100. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
101. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
102. Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 898 (1993).
103. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion).
For an excellent description of the penalty trial, what the author calls the "most visible
by-product of the modem era of capital punishment," see WHITE, supra note 27, at 51-74.
104. 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). My usual use of masculine pronouns for capital
defendants reflects that they are generally men. See Howarth, supra note 23. The
defendant in Lockett was Sandra Lockett, a woman.
1994:1345 1367
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circumstances of the defendant's life and crime that might provide a
reason to let her live.1°
Although the Woodson-Lockett requirement of individualized
discretion has not been overruled," the current Court has relaxed the
requirement of individualized consideration, and become less vigilant
against mandatory aspects of capital sentencing. The Court's willingness
to shrink the discretion requirement can be seen most clearly in its
rejection of challenges to Texas' special issue scheme. Texas' statute is
extremely focused, imposing death if the penalty phase jurors simply
answer in the affirmative to specific questions, one of which concerns
future dangerousness." 7 In Penry v. Lynaugh"15 the Court overturned
a death sentence because the narrow focus of the Texas special issues
provided no genuine opportunity for the jury to give mitigating effect to
evidence of the defendant's mental retardation and abuse during
childhood." Constrained by the special questions, the jurors could
have justified executing Penry by using the evidence of retardation to
support a finding of future dangerousness. 0  Retrial was required,
along with the addition of an instruction clarifying that the evidence of
Penry's mental retardation could support a decision for life.
In subsequent cases, however, the Court has refused to require a
similar instruction regarding the mitigating potential of evidence of the
defendant's youth at the time of the capital crime. In Graham v.
Collins,"' the Court used a cramped interpretation of its habeas
jurisdiction to refuse to reach the claim of a man sentenced to death for
a crime committed when he was seventeen; the petitioner argued that the
Texas special questions prevented adequate consideration of his youth as
105. Death penalty schemes must enable consideration of "any aspect of the
defendant's character or record ... that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence
less than death." Id. at 604.
106. See, e.g., Sumner v. Schuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987) (holding unconstitutional
a mandatory death penalty for prison inmates convicted of murder while serving a life
sentence without possibility of parole).
107. In five states the jury determines whether to impose a death sentence by
answering special verdict questions. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a (West
1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. §
163.150 (1993); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (West 1981 & Supp. 1994);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.060 (West 1991).
108. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
109. The Court determined that Penry was constitutionally entitled to further
instructions "informing the jury that it could consider and give effect to [Penry's] evidence
. . . by declining to impose the death penalty." Id. at 328. The Texas statute has since
been amended to include a more open-ended question to address Locket concerns.
110. Penry is an eloquent statement of the Court's capital jurisprudence.
Abolitionists considered it a major defeat, since their goal was a decision that execution
of mental retarded people categorically violates the Eighth Amendment. The Penry result
was much more modest, simply deciding that the jury had to have a way to consider
mental retardation prior to sentencing Penry to death. Yet Justices Scalia and Thomas
complain bitterly that Penry went too far. See sources cited infra note 127.
111. 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993).
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a mitigating factor.112  A few months later the Court ruled in Johnson
v. Texas"' that the Texas special issues did allow adequate
consideration of the defendant's youth at the time of his offense. Because
allowing consideration of individualized mitigation is not the same thing
as ensuring such consideration, the Johnson Court's insistence that it
"ha[s] not altered [Lockett's] central requirement"11 is strained, at
best. 1
15
Although the Court has rendered the Lockett-required discretion
largely illusory in the five jurisdictions that use Texas-style special
questions, contextualized discretion remains central in the majority of
states with capital punishment. Twenty-four states responded to Furman
by adopting statutes that require capital jurors to weigh aggravating and
mitigating factors to determine whether death is the appropriate
punishment for any particular capital defendant." 6
112. Four justices in dissent reached the merits and would have reversed. 113 S.
Ct. at 926 (Souter, J., dissenting).
[E]ven if the future dangerousness issue allowed the jury to recognize
Graham's evanescent youth as tending to mitigate any danger if he were
imprisoned for life, it would still fail the test of the Eighth Amendment
because the jury could not give effect to youth as reducing Graham's moral
culpability.
Id. at 925 (Souter, J., dissenting).
113. 113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993).
114. Id. at 2666. The Graham dissenters insisted that "Lockett and Eddings meant
what they said." Id. at 2676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Court's cramped
interpretation of Lockett is evident:
Lockett and its progeny stand only for the proposition that a State may not cut
off in an absolute manner the presentation of mitigating evidence, either by
statue or judicial instruction, or by limiting the inquiries to which it is relevant
so severely that the evidence could never be part of the sentencing decision at
all.
Id. at 2666 (quoting McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 465 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added)).
115. The assertion shows only that the Court is not willing to openly abolish the
Lockett promise of individualized discretion. The promised stability of at least formal
stare decisis is undoubtedly especially comforting in the arena of capital jurisprudence,
where "the Court has tried to dignify the once lawless death penalty with the reassuring
symbolism of legal doctrine." Weisberg, supra note 27, at 307. But see Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (decrying willingness to discard
precedent with change in Court's personnel).
116. Such weighing statutes are the most prevalent type of capital punishment
statute. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603 (Michie 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3
(West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994); GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (Michie 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (Smith-Hurd
1979); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (Baldwin 1988); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 905.3 (West 1991); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (1957); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 279,
§ 68 (1992); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030 (Vernon
1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.554 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (1986);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-7010 (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1991); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West
1991); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op.
HeinOnline -- 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 1369 1994
1370' WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
Even after recent decisions rejecting Lockett challenges to certain
features of weighing statutes,117 the weighing process remains extremely
contextual. In weighing states, the rules bind the edges of the process,
and undoubtedly circumscribe certain bases for death sentences,"'s but
the decision to impose death remains largely discretionary. Careful
consideration of information presented will not necessarily result in any
particular conclusion, because the conscience, not any external rule or
standard, is the foundation for the determination."' For that reason,
the penalty decision is wildly indeterminate at its core." Unlike
virtually all other legal tasks handed to jurors,12 the decision whether
to impose death is made in the absence of even a theoretical right
answer. " Under the law, a terrifying serial killer might be given life
even without any defense presented during the penalty trial, on the basis
of some factor evoking mercy from jurors. Thus, current doctrine still
requires a discretionary, individualized determination for which there is
1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-4 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204
(1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (1992);
WYO. STAT. § 6-2-102 (1988).
The death penalty enacted by Congress for "drug kingpins" in 1988 (21 U.S.C. §
848(e)) also provides for a death verdict imposed by members of a jury after weighing
mitigating and aggravating factors. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(i)-(k) (1988). The special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States provides for the death penalty for
certain first degree murders, at the determination of ajury. 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (1988).
117. See, e.g., Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 (1990); Blystone v.
Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990). In Blystone the Court upheld the Pennsylvania statute
mandating a death sentence if the jury finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no
mitigating circumstance, against the challenge (agreed to by the four dissenters) that the
mandatory aspect prevented the required individualized assessment.
118. For example, a death sentence intentionally imposed because of the race of
the defendant would be unreliable. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
119. Social scientists Mark and Sally Costanzo have studied the different task
handed to penalty jurors: "The penalty decision is essentially a moral one, which is
argument poor. Thus deliberation at this phase is more sensitive to normative
pressures .... mhe fact-finding dimensions of a typical penalty decision are minor."
Costanzo & Costanzo, supra note 32, at 190.
120. Jury nullification does not exist in this context, because no theoretical right
answer exists. But see infra text accompanying notes 377-78 (describing prevalence of
reverse nullification in jurors voting for death in order to get life without parole).
121. The normal role of the jury is to determine facts. See, e.g., JOHN GUINTHER,
THE JURY IN AMERICA, at xv (1988) (study attempting to describe "what we know about
the jury as a fact-finding body"); REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 230 (1983)
(assessing "jury performance of the fact-finding task" as "remarkably competent"); SAUL
M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL 120 (1988)
(describing jury as "a fact-finding machine").
122. Justice Powell described the difference 'between the roles as follows:
"Underlying the questions of guilt or innocence is an objective truth: the defendant, in
fact, did or did not commit the acts constituting the crime charged. The sentencer's
function is not to discover a fact, but to mete out just deserts as he sees them."
Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 450 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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no right answer, no perfect case.1 23 Professor Radelet has described
this adjudication process: "[J]ury decisions are made by vibrations that
defy objectification into precise reason. The list of aggravators and
mitigators thus becomes parallel to an attempt to list precisely the reason
why people love their mothers.""2 Whether made by vibrations or a
"gut-level hunch as to what is just, " " a discretionary decision to
impose death runs fundamentally against the promised certainty of the
rule of law.
The "guided discretion" of capital decisionmaking is a battleground
of context versus principle. If contextual reasoning is associated with a
feminine mode of decisionmaking, the decision to impose death is a
startlingly feminine moment at the heart of capital punishment
jurisprudence. Indeed, the capital decision stands today as an island of
indeterminacy in an ocean of determinate sentencing. If "man is to
woman as fact is to value,"" the discretionary decision whether to
impose death appears uniquely on the female side of the gendered
dualisms by which law is constructed. Acknowledging the gender in the
hierarchy helps to explain the battleground between context and rules in
capital decisionmaking, as well as the vehemence of the fight about the
proper role, if any, of individualized discretion.
3. THE PASSIONATE ATTACK ON DISCRETION
Even as the Court constrains individualized discretion, whatever
discretion remains is under full-scale attack by Justice Scalia, now joined
by Justice Thomas." 7 Justice Scalia's capital jurisprudence is an angry
single-minded attempt to eliminate the discretion from the process."
123. Samuel H. Pillsbury, Evil and the Law of Murder, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REV.
437, 460 (1990). "Mhe categorization decision remains essentially discretionary; it is
a 'legal' one, that is, bound by rules capable of rigorous review in name only." Id.
According to Justice Stevens, a death sentence "cannot be prescribed by a rule of law as
judges normally understand such rules." Spaziano, 468 U.S. 447, 469 (1984) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
124. William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death:
Operative Factors in Ten Florida Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 51 (1988); see also
Weisberg, supra note 27, at 308 ("Mhe decision to kill is an intensely moral, subjective
matter that seems to defy the designers of general formulas for legal decision.").
125. Patrick E. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, 41 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 1049 (1991).
126. EISENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 52.
127. See Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 2672 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring);
id. at 2672 (Thomas, J., concurring); Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 903 (1993)
(Thomas, J., concurring); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
128. Commentators have noted that Scalia's claim that discretion is inconsistent
with Furman suggests not only that individualized discretionary sentencing be
deconstitutionalized, but that it be eradicated. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M.
Steiker, Review Essay: Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization
Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE L.J. 835, 860 (1992); Scott E. Sundby, The
1994:1345 1371
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With characteristic boldness, Justice Scalia identifies the individualized
discretion at the heart of capital sentencing with nothing less than evil and
Nazi Germany:
To acknowledge that "there is perhaps an inherent tension"
[between the two poles of guided discretion] is rather like
saying that there was perhaps an inherent tension between the
Allies and the Axis Powers in World War II. And to refer to
the two lines as pursuing "twin objectives" . . . is rather like
referring to the twin objectives of good and evil. They cannot
be reconciled."
Although Scalia's dualities are not themselves overtly gendered, the
fierceness of his insistence that the spheres be kept separate suggests the
passion which maintains masculine and feminine as polar opposites.
Scalia complains that unbridled discretion to consider mitigation "quite
obviously destroys whatever rationality and predictability the former
requirement was designed to achieve." 11° Similarly, in his dissent in
Richmond v. Lewis,' Justice Scalia sneered at the requirement of
individualized, or contextual, capital sentencing: "As this and other cases
upon our docket amply show, that recently invented requirement has
introduced not only a mandated arbitrariness quite inconsistent with
Furman, but also an impenetrable complexity and hence a propensity to
error that make a scandal and a mockery of the capital sentencing
process."1
Justice Scalia's passion to eliminate the discretion in capital
sentencing takes him beyond simply decrying the discretion that remains;
occasionally Justice Scalia indulges the conceit that he has already
succeeded in wiping it out. A prime example is Justice Scalia's dissent
from the unremarkable holding of Morgan v. Illinois'33 that jurors who
insist during voir dire that they will impose a death sentence in every case
are excludable for cause. Morgan was decided in light of well-established
doctrine that people who are conscientiously opposed to the death penalty
in all cases are not qualified to sit on capital juries." In Morgan, the
Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital
Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1147, 1189 (1991).
129. Walton, 497 U.S. at 664 (Scalia, J., concurring in part & concurring in
judgment) (citations omitted). Justice Scalia apparently imagines that good and evil are
isolated and separate.
130. Id. at 664-65. Justice Scalia also uses evidence of slowness to bolster this
argument in favor of finality. Id. at 668-69.
131. 113 S. Ct. 528 (1992). In Richmond v. Lewis, the majority determined that
the Arizona Supreme Court had improperly affirmed a death sentence based on the
prisoner's clear eligibility without the required weighing of individualized mitigation. Id.
at 537.
132. Id. at 538 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 38-41 (discussing death qualification).
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Court addressed the opposite problem, and reaffirmed that a capital
defendant's right to an impartial jury would be violated by the presence
of any juror who would automatically votefor death for all death-eligible
defendants. 135  Justice Scalia's startling dissent expunges all
individualized moral judgment. According to Scalia, "[t]he fact that a
particular juror thinks the death penalty proper whenever capital murder
is established does not disqualify him."" Justice Scalia describes the
penalty determination as if it were proof of elements of a crime' 3 and
denounces a decision for life for any reason as tantamount to improper
jury nullification. 38
In Morgan, Scalia elevates the simple mandatory vote to execute I
la Exodus ("He that smiteth a man, so that he dies, shall be surely put to
death"' n ) over the murky, merciful discretion that he disdainfully
dismisses as a "fog of confusion":
Today, obscured within the fog of confusion that is our annually
improvised Eighth-Amendment, "death-is-different"
jurisprudence, the Court strikes a further blow against the
People in its campaign against the death penalty. Not only must
mercy be allowed, but now only the merciful may be permitted
to sit in judgment. Those who agree with the author of Exodus,
or with Immanuel Kant, must be banished from American juries
- 140
135. Justice White's opinion for six Justices is an unremarkable explanation of
fundamental principles, based on the premise that a juror who is unable to consider the
individual circumstances of a particular defendant is unable to follow the law.
136. 112 S. Ct. at 2236 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas joined the dissent.
137. Justice Scalia confuses moral determination with proof of elements:
Assume . . .a criminal prosecution in which the State plans to prove only
elements of circumstantial evidence x, y, and z. Surely counsel for the
defendant cannot establish unconstitutional partiality (and hence obtain
mandatory recusal) of a juror by getting him to state, on voir dire, that if, in
a prosecution for this crime, element x, y, and z were shown, he would
always vote to convict.
Id. Justice Scalia's principle and even his rhetorical choices were echoed by juror Stark,
who told me that she would remove all discretion from the death penalty determination:
"I think it should be based on what the penalty is for X and what the penalty is for Y and
what the penalty is for Z and just leave it at that. Nobody is going to be happy anyway."
Stark Interview, supra note 41.
138. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2236 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "Mhe law governing
sentencing verdicts says that a jury may give less than the death penalty in such
circumstances,just as, in the hypothetical case I have propounded, the law governing guilt
verdicts says that a jury may acquit despite proof of elements x, y, and z."
139. id. at 2242 n.6 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Exodus 21:12).
140. Id. at 2242 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). One suspects that the
author of Exodus and Immanuel Kant might be banished from juries on a number of
additional grounds. See, e.g., Annette C. Baier, Moralism and Cruelty: Reflections on
Hume and Kant, 103 ETHICS 436, 445 (1993) (discussing the fact that Kant's support for
the death penalty excepted murders committed for honor, such as the killing of an infant
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Thus Scalia cloaks the person who would automatically vote for death in
Biblical authority, and casts that juror with Kantian morality. The judge
who always upholds death is similarly valorized.141 Justice Scalia
cannot reconcile the male authority of the rule of law with female
discretion, so discretion must disappear. For Scalia, any case where
death is possible is another perfect case for death.
Justice Scalia's cold and relentless contempt for context easily invites
the epithet "male" hurled by relational feminists. Justice Thomas has also
weighed in on the side of certainty rather than discretion, but his analysis
challenges the feminist valorization of contextual reasoning, in that
Thomas has set his argument in the context of racial justice. Thomas
correctly suggests that the Court moved away from uncontrolled
discretion after realizing the role race played in discretionary capital
punishment schemes. 42 In assessing Furman, Thomas concludes that
"behind the Court's condemnation of unguided discretion lay the specter
of racial prejudice-the paradigmatic capricious and irrational sentencing
factor." 43 Thus, for his own reasons Thomas shares Scalia's desire to
return to a mandatory sentencing scheme.'" Thomas equates discretion
with bias, certainty with equality."t  Justice Thomas' analysis
challenges the equation of discretion with female; if discretion is female,
born outside of marriage); Susan Moiler Okin, Reason and Feeling in Thinking About
Justice, 99 ETHICS 229, 253 (1989) ("[Kant] makes it clear that women are not
sufficiently rational and autonomous to be moral subjects.").
141. Justice Scalia incorrectly describes jurors who refuse to consider not imposing
death as "jurors who favor the death penalty" and suggests:
A State in which the jury does the sentencing no more violates the due process
requirement of impartiality by allowing the seating of jurors who favor the
death penalty than does a State with judge-imposed sentencing by permitting
the people to elect (or the executive to appoint) judges who favor the death
penalty.
112 S. Ct. at 2236 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Thus, Scalia invites the
conclusion that judges such as himself, who favor the death penalty, should be expected
to vote to uphold death sentences in virtually all cases, automatically, without regard to
the specific facts at issue, in defiance of the constitutionally required individualized
discretion. (A similar perspective was held by a juror who voted for death, who
explained, "I also felt if I had voted [for the death penalty initiative], I had an obligation
to society to follow through." Neider Interview, supra note 77. Morgan arguably renders
Justice Scalia ineligible for capital jury service.
142. Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 903 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 906. "Such unbridled discretion, it was argued, practically invited
sentencers to vent their personal prejudices in deciding the fate of the accused." Id.
(citing Brief for Petitioner, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (No. 69-5003)).
144. "One would think, however, that by eliminating explicit jury discretion and
treating all defendants equally, a mandatory death penalty scheme was a perfectly
reasonable legislative response to the concerns expressed in Furman." 113 S. Ct. at 908
(Thomas, J., concurring).
145. Justice Thomas thus urges that such discretion leads to arbitrariness and
capriciousness. "It is manifest that 'the power to be lenient [also] is the power to
discriminate.'" Id. at 912 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987)).
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rather than male, then informal bias, including racism, is female, rather
than male.'"
To the extent that the caring mode embodies contextual moral
reasoning, Thomas' criticism implicates the serious charge that the caring
voice invites differential treatment. 47  For example, Noddings'
presentation of Manlius' dilemma seems to provide moral validation for
differential treatment of Manlius' son.'" Thomas unwittingly leads us
to the most cogent caution to the ethic of caring: an ethic whose paradigm
is that of mother and child invites differential treatment based on
proximity.
The potential for bias in discretionary, contextual decisionmaking is
real, although Justice Thomas' solution is not. Thomas' error is not in
seeing potential bias in discretion; it is in offering the illusory solution of
mandatory sentencing. Thomas' skepticism toward jurors is equally well-
earned by the decisionmakers who implement mandatory schemes,
including legislators, 49 police officers," 5' and prosecutors.'5'
Eliminating the discretion from guided discretion makes less sense
than changing the guidance; explicit instructions about and against racial
bias are not currently even attempted. 52 Formalizing and demystifying
jury deliberations also offers the hope of preventing, or at least
correcting, racial bias in deliberations. 53 Justice Stevens was correct
to challenge Thomas' insistence in Collins that allowing a jury to give
weight to a defendant's mental retardation or youth invites racial
discrimination."5  In the absence of other proposals for addressing
racism in capital sentencing,'55 Thomas' sweeping condemnation of
146. See generally Patricia A. Cain, Good and Bad Bias: A Comment on Feminist
Theory and Judging, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1945 (1988).
147. See, e.g., Shaughnessey, supra note 43.
148. Noddings' answer is that the caring person in Manlius' position would treat
each soldier as a son. See NODDINGS, supra note 16, at 44.
149. See, e.g., United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Mo. 1994)
(holding that unconscious congressional racism motivated sentencing disparities between
crack and powder cocaine), rev'd, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994).
150. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Does Race Matter in Criminal Prosecutions?,
THE CHAMPION, July 1991, at 7, 10-13.
151. See, e.g., id. at 8-10; Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have
Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419
(1991); Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1472 (1988).
152. Justice Kennedy's recent admonishment that "[a] juror who allows racial or
gender bias to influence assessment of the case breaches the compact and renounces his
or her oath," J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1434 (1994) (Kennedy,
J., concurring), is not likely to be heard by jurors unless included in a trial court's
instructions.
153. See infra text accompanying notes 379-81.
154. 113 S. Ct. at 915 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. Justice Thomas' concern about widespread racism in capital punishment
would appear more genuine if it included some critique of McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279 (1987), the decision that insulated and protected systemic racism in capital sentencing
1994:1345 1375
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discretion suggests the confluence of anti-racism passion with the
conventional distrust of feminine discretion.
4. KEEPING DISCRETION HIDDEN
The well-entrenched preference for principle over discretion does not
fuel the only fierce attack on the doctrine of individualized discretion;
even participants in and proponents of individualized discretion actively
hide the indeterminacy. Jurors given awesome discretion report that they
had no choice but to impose death; judges hide the messiness of discretion
behind the soothing rhetoric of accuracy and reliability.
a. Jurors: The False Experience of Applying Rules
Many jurors who use their discretion to impose death do not
recognize that they had a choice to do otherwise. Jurors want the
instructions to tell them whether to sentence to life or death, so that is
how they understand the instructions." But when the law requires
jurors to use their own discretion, the law refuses to provide the right
answer."' Although each had participated in a relatively open-ended
weighing process, juror after juror told me that the judge's instructions
required them to impose death. "The instructions that we received...
didn't leave any room for choices."5 ' The forewoman of a jury that
returned a death verdict told me almost defiantly that "we were trying
desperately to find something in his favor.""' Another told me three
by rejecting all claims of racial bias except those which can prove a particular death
sentence the product of intentional racism. For commentary on McCleskey, see Mumia
Abu-Jamal, Teetering on the Brink: Between Death and Life, 100 YALE LJ. 993, 999-
1001 (1991); see also M. Shanara Gilbert, Racism and Retrenchment in Capital
Sentencing: Judicial and Congressional Haste Toward the Ultimate Injustice, 18 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANOE 51, 52-61 (1991).
156. Cf. J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J.
743, 782 (1987) (-It is the text as read, and not the text as written, that becomes the
law."); Cover, supra note 21, at 1622 ("Because in capital punishment the action or deed
is extreme and irrevocable, there is pressure placed on the word-the interpretation that
establishes the legal justification for the act.") (emphasis in original).
157. Higginbotham, supra note 125, at 1065 ("Instructions to juries, such as to
consider all mitigating circumstances and weigh them against aggravating circumstances,
are important as ritualistic reminders of the jury's responsibility, but I would not overload
their mission.").
158. Stark Interview, supra note 41; see Weisberg, supra note 27, at 393 ("In the
case of the death penalty, the law has sometimes offered the sentencer the illusion of a
legal rule, so that no actor at any point in the penalty procedure need feel he has chosen
to kill any individual."). The foreperson of a jury that rendered a death verdict after a
few hours of deliberation recounted that two women on the jury were troubled: "They
thought by the rules ... that he should get the death penalty but they did not want to give
the death penalty." Hofeller Interview, supra note 41.
159. Boisvert Interview, supra note 78; see also Interview with John P. DeMasi,
Juror in People v. Guzman, in S. Lake Tahoe, Cal. (Aug. 4, 1992) [hereinafter DeMasi
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times that the death penalty was a "requirement" in the case in which he
was the foreman."w Professors William S. Geimer and Jonathan
Amsterdam have described the way that Florida jurors improperly used
the statutory list of mitigating circumstances as a check-off to reduce
discretion.161 Geimer and Amsterdam explained one juror's continuing
pain and misunderstanding that the law required the defendant's death
fourteen years after her verdict: "[C]rying, she said, 'I searched my heart
and tried to find something to vote to save him, but the evidence was so
clear that he was guilty-there was no way to find something to save his
life.'"'6
One juror reported, "I didn't want to do it, but I had to.""
Another explained, "You can feel sorry and sadness for what you have
to do but you still have to do it. That is part of discipline." 1" These
accounts confirm the hypothesis of social scientists that jurors who had
imposed death would readily characterize the decision as one required by
the applicable law in order to minimize their sense of personal
responsibility."6
Interview] (many of the jurors were "trying to find some way to give him life without the
possibility of parole"). Another juror reported disappointment that a life sentence was
not possible: "We kind of hoped. . .[to be able to give him life] but under the terms
of what it was, we really couldn't." Interview with Ellen Smith (pseudonym), Juror in
People v. Guzman, in S. Lake Tahoe, Cal. (Aug. 4, 1992) [hereinafter Smith Interview].
160. Hofeller Interview, supra note 41.
161. The explanations included:
"We were all ready to hang him, but we went over the list so we would be
within the law ... to get it right."
"It seemed that the State of Florida called for the death penalty. There didn't
seem to be any choice."
Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 124, at 25 (footnotes omitted).
162. Id. at 46.
163. Hans, supra note 55, at 49-50. One juror explained, "Sentencing someone
to death is something none of us wanted to do. It will take a very long time to get over
this for all of us." Id. Robert Weisberg describes the prosecutorial tactic of arguing that
voting to impose the death penalty is part of the jurors' legal duty, as opposed to a moral
choice. Weisberg, supra note 27, at 375-76.
164. Neider Interview, supra note 77.
165. Costanzo and Costanzo hypothesize that
the postverdict accounts of jurors who voted for death will emphasize their
lack of choice in the verdict. That is, to cope with the burden of rendering
death they will claim less discretion-that no other decision was possible given
the legal requirements.. . . In contrast, members of juries that rendered a
verdict of life will emphasize their discretion.
Costanzo & Costanzo, supra note 32, at 196; see also Weisberg, supra note 27, at 393
("[lit seems fairly plausible that a lay jury exposed to the mystifying language of legal
formality may indeed allow its moral sense to be distorted.") (footnote omitted).
The search for rules to follow is also very conspicuous in juries' normal fact-finding
role of determining guilt. "Systematic empirical research suggests that jurors' decisions
in [non-penalty] criminal trials are dominated by the relevant evidence and the 'official'
fact-finding task as defined by the court" rather than "the dictates of conscience" or
"sense of fair play." HASTIE ET AL., supra note 121, at 29.
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Thus, jurors approach open-ended weighing as if rules provided
answers; as if the task were finding facts, not supplying a moral response.
This false experience of applying rules is directly contradicted by the
Court's fictional description of how jurors operate. The Court reverses
the reality, insisting, for example, that Texas' narrowly focused Special
Issues questions invite the jurors to engage in the required "reasoned
moral response" rather than to undertake a "narrow factual inquiry."'"
The Court upheld the special questions in the Texas scheme in part on the
theory that Texan jurors approached these specific questions as if they
were broad invitations to balance:
This view accords with a "common sense understanding" of
how the jurors were likely to view their instructions ....
Indeed, we cannot forget that "a Texas capital jury deliberating
over the Special Issues is aware of the consequences of its
answers, and is likely to weigh mitigating evidence as it
formulates these answers in a manner similar to that employed
by capital juries in 'pure balancing' States."16
The Court's insistence that jurors faced with the specific questions used
in Texas' sentencing scheme in fact consider mitigating factors-even
without any instruction to do so-is a rhetorical reversal, cloaking a
determinate reality in a pretend costume of discretion.'"
b. Judges: The False Rhetoric of Precision
The preference for certainty and principled decisionmaking is so
well-entrenched that even the members of the Court who recognize that
contextualized discretion is necessary choose language to describe capital
decisionmaking that hides the uncertainty of discretion behind the soothing
language of certainty and predictability. The Court indulges in the
comforting words of legal determinacy, calling the decisions made
through individualized discretion nothing less than "reliable" and
"accurate,"" 6 as if capital sentences were somehow comparable to
brand name appliances. The very concept of an "accurate death
sentence" is awkward, as the Court has come close to acknowledging."'
166. 113 S. Ct. at 2670.
167. Id. (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 182 n.12 (1988) (plurality
opinion)).
168. The Court's claim to having a "common-sense understanding" of the jurors'
process is not supported by applicable research. Social scientists Costanzo and Costanzo
point out that "Itihe available data suggest that the Supreme Court and penalty jurors may
have fundamentally different conceptions of the sentencing task." Costanzo & Costanzo,
supra note 32, at 190.
169. See Stephen Gillers, The Quality of Mercy: Constitutional Accuracy at the
Selection Stage of Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1037 (1985).
170. See generally Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992) (suggesting that a
possibly inaccurate death sentence is a broader category than "innocent of the death
1378
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Further, the shining certainty of "reliable" is belied by the meaning
given to it by the Court. Although the origin of the requirement of
"reliability" in capital sentencing was the Woodson recognition that
"death is different" in seriousness and finality, 11 a diluted goal of
accurate or reliable death sentences has displaced the aspiration to
fairness. " In Lockhart v. Fretwell,1" the Court considered the
reliability of a death sentence that would not have been rendered, except
for the failure of defense counsel to notice that a death sentence was
impermissible under the law controlling at the time of trial.1 ' To the
Court, Fretwell's death sentence was "reliable": "To set aside a
conviction or sentence solely because the outcome would have been
different but for counsel's error may grant the defendant a windfall to
which the law does not entitle him."175
The very concept of "accuracy" is poorly adapted to a purely moral
question. "Accuracy" is a term that fits within the traditional fact-finding
role of jurors.176 But science, and even facts, are not without value and
context.1" If even science is not objective reality,1" where is the
"accuracy" in a moral determination?1 9  How can a moral
penalty"). Id. at 2519. "The phrase 'innocent of death' is not a natural usage of those
words . . . ." id., at 2520.
171. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
172. Justice Blackmun is critical: "I continue to believe, however, that the Court's
'exaltation of accuracy as the only characteristic of "fundamental fairness" is deeply
flawed.'" Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. at 2527 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting
Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 572, 545 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
173. 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993).
174. At the time of FretweU's capital trial, controlling Eighth Circuit precedent
prohibited double-counting the fact that a murder was committed in the course of a felony
both as aggravation to form the basis for death eligibility and for imposition of the death
penalty. Had the correct law been followed, Fretwell could not have been sentenced to
death. The Eighth Circuit doctrine was subsequently reversed to allow this type of
double-counting.
175. 113 S. Ct. at 843 (citation omitted). "[Ain analysis focusing solely on mere
outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was
fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective." Id. at 842 (footnote omitted).
176. But even in a fact-finding context, where a correct and therefore accurate
answer is at least theoretically possible, the assertion that knowing that such a verdict is
in fact accurate is problematic. See, e.g., HASTIE ET AL., supra note 121, at 62 ("Mhe
issue of the correctness of the final verdict cannot be resolved in absolute terms, for there
are not ideal rational or empirical criteria for accuracy in jury decisions.").
Justice Blackmun mounted an extensive attack on the Court's misguided emphasis
on 'actual innocence" in the guilt phase as a method of assessing error in the penalty
phase, in Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. at 2525 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also id.
at 2530 ("Fundamental fairness is more than accuracy at trial; justice is more than guilt
or innocence. Nowhere is this more true than in capital sentencing proceedings.").
177. See, e.g., Donna J. Haraway, In the Beginning Was the Word: The Genesis
of Biological Theory, 6 SIGNs 469,477 (1981) ("Facts are theory laden; theories are value
laden; values are history laden.").
178. Zillah Eisenstein makes this point clearly. See EIsENsTEIN, supra note 2, at
24-31.
179. See also Weisberg, supra note 27, at 346, 353.
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determination-for which no correct answer exists-ever be accurate?
The Supreme Court's insistent repetition of the requirement (and finding)
of "reliability" reflects the same impulse to embrace a false certainty that
moves jurors to find answers in the instructions. Both are cases of
rhetorical certainty masking wildly uncontrolled decisionmaking1W In
short, "accuracy" and "reliability" connote the masculine goals of
objectivity, certainty, and precision, all of which are missing from the
feminine "gut-level" hunches and vibrations of capital decisionmaking.
The language of capital cases reveals judicial unease with
individualized discretion not merely in the choice of falsely determinate
descriptors such as "reliable" and "accurate", but also in the rhetorical
reluctance of the members of the Court who support individualized
discretion. As Robin West has demonstrated, even the proponents of
individualized decisionmaking describe their judgments in terms of broad-
based principles, eschewing the rhetoric of individualized circumstances
which they purport to embrace."' 1 In other words, the liberals use the
rhetoric of broad-based principles to propound the principle that
individualized attention is required, without undertaking the individualized
attention in question.
Of course, the reality of capital decisionmaking, as with all other
decisionmaking, is that both theoretical principles and detailed contextual
analysis are required." 2 Inevitably, of course, all decisionmaking
requires some consideration of context, with concomitant choices, in
order to apply more generalized rules. Unbridled discretion is ubiquitous
in death penalty practice; prosecutorial charging and police investigative
practices are largely unconstrained, for example. Those areas are
justified not by the feminine goal of discretion, however, but rather by the
masculine virtue of independence. Discretion itself is neither lawless nor
frightening; rules in themselves are neither fair nor neutral. Thus the
180. Id. at 307 ("Mhe Court has tried to dignify the once lawless death penalty
with the reassuring symbolism of legal doctrine."); cf JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM 12
(1964) (stating that analytical positivism "allow[s] judges to believe that there always is
a rule somewhere for them to follow").
181. West suggests that the capital doctrine which entitles each capital defendant
to be considered in his particularity clashes with the liberal premise that each person is
entitled to the same right, whatever his circumstance:
A capital defendant's right to a sentence mitigated by evidence of his personal
circumstances is ... the right to be treated in one's particularity rather than
a right to generality .... On the other hand, the liberal legalist insistence on
the insularity of the rightholder means that the subjectivity of the defendant,
his worthiness, and indeed his individual life history should all be simply
irrelevant to his possession of rights.
Robin West, Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REv. 43, 89 (1990)
(footnote omitted).
182. See, e.g., Scaltsas, supra note 73, at 15, 17 (criticizing call to context in part
because "[the concrete, contextual aspect of moral thinking is a necessary stage in
applying any principle, whether by women or men"); Catherine Wells, Situated
Decisionmaking, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1728, 1741 (1990) (asserting that structured and
contextual decisionmaking is not an "either/or proposition").
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context versus rule dichotomy oversimplifies and denies the connection
between the two. The primary value of the feminist reclamation of
contextual thinking is to reveal and explain the way that contextual
reasoning is often denied, hidden behind the reassuring rhetoric of
certainty and principle. A more honest description of both would prevent
indulgent one-sided modifiers such as "reliable" from so easily obscuring
a far messier reality. Acknowledging the connotations of gender helps to
explain the deep willingness to choose misleading descriptions that reflect
masculine aspirations.
B. Distance vs. Connection
1. CONNECTION RECLAIMED
Relational feminists are suspicious of traditional liberal thought which
values separation between the decisionmaker and the object of his
decision, in service of the conventional goal of detachment or distanced
decisionmaking. 1" Gilligan explains, "Detachment is considered the
hallmark of mature moral thinking within a justice perspective, signifying
the ability to judge dispassionately, to weigh evidence in an even-handed
manner, balancing the claims of others and self. From a care perspective,
detachment is the moral problem."'" Feminists have reclaimed the
value of connection between the legal decisionmaker and the subject of
her decision.'" Rather than distance, the caring judge or juror needs
the benefit of closeness to the subject of the decision: "Within this
framework, detachment, whether from self or from others, is morally
problematic, since it breeds moral blindness or indifference-a failure to
discern or respond to need.""
Law claims to be distanced, but is so only selectively. The male
value of distance is aspirational, and is certainly present in judges'
rhetoric in capital cases; but, in fact, a great deal of connectedness
already exists. The three main subjects considered by a capital penalty
juror are the defendant, the execution itself, and the victim. Current
doctrine imposes a growing distance between the decisionmaker and the
183. E.g., Williams, supra note 8, at 74. "The relation between knower and
known is one of separation, a relation of objectivity. Such separation is required for the
autonomy of the knowing subject. And masculinity is, of course, defined importantly in
terms of autonomy and separation." Id. (footnote omitted).
184. Gilligan, supra note 47, at 30-31.
185. See, e.g., NAFFINE, supra note 12, at 7 (to "feminists, detachment may not
be the best approach to resolving disputes: involvement and close proximity to the subject
may be better"); id. at 37 (judging is supposed to be done by distanced, neutral
decisionmakers); Grillo, supra note 51, at 1587 (referring to "dispassionate, bloodless
neutrality that can give that word a bad name. . . ."); Resnik, supra note 46, at 1922
(discussing tension between the traditional rule of disinterested judges and connectedness);
cf Williams, supra note 8, at 72 (discussing critique of distance between knower and
known).
186. Gilligan, supra note 47, at 24.
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defendant, an immense distance between the decisionmaker and the
execution, but a shrinking space between the decisionmaker and the
victim.1
2. THE DISAPPEARING DEFENDANT
Twenty-five years ago the Supreme Court in Witherspoon v.
Illinois.8 turned to Arthur Koestler's Reflections on Hanging to suggest
in favorable terms that those who opposed the death penalty reflect "'the
shuddering recognition of a kinship' with the accused."' In that way
the Court recognized the obvious correlation between a decisionmaker's
perceived connection to the defendant and reluctance to impose death.
Many capital jurors experience a significant distinction between a
theoretical willingness to impose a death sentence, assured during death
qualification, and actually voting for death for a particular individual."
Professors Geimer and Amsterdam found "intense internal conflicts that
can arise when an abstract proposition is reduced to a decision about the
life or death of a particular human being.""'1 The task. becomes more
difficult when it is connected to a real person.
In contrast, the current Court's enthusiasm for death sentences has
resulted in both substantive and procedural moves to increase the distance
between the decisionmaker and the accused. Through doctrinal shifts
such as limitations on mitigating evidence and new openness to appellate
sentencing, as well as through casual rhetorical choices, the Court is
sending the capital defendant further and further into the distance.
187. Cf. Mark G. Yudof, Tea at the Palace of Hoon: The Human Voice in Legal
Rules, 66 TEx. L. REV. 589, 604-05 (1988) (discussing Booth as example where all
Justices listened to voices; the only difference being which voices the Justices thought
should be heard). "No Justice was inattentive to human voices, but their disparate views
of the appropriate legal standards caused them to attend to different voices." Id. at 605.
188. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
189. Id. at 520 n. 17 (quoting ARTHUR KOESTLER, REFLECTIONS ON HANGING 166-
67 (1956)). The full quotation used by the Court was as follows:
The division [between supporters and opponents of hanging] is not between
rich and poor, highbrow and lowbrow, Christians and atheists: it is between
those who have charity and those who have not . . . . The test of one's
humanity is whether one is able to accept this fact-not as lip service, but with
the shuddering recognition of a kinship: here but for the grace of God, drop
I.
ld.
190. One capital juror had the insight that "the difference between objective death
and real death made the difference." Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 124, at 35.
191. Id.
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a. The Defendant's Right to Tell His Story
Jurors are alert to whatever clues can be gleaned about the defendant
as a person. A juror who held out for life on a hung penalty jury told me
that he never got much sense of the defendant, who never testified.
Instead, the juror remembered that his entire impression of the defendant
was formed by a single interchange between him and his
defense attorney. One came in and started the day walking
behind him and said "good morning." Then the man turned
and looked at his attorney, saying "good morning" in return.
That was the only time I heard the man speak during the entire
trial. 192
The best way to draw the decisionmakers closer to the defendant is
to tell them his story. 19' Defense attorneys attempt to present to the
penalty jurors a portrait of their client that humanizes him: that is, makes
connections between the client and the jurors. Often the defendant's
mother testifies, for example, to show that the defendant is cared for."
Presenting a humanizing story of the defendant's life is especially
important in light of social science research that suggests that all jurors
192. Interview with Michael Quinlan, Juror in People v. Jackson, No. 074222
(Alameda Cty. Super. Ct. 1983), in Berkeley, Cal. (June 11, 1991) [hereinafter Quinlan
Interview].
193. The power of storytelling to remove distance between the decisionmaker and
the object of her decision is one reason that narrative is understood to be a feminist
method. See, e.g., Calhoun, supra note 84, at 88-90; Mary I. Coombs, Telling the
Victim's Story, 2 TEx. J. WOMEN & LAW 277 (1993); Phyllis Goldfarb, The Theory-
Practice Spiral. The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599,
1630 (1991) (same); Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MIcH. L. REV.
2073 (1989); Smith, supra note 59, at 8 (identifying storytelling as feature of feminist
method); Robin West, Communities, Texts, and Law.- Reflections on the Law and
Literature Movement, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 129 (1988).
194. Two male jurors from two cases in which the verdict was for life denied that
the mother's testimony had any impact on their deliberations. One claimed that it "didn't
cut any ice at all." Interview with James Dalrymple, Juror in People v. Calderon, No.
077450 (Alameda Cty. Super. Ct. 1986), in San Francisco, Cal. (Mar. 22, 1991)
[hereinafter Dalrymple Interview]. The other juror said that "anybody's mother would
come and say the same thing. It's almost part of the job [of being a mother]." Quinlan
Interview, supra note 192. One juror voting for death reported that "[the defendant's]
mother obviously seemed biased in her testimony so that did not make me feel that he was
less deserving of the death penalty but at the same time I always had compassion for
him." Neider Interview, supra note 77. A female juror who voted for death speculated
that women jurors would be more vulnerable to family testimony: "The mothers and the
wives and all, it certainly would increase the emotional strain, because you'd have to put
yourself in their position; I suppose men wouldn't be as vulnerable .... But when it
comes down to the bottom line that isn't what we were there for." Smith Interview,
supra note 159.
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deliberate by creating a story to make sense out of the evidence
presented.19
The Lockett" doctrine, which requires the admission of all
mitigating evidence offered by the defendant, represents the triumph of
connectedness between the decisionmakers and the defendant. In Lockett
the Court recognized that the opportunity to humanize the defendant by
telling his story is constitutionally required prior to imposition of a death
sentence." 9 As discussed above, the Lockett doctrine has lost some of
its reach, and a continuing, concerted, angry attack on the fundamental
values of the doctrine is being led by Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas. '"'
A more subtle deemphasis of the Lockett requirement of individuation
can be seen in Sawyer v. Whitley,"w a recent case in which the Court
decided the standard by which a federal court should address certain
claims of actual innocence raised on habeas corpus. Six members of the
Court held that to show "actual innocence" one must show "by clear and
convincing evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no reasonable
juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty" under
the applicable state law.' In other words, actual innocence is
determined solely by the rules that define the class of death eligibility;
according to Whitley, any errors related to the individualized portrait are
simply irrelevant to the inquiry.
The Court eliminated any consideration of incorrect mitigating
evidence, in part because considering the impact of those errors on the
jury would be too difficult for a federal judge: "It is a far more difficult
task to assess how jurors would have reacted to additional showings of
mitigating factors, particularly considering the breadth of those factors
that a jury under our decisions must be allowed to consider.""' Thus,
Chief Justice Rehnquist used the breadth of the Lockett requirement as a
good excuse to ignore it completely.
The value of the requirement for individualized sentencing lies
precisely in its ability to require the jurors to acknowledge the humanity
of the defendant. Thus, arguments to limit the reach of Lockett to some
more narrow aspect of the defendant, such as, for instance, whatever
195. See, e.g., W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING
REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE & JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1981);
Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decisionmaking: The Story
Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991). But see BERNARD S. JACKSON, LAW, FACT,
AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE 61-88 (1988) (criticizing Bennett's and Feldman's
conclusions about storytelling).
196. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
197. One juror suggested that the people who voted for life "may have connected
more with this guy because he was there in front of us than with the victim because she
was dead." Neider Interview, supra note 77.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 127-48.
199. 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992).
200. Id. at 2523 (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 2522.
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information lessens his culpability for the crime,' miss the point,
which is to permit the jury to hear about humanizing aspects of the
defendant simply in order to be sure that the jury may see him as a
human being. Personalization becomes precisely the purpose, once
connection is valued.
b. Appellate Sentencing
Beyond shrinking the role of the defendant's own story, the Court
has put distance between the capital defendant and the sentencer quite
literally by-for the first time-permitting an appellate court to salvage a
death sentence by resentencing the defendant. In Clemons v.
Mississippi' the Court authorized state appellate courts to affirm death
judgments in spite of constitutional errors made at the trial, by re-
weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors. In effect, members of
the reviewing court may save a tainted death verdict by becoming
appellate sentencers.'
Aside from questions of institutional competency,' the Clemons
claim that appellate judges are capable of providing reliable individualized
death sentences rests fundamentally on a willingness to impose great
distance between the defendant and the sentencers. Appellate judges who
202. See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 128 (suggesting the reach of Lockett
be limited to those facts which reduce the defendant's culpability). Steiker and Steiker
discuss Beverly Lowry's book Crossed Over, about her friendship with Karla Faye
Tucker, a woman on death row in Texas. The authors acknowledge that they were moved
by Lowry's portrait of Tucker, but they would not want a jury sentencing Tucker to be
given the full portrait: "Mhe more of Lowry's individualizing portrait of Tucker we
permit a sentencer to consider, the greater the opportunity for arbitrariness and bias.
Opened discretion in capital sentencing risks unprincipled dispensations of mercy." Id.
at 870.
203. 494 U.S. 738 (1990).
204. Id. at 747-50. Prior to Clemons, the Court had repeatedly recognized that
appellate courts are seriously limited in the fact-finding and sentencing arenas. See, e.g.,
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330-31 (1985) (appellate courts have different
sentencing obligations); Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980) (speculative appellate
findings not sufficient due process protection when substituted for specifically required
jury findings).
The Court's insistence that appellate resentencing can be accomplished without the
taint of whatever illegal evidence or unlawful legal standard invalidated the jury's original
sentence contradicts social science data. A researcher into capital sentencing has
concluded that once a decision is made, "it is usually impossible to 'subtract' an element"
because the weight of that factor cannot be accurately assessed by the decisionmaker or
an observer and "hindsight bias could convince the observer that the same result would
have been obtained." Hans, supra note 55, at 167.
Substituting the appellate court for the jury has the potential benefit of relieving the
jurors' responsibility for a death verdict made under error. See infra text accompanying
notes 297-305, 387-403.
205. In his Clemons dissent, Justice Blackmun characterized capital sentencing by
a state appellate court as "a radically different conception of its institutional role." 494
U.S. at 768 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
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sentence a defendant to death do not know what the condemned even
looks like. In his dissent in Clemons, Justice Blackmun charged that the
error in appellate sentencing lies precisely in allowing too great a distance
to come between the decisionmaker and the subject of the decision to
condemn:
[An adequate assessment of the defendant ... surely requires
a sentencer who confronts him in the flesh .... I also believe
that, if a sentence of death is to be imposed, it should be
pronounced by a decisionmaker who will look upon the face of
the defendant as he renders judgment. The bloodless alternative
approved by the majority conveniently may streamline the
process of capital sentencing, but at a cost that seems to me to
be intolerable.'
Justice Blackmun's claim that sentencing from a cold appellate record was
not "a procedure which recognizes the 'need for treating each defendant
in a capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the
individual"' echoes Nel Noddings' description that the caring person
receives even a stranger "not by formula but as individual."" 5  The
appellate judges who determine that a defendant deserves death are the
epitome of distanced, clean, bureaucratic, executioners.' This is
sentencing as paperwork. The real-life defendant never makes an
appearance.
c. Rhetorical Distance
The rhetoric of the Court pushes the flesh and blood defendant into
the distance in several ways, from the general willingness to transform a
death penalty trial into a metaphor for fighting crime,21° to the failure
206. Id. at 771-72. Similarly, in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1986),
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, found that one of the reasons advising the capital
jury that its work will be reviewed on appeal impermissibly undermines the reliability of
the jurors' sentence lies in the unsuitability of an appellate court undertaking sentencing.
207. 494 U.S. at 771 (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. 586).
208. See NODDINGS, supra note 16, at 47:
mhe caring person... dreads the proximate stranger, for she cannot easily
reject the claim he has on her. She would prefer that the stray cat not appear
at the back door-or the stray teenager at the front. But if either presents
himself, he must be received not by formula but as individual.
Id.
209. Cf Martha Minow & Elizabeth Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10 CARDOZO
L. REv. 37, 58 (1988) ("[S]urely it is not in keeping with such dignity for the judge who
has sentenced the defendant to death actually to incarcerate the defendant, guard him in
prison, and pull the switch that electrocutes him.").
210. See Austin Sarat, Speaking of Death: On Narratives of Violence in Capital
Trials, 27 LAw & Soc. REv. 19, 54-55 (1993).
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to include the defendant's story in the opinion, and even to the choice to
hide actual connection behind rhetorical distance.
On occasion, the Court chooses the language of distance even where
connection to the capital defendant prevails. For example, Morgan v.
Illinois21' closed the distance between the jurors and the defendant by
preventing people who would refuse to consider the defendant's own
circumstances from becoming capital jurors. But the Court described
itself as achieving the opposite. The Court claims that these jurors who
are willing to consider the individual circumstances of the defendant are
"dispassionate"; jurors who would make up their minds to impose death
without any consideration of the particular defendant are rejected by the
majority as not sufficiently "indifferent."2" The Court's misleading
rhetorical choice reflects its aspirations to distanced decisionmaking.
More significant distancing occurs when a capital case is allowed to
become a metaphor for fighting crime: the flesh and blood defendant
disappears behind the metaphor. Professors Geimer and Amsterdam
rightfully decry the Court's apparent willingness to view death cases as
an absolute choice between order and anarchy, sacrificing the person for
the symbol:
[T]he life/death decision is not an all-or-nothing Holmesian
choice whether an individual must be sacrificed for the greater
good of society. That conflict is often portrayed, to the
detriment of individuals, in absolute terms-as one between
order and anarchy. It is not. These jurors in favor of life
understood that the foundations of public order would not
crumble, or even tremble, if the life of a murderer was
spared.
213
The symbolic power of executions is irrefutable. 24  But once a
sentencing decision becomes a choice between good and evil, or a
statement against crime (or violence), 215 the real-life person being
sentenced has disappeared.
211. 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992).
212. Id. at 2228 ("Mhe right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a
fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors.").
213. Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 124, at 38 n. 171; cf Cover, supra note
21, at 1608 ("Beginning with broad interpretive categories such as "blame" or
"punishment," meaning is created for the event which justifies the judge to herself and
to others with respect to her role in the acts of violence.").
214. I have written elsewhere that one explanation for the low number of women
sentenced to death is the symbolic unsuitability of executing women. Howarth, supra note
23 (few women are sufficiently frightening and many women are too easily humanized to
be satisfying candidates for execution).
215. See Angela Harris, The Jurisprudence of Victinhood, 1991 SUP. CT. REV.
77 (discussing the Court's view of a death penalty case as a contest between defendant and
victim).
1994:1345 1387
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Finally, as revealed by Robin West, even the dissenters writing on
behalf of the rights of capital defendants have distanced themselves from
those defendants by failing to include the defendant's own story. West
shows that the dissenters' failure to include the story of the defendants'
circumstances obscures the legal determination at issue in each case216
and allows the majority to isolate the defendant as essentially aberrational,
symbolic, inhuman, and foreign.217 The narrative or description (if
explanation is impossible) of what led to the crimes is the link between
the audience and the condemned. When the defendant disappears from
capital punishment, the moral gravity leaves as well.
3. THE EXECUTION IS FAR, FAR AWAY
The other crucial aspect of the decision whether to execute is the
punishment itself, the execution. The premise of distance between the
jurors and the execution is so basic that a lapse is funny:
COUNSEL: Can you participate in an endeavor
in which the ultimate result might
be death by lethal injection?
JUROR: They do that up in Huntsville,
don't they? Yeah, I guess I could
do it if it was on a weekend.218
Although aspects of the Court's capital jurisprudence could be interpreted
to require closeness or connection between the decisionmakers and the
execution itself, the main theme is to push the execution far, far away.
a. Responsibility from Afar
The line of authority that promises the most closeness between the
jurors and the execution they are contemplating begins with Caldwell v.
Mississippi.19 Caldwell counselled that reliable death sentences require
216. "The effect is a peculiar and disorienting disjunction between the legal issue
on which the cases turn-the jury's duty and entitlement to hear and consider all aspects
of the defendant's life history that might, in the jury's mind, mitigate the crime and hence
the harshness of the sentence, and the defendant's correlative right to a jury so
informed-and what is learned about the defendant's circumstances or the social world,
from either the majority or the dissent, which is absolutely nothing." Robin West,
Narrative, Responsibility and Death: A Comment on the Death Penaly Cases from the
1989 Term, MD. J. CONTEMP. LEOAL IssuES, Fall 1990, at 161, 174.
217. "The liberal's narrative silence validates our societal self delusion that the
capital defendant's fate is not inextricably linked, through chains of causation,
responsibility, commonality and community, with our own." West, supra note 216, at
175.
218. RODNEY R. JoNEs & GERALD F. UELMEN, SuPREME FOLLY (1990)
(transcript of voir dire in Texas capital trial included in humor compendium).
219. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
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the sentencers to understand the decision as an "awesome responsibility"
and that "it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on
a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the
responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death
rests elsewhere."' In other words, the Constitution forbids the jurors
from distancing themselves from responsibility for the execution
itself."1 The specific problem in Caldwell was the prosecutor's
argument to the jury: "[They would have you believe that you're going
to kill this man and they know-they know that your decision is not the
final decision. My God, how unfair can you be? Your job is reviewable.
They know it."'
Although the Caldwell line has focused on the error in letting the
jury off the hook by telling them about appellate review, the prosecutor's
reassurance that the jurors were not "going to kill this man" was also
problematic. How is it consistent with pressing upon jurors their
awesome responsibility to assure them that they are not the ones actually
executing the defendant?
Yet such distancing comments are widespread. One juror was
adamant:
One of the things that certainly bothered me was people saying,
"how can you put someone to death?" I mean, this is
ridiculous. I didn't. All I did was sift through the facts with
the other people and this is what we came up with and what we
suggested to the judge. Now that goes through various
processes. They don't lead them off and hang'em.' ,
In Saffle v. Parks,' in addition to telling the jurors to approach their
task in a mechanical fashion, without sympathy (the focus of the Court's
decision affirming the sentence), the prosecutor told the jurors, "[Y]ou're
not yourself putting Robyn Parks to death."' One judge in Florida,
who has the statutory authority to override jurors' recommendations for
220. Id. at 328-29.
221. The authority of Caldwell (written by Justice Marshall) has been diminished
considerably by the current Court. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990)
(upholding a death sentence although the jury had been told explicitly that it was not
ultimately responsible for the sentence it pronounced; finding the law forbidding such
instructions a "new rule" and therefore not reviewable on habeas); see West, supra note
181, at 86 (suggesting that this and other decisions reduced the "sphere of jurors'
responsibility" in addition to shrinking judicial responsibility).
222. 472 U.S. at 325.
223.. Boisvert Interview, supra note 78.
224. 494 U.S. 484 (1990).
225. The prosecutor continued, "You just have become a part of the criminal
justice system that says when anyone does this, that he must suffer death." Id. at 512
n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1994:1345 1389
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life,' explained his practice of not polling the jurors about the vote
breakdown of their sentencing recommendation on the grounds that "he
does not think that jurors should be put on the spot. " ' But there is a
tension between wanting to make the jurors' role more comfortable"
and wanting to make their power more apparent. Noteworthy simply
because of its difference from others, the first line of Professor Pillsbury's
proposed penalty phase jury instruction reads, "The sentencing decision
which lies before you is one of the most important you will ever
make .... ,9 Certainly connectedness to the pain of the execution
would also involve heightened sense of importance of decision.' Juror
Boisvert objected to my question about what could be done to make the
process more comfortable by insisting that the experience should not be
comfortable, because it was too important. 1 The impulse to protect
the jurors is widespread.
b. Execution Evidence Excluded
One of the ways that jurors are made more comfortable is through
courts' routine and steadfast exclusion of evidence of how the death
penalty is carried out.232 Austin Sarat noticed that the violence of the
226. Four states provide that the jury return an advisory verdict to the court after
the sentencing hearing. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
4209 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9
(Burns 1991). For a description of the Florida statute, see Geimer & Amsterdam, supra
note 124, at 8-9.
227. Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 124, at 14 n.59.
228. Cf Carolyn Heilbrun & Judith Resnik, Convergences: Law, Literature and
Feminism, 99 YALE L.J. 1913 (1990).
229. Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passion of Criminal
Punishment, 74 CORNELL L.REV. 655, 703 (1989).
230. For a description of a death sentence upheld even after a capital juror "fell
to the floor in the hallway outside the courtroom and ...repeatedly cried, 'I can't do
it,'" see WHITE, supra note 27, at 120-28; see also Sarat, supra note 210, at 47-51.
231. "I remember feeling shocked when we got through one phase and some of
the jurors said 'let's celebrate.' I went outside and I started crying and I thought 'this is
nothing to celebrate. We haven't won anything.'" Boisvert Interview, supra note 78.
232. See, e.g., Shriner v. Wainwright, 715 F.2d 1452 (11th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984); People v. Daniels, 802 P.2d 906, 939 (Cal.) (excluding
"evidence of what paraplegic defendant's life in prison would be or evidence about
gruesome nature of execution in gas chamber), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 145 (1991);
People v. Whitt, 798 P.2d 849, 862 (Cal. 1990) (defendant's request that jurors be
allowed to view gas chamber properly denied as irrelevant, as was offer of testimony from
artist/journalist Howard Brodie regarding 1967 execution that he witnessed), cert. denied,
501 U.S. 1213 (1991); People v. Gordon, 792 P.2d 251, 277 (Cal. 1990) (evidence of
how execution would be carried out is not relevant to individualized sentencing decision),
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 913 (1991); People v. Grant, 755 P.2d 894, 913 (Cal. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1050 (1989); Horton v. State, 295 S.E.2d 281 (Ga. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1188 (1983); State v. Boyd, 319 S.E.2d 189 (N.C. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1030 (1985); State v. Johnson, 259 S.E.2d 752 (N.C. 1979). Onejuror who simply
dismissed information about executions, deterrence, or other aspects of death penalty
1390
HeinOnline -- 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 1390 1994
Deciding to Kill
execution was glaringly absent from the capital trial he studied: "While
the other kinds of violence are presented as weapons and wounds and
described in vivid, concrete, gory detail, law's violence is hardly
presented at all. It is named, when it is named, in the most general,
abstract, and impersonal ways."233 The evidentiary exclusion and
rhetorical silence remove context and isolate the jurors from the actual
execution they are contemplating.
The jurors I interviewed were divided on the subject of permitting
information about the execution. One juror suggested that evidence of the
reality would erase more gruesome conjecture.' Another juror first
called such information a "cheap trick," but after noting that he had never
seen an execution added that "one-hundred percent of the pain should be
brought home to the jurors. How can we decide on the capital case if we
don't know what [an execution] looks like?" 35
Information about the actual execution would strengthen the sense of
jurors' responsibility for the decision they are making. This evidence is
relevant, not to the defendant, but to the decision. Evidence suggests that
decisions to execute are fewer in jurisdictions with especially gruesome
methods of execution.' But the Lockett doctrine is based on the
defendant's right to have the jurors hear mitigating evidence related to
him or his crime; evidence related to the penalty is not swept within
it.237
policy as "a waste of time" perfectly reflected this doctrine. Smith Interview, supra note
159.
233. Sarat, supra note 210, at 52.
In the penalty phase of a capital trial, law's own violence is put, as it always
must be, precariously into discourse. . . . mhe legitimation of that power
is the most pressing because law enlists ordinary citizens and asks them to
exercise its power over life and death. In so doing law seeks to make its
violence our violence.
Yet even at this moment it is striking that so little is actually said about
the nature of that violence.
Id. at 47.
234. He posited that evidence of the execution method "would be relevant to me
becauseit would [make it] much easier. I don't want to see people drawn and quartered."
Hofeller Interview, supra note 41.
235. Quinlan Interview, supra note 192.
236. See No Nice Face for Death, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1983, at A23; see also
Not Carried Out For Fifty Years, BOSTON GLOBE, July 9, 1989, at 1 (state attorney
general's view that execution rate will increase now that lethal injection has replaced
hanging). One juror told me that she was opposed to information about executions being
given to jurors because it might make them squeamish: "If you made it gory enough you
might frighten some people into not permitting it." Stark Interview, supra note 41.
237. Writing in 1983, Weisberg assumed that evidence about the usefulness of the
death penalty as policy would be admissible under Lockett. Weisberg, supra note 27, at
325. That has turned out not to be true. The California Supreme Court steadfastly rejects
the claim that the defendant should be entitled to present as mitigating evidence
information on the lack of deterrent effect of the death penalty or of the costs of the death
penalty. See, e.g., People v. Benson, 802 P.2d 330 (Cal. 1990) (evidence of deterrence
properly excluded); Barry Nakell, The Cost of the Death Penalty, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 69
1994:1345 1391
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Several courts have rejected evidence of the views of philosophers
or clergy that the death penalty is morally offensive,"8 and evidence
that the death penalty is not a deterrent to crime. 9  Professor Bilionis
suggests that such evidence is excludable because "[s]uch general policy
decisions should be made in political forums."' But the juror who is
seriously addressing the moral question before her may well be interested
in such evidence. To the individual juror, evidence about the death
penalty or executions is not about the policy in a vacuum; it is relevant
to the specific decision to be faced. Beyond that, allowing the juror to
know about the execution, and to learn about policy issues related to
capital punishment, enables her to face her task with the clarity that
comes from proximity.
4. PULLING THE VICTIM CLOSER
Even as the Court pushes the defendant and the execution further and
further into the distance, the victim is being pulled closer. The clearest
example of the Court's willingness to remove the distance between the
jurors and the victim is the recent acceptance of victim-impact evidence
and argument in support of a death sentence. Booth v. Marylande' and
(1978) (describes financial burden of capital adjudication); Comment, The Cost of Taking
a Life: Dollars and Sense of the Death Penalty, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1221, 1245-73
(1985) (describes financial burden of capital sentencing); see also Stephen Magagnini,
Closing Death Row Would Save State $90 Million a Year, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 28,
1988 (n.p.) (article on the millions that capital punishment costs Californians). The
California Supreme Court also rejected proffered testimony as to the percentage of
California death-eligible cases in which a death sentence was actually rendered. See
People v. Wright, 802 P.2d 221 (Cal. 1990) (trial court properly excluded defendant's
proffered testimony regarding the number of special circumstance cases where death
penalty is imposed compared to all such cases).
For a claim that the Lockett doctrine should not reach this type of evidence, see
Louis Biionis, Moral Appropriateness, Capital Punishment, and the Lockett Doctrine, 82
J. CRim. L. & CRIM. 283, 306 (1991) (such evidence is excludable because it "[does] not
suggest a moral basis for a sentence less than death in one particular case as opposed to
any other."). "Thus, society's traditional commitment to discretionary capital sentencing
does not argue in favor of making the morality of capital punishment per se a litigable
question in individual cases." Id. at 307 n.87.
238. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 628 S.W.2d 284 (Ark.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 882
(1982); People v. Yates, 456 N.E.2d 1369 (Ill. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 981 (1984);
State v. Watson, 449 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1181 (1985); State
v. Huffstetler, 322 S.E.2d 110 (N.C. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1009 (1985); State
v. Taylor, 283 S.E.2d 761 (N.C. 1981), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213 (1983).
239. See, e.g., People v. Benson, 802 P.2d 330, 362 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 336 (1991); State v. Jenkins, 473 N.E.2d 264 (Ohio 1984), cert. denied, 472
U.S. 1032 (1985); State v. Williams, 292 S.E.2d 243 (N.C.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056
(1982); State v. Cherry, 257 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1980);
State v. Woomer, 299 S.E.2d 317 (S.C. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 (1983).
240. Bilionis, supra note 237, at 308.
241. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
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South Carolina v. Gathers 2 held that the Eighth Amendment bars the
admission of victim-impact evidence (Booth) or argument (Gathers)
during the penalty phase of a capital trial. The victim-impact evidence
was held to taint the trial with too much emotionality, at the expense of
reliability and reason. Booth and Gathers were overruled in 1991 in
Payne v. Tennessee.' Payne reveals what Angela Harris has called the
Court's "jurisprudence of victimhood,"2 which "reduces the penalty
trial to a contest between the innocent and the guilty."' Indeed,
writing for the Court in Payne, Chief Justice Rehnquist consciously set
out to balance the scales between the defendant (whose individualized
mitigating evidence is protected under Lockett) and the victim.'
The error in Payne is not in allowing jurors to receive evidence of
the impact of the defendant's crime on the survivors. As commentators
have suggested, the impact of the crime is highly relevant to common
notions of blameworthiness.' 7 The problem is that the Court is pulling
the victim closer while pushing the defendant and the execution away.
Payne justifies admission of victim-impact evidence in part because
"virtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a
capital defendant may introduce concerning his own circumstances. " '
Yet, when directly addressing the defendant's rights, the Court
simultaneously offers a much more cramped version of what a defendant
is entitled to present. 9
The Court has lessened the distance between victim and
decisionmaker not only by bringing more evidence of victim impact into
the capital trial, but also by bringing the rhetoric of victims' rights into
its opinions.' Robin West has demonstrated that the opinions
affirming death sentences highlight the ghastly crime of which the
defendant stands convicted,"' which also serves to bring the victim
closer to the decisionmaking, even as the defendant's story disappears.
242. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
243. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
244. Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudence of Victimhood, 1991 Sup. CT. REv. 77
(discussing Payne, Booth, and Gathers).
245. Harris, supra note 244, at 87; see also Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127
(1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in denial of cert.) (noting that death-by-injection for
defendant "looks pretty desirable" compared to shooting death suffered by victim).
246. 501 U.S. at 822-23.
247. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 244.
248. 501 U.S. at 822-23.
249. See Justice Kennedy's formulation in Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658,
2666 (1993), which quotes McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 465 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
250. E.g., Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2668 ("The interests of the State of Texas, and
of the victims whose rights it must vindicate, ought not to be turned aside when the State
relies upon an interpretation of the Eighth Amendment approved by this Court.").
251. See West, supra note 216.
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5. CONNECTION ACKNOWLEDGED
Those who fear that the feminist call for connectedness could result
in longer and harsher sentences for defendants 2 are describing a
condition that already exists. 3 Several jurors told me that they felt
closest to victims of the defendant who testified during the penalty phase.
One juror characterized his reaction to the victims' testimony as
establishing a "strong connection."' Another explained that the most
moving portion of the trial was the penalty testimony of a rape victim of
the defendant: "Whatever doubts we had about the guilt phase went away.
We went back to that jury room [with] a sigh of relief."251
Comparison of the positions of the defendant, the execution, and the
victim reveals that connection already exists, at least with victims, but that
it is camouflaged, and called distanced neutrality. Proximity can enhance
responsibility. The pain of the victims should be brought home to a juror
asked to make a moral determination as to appropriate punishment; so
should the pain of the defendant, and the violence of the execution being
contemplated. The false front of masculine, distanced decisionmaking
prevents honest decisionmaking, and thereby makes fair decisions much
more difficult to attain.
C. Reason vs. Emotion
1. EMOTION RECLAIMED
Feminist philosophers, historians, scientists, and others have
revealed, examined and condemned the false, gendered dichotomy of
reason and emotion that has misshapen Western thought.' Just as
252. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 46:
For those of us who might applaud a possible reduction in criminal penalties
which such intimacy and empathy might foster, we must recognize that our
empathic judges would not simply experience connection with defendants, but
also with victims. Might such judges respond with too harsh condemnations?
Or with paralysis from being torn in many directions?
Id. at 1924.
253. See West, supra note 216.
254. DeMasi Interview, supra note 159.
255. Close connection between the jurors and the victims undoubtedly occurs in
many criminal trials. One researcher suggests that his findings that jurors in criminal
cases in fact apply a standard of guilt "substantially below the meaning of 'beyond a
reasonable doubt'" can be explained by jurors' greater connection to the victim: "Perhaps
their personal experiences or fears are such that they have more dread of being the victim
of a guilty defendant than being wrongly accused of a crime." Stuart Nagel, Bringing the
Values of Jurors in Line with the Law (n.p., n.d.).
256. See, e.g, EISENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 28-29; JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN,
MEDITATIONS ON MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT: MASCULNE/FEMININE THEMES FROM
LUTHER TO ARENDT (1986); ALISON M. JAGUAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN
NATURE (1983); GENEVIEVE LLOYD, THE MAN OF REASON, at ix (1984); Iris M. Young,
Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist Critiques of Moral and
1394
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women have been identified with unreasonable emotionality," emotion
has been tainted as feminine:" s "The reason of man suppresses the
passion of woman."' Emotions are conventionally understood to be
unintentional, instinctual, and somehow base.' The false, gendered
separation of reason from emotion has misshapen legal thought as
well .6'
The fallacy is not only the normative assumption that judgment
should be made by reason alone, without emotion, but also the descriptive
assumption that judgment can be made without emotion. 62 Reason
Political Theory, in FEMINISM As CRITIQUE 57 (Sevla Benhabib & Drucilla Cornell eds.,
1987); see also Jaggar, supra note 9, at 146 ("Because values and emotions had been
defined as variable and idiosyncratic, positivism stipulated that trustworthy knowledge
could be established only by methods that neutralized the values and emotions of
individual scientists.").
257. The traditional assessment of women as emotional and unreasonable is
pervasive and well-known. See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE
COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 257-58 (James Strachey trans.
& ed., 1968) (claiming that women "show less sense of justice than men ... [and] are
more often influenced in their judgments by feelings of affection or hostility"); A.P.
HERBERT, MISLEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 13 (1928) ("humorous" reference
to difficulty of finding a reasonable woman quoted widely in Torts texts). This stereotype
of women continues today in more subtle ways. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 3, at
559-60 (noting feminist work combatting woman-abuse that addresses the assumption that
women are inherently irrational).
258. Men of color have also been associated with emotions. See, e.g., Jaggar,
supra note 9, at 157 ("Women appear more emotional than men because they, along with
some groups of people of color, are permitted and even required to express emotion more
openly.").
259. EISENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 51 (emphasis added).
260. See, e.g., Jaggar, supra note 9, at 145 (criticizing conventional understanding
of emotions as unintended, base, and passively experienced).
261. According to Lucinda Finley, "One of the other languages that the law does
not easily hear is that associated with the emotions . . . . Law is a language firmly
committed to the "reason" side of the reason/emotion dichotomy." Finley, supra note 8,
at 903; see also Minow & Spelman, supra note 209, at 38-39 ("'Emotion,' on the other
hand, most likely is thought to refer to something potentially dangerous, unreliable, and
unjustifiable."). Minow and Spelman describe Robert M. Cover's landmark book about
the role of law in upholding slavery, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTI-SLAVERY AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975), as an explication of the danger of attempting to banish emotion
from law: "[Judges'] adherence to a conception of law as distinct from emotion and as
something found, outside of themselves, helped them to rationalize their enforcement of
slavery as beyond their power." Id. at 48.
262. See, e.g., Jaggar, supra note 9, at 147 (criticizing ordinary ways of
understanding emotion, including reference to anthropologist who argues that
"dichotomous categories of 'cognition' and 'affect' are themselves Euroamerican cultural
constructions'"). For an extended refutation of the dichotomy of emotion and justice, see
ROBERT C. SOLOMON, A PASSION FOR JUSTICE: EMOTIONS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT (1990); id. at 30 ("Justice ... consists first of all of a constellation
of feelings."); id. at 44 ("Rationality is not opposed to emotions but is rather an intrinsic
part of them. Emotions are not opposed to judgment; they invoke and require
judgment."); Emily K. Abel & Margaret K. Nelson, Circles of Care: An Introductory
Essay, in CIRCLES OF CARE, supra note 73, at 5 ("Caregiving also challenges the division
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alone cannot choose between conflicting principles: "The choice about
what to value, the choice about whose plight to find moving, and indeed,
the choice about how to act in the face of uncertainty calls for more than
what reason in the narrow sense can supply. You need passion.'
Like other powerful systems of thought, law aspires to rationality,
and describes itself as rational, without the taint of emotion.' The
capital sentencing task is awash in confusion about how to make a moral
decision without "succumbing" to emotions.'
2. EMOTION EVERYWHERE
We insist upon public trials because "the open processes of justice
serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for
community concern, hostility, and emotion."' Emotions offer
particular fuel to capital cases. Prosecutors and defense attorneys
inevitably attempt to reach the jurors with emotional claims; in fact, social
science data reveal that prosecutors' arguments for death focus primarily
on the emotional component of the decision.'
Emotions operate throughout capital litigation. Several jurors
acknowledged the emotion in their experience.' They reported
between reason and emotion.").
263. Minow & Spelman, supra note 209, at 37. "This treatment of reason and
passion as abstract entities simultaneously personifies as distinct persons the traits of
reason and emotion, and makes it all the more difficult to articulate and understand their
interconnections." Id. But see Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101
HARV. L. REV. 10, 77 (1987) (distinguishing "[slympathy, the human emotion,... from
equal respect, the legal command").
264. Jaggar, supra note 9, at 156. "[L]ike the ideal of disinterested enquiry, the
ideal of dispassionate enquiry is an impossible dream but a dream nonetheless or perhaps
a myth that has exerted enormous influence on western epistemology. Like all myths, it
is a form of ideology that fulfills certain social and political functions." Id.
265. See Joan Shaughnessy, Booth v. Maryland, Insights into the Contemporary
Challenges to Judging, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 279 (1992) ("Nevertheless, the capital
cases may be seen in part as the Court's struggle to deal with an issue for which modem
law has left the Court utterly unequipped-the uses and dangers of emotion in judging.").
266. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980) (Burger,
C.J., plurality opinon).
267. See Hans, supra note 55, at 167 ("Mhe overall pattern of [prosecutors']
arguments in the penalty phase suggested that they perceived the emotional dimensions of
the decision to be paramount.").
268. " ]t's an emotionally gripping thing and I don't think you can get away from
that." Smith Interview, supra note 159. "[Ilt was an emotional experience for me. It
got tense during the deliberation section. Frustration in the process of coming to a
decision. Anger at the man himself, for what he did . . . . Compassion during the
penalty phase. He is still a human being. He is not an insect." Quinlan Interview, supra
note 192. Another juror doubted that the emotion could be eliminated: "You're not
dealing with twelve profound people there." "mhe most mild looking person in there was
a gal who was [so] gung ho she wanted to do him in. I was amazed. She was emotional;
she said an eye for an eye about forty thousand times." Dalrymple Interview, supra note
194.
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crying,' weight loss, m  or lost sleepy 1  The Chief Justice of the
Florida Supreme Court at the time of John Spenkelink's final
(unsuccessful) petitions described his participation as "emotionally
devastating."I Justice Blackmun prefaced his vote in Furman to
uphold capital punishment by acknowledging "excruciating agony of the
spirit."' The desire to punish is steeped in emotions, especially
anger.' Proponents of speeding up executions, including members of
the Court, are animated by anger, pride, frustration, and other
emotions 5 that do not seem to count in the rhetorical banning of
emotion. The impatience of the members of the current Court is not
Not all jurors agreed. One characterized the experience as sometimes
"embarrassing" but not emotional: "[We had] no emotion because we were told ahead
of time [what to expect). The only thing gruesome about it is that he had stabbed her 22
times and the coat that had been wrapped around her was all full of stab marks."
Manchester Interview, supra note 77.
269. Boisvert Interview, supra note 78 ("I went outside and started crying.");
Neider Interview, supra note 77 (noting one woman who changed her vote was practically
crying).
270: "[lt was a very painful experience. I grew from it. I lost weight." Boisvert
Interview, supra note 78.
271. "I might have lost at most one or two hours sleep but it probably is the
biggest decision I ever made in life." Neider Interview, supra note 77.
272. Arthur England has recounted: "[lit was emotionally devastating to be a part
of this process. And I can't even capture it in words. I can't even give you a sense of
what it was like." Burt, supra note 40, at 1807; see also Janice Rogers Brown, The
Quality of Mercy, 40 UCLA L. REv. 327, 336-37 (1992) (California Governor Pete
Wilson's legal affairs secretary ends her discussion of governor's decision to deny
clemency to Robert Harris by recounting how surprisingly hard the (pro-execution)
governor's staff found the actual execution to be).
273. 408 U.S. 238, 405 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
274. See, e.g., Joseph M. Giarratano, To the Best of Our Knowledge We Have
Never Been Wrong, 100 YALE L.J. 1005, 1006 (1991) (judiciary responding to the
"anger, frustration, or fear" causing clamor for faster executions); Samuel H. Pillsbury,
Evil & the Law of Murder, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 437, 443 & n.16 (1990); Pillsbury,
supra note 229, at 689.
275. See, for instance, Justice Rehnquist's angry and impatient opinion in Coleman
v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 956-64 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of cert.),
in which he proposed accepting all death penalty cases on appeal for review for quick
resolution of all constitutional issues in order to end the federal court jurisdiction which
he clearly saw as simply an impediment to executions:
I do not think that this Court can continue to evade some responsibility for
this mockery of our criminal justice system ....
When our systems of administering criminal justice cannot provide
security to our people in the streets or in their homes, we are rapidly
approaching the state of savagery. . . . In the Nation's Capital, law
enforcement authorities cannot protect the lives of employees of this very
Court who live four blocks from the building in which we sit and deliberate
the constitutionality of capital punishment.
Id. at 958, 962; cf. Minow & Spelman, supra note 209, at 42 ("But systems of
bureaucratic rationality in fact embody other emotions, such as contempt for or fear of
litigants or clients.").
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unlike the frustration of the jurors who "were anxious to go home.""O
But the false gendered dichotomy that separates male reason from female
emotion prevents "strong" (and therefore male) emotions such as anger,
frustration, or vengeance2 " from even being recognized as emotion at
all.
279
3. EMOTION DENIED
Capital jurisprudence denies its emotional component. m Jurors
learn to fight authentic emotional response,' and therefore distrust
open appeals to emotion." One juror believed that one "of the most
important and one of the most difficult things to do was to separate
myself from an emotional response." When asked which emotions were
"troublesome" she responded, "Pity, or compassion . . . . Anger.
Sorrow. But when you go in to deliberate you have to let that go [or] it
is not justice."' Although appeals to emotions are the most prevalent
type of argument, "transparent" appeals to the emotions of jurors
276. Dalrymple Interview, supra note 194. Jurors from two cases reported
frustration at other jurors who delayed reaching a verdict in order to obtain free meals and
delay their return to work.
[The jurors] got steamed up after all the time, days, even weeks .... because
one guy . .. made a game of it. He worked for the government, [and] was
paid all that time but there were a lot of people including the foreman who
didn't get any pay at all . . .so finally I blew my stack and I told the guy I
think that's a lousy trick your holding out and horsing around like this all the
time. mhat guy got angry back but came in the next morning and said "Ok,
let's go home," but even then he loved to eat those free lunches.
Id.
277. See HARRIET G. LERNER, THE DANCE Op ANGER 1 (1985) (women have
been discouraged from expressing their anger); Audre Lorde, The Uses of Anger: Women
Responding to Racism, in SISTER OUTSIDER, supra note 35, at 124; Grillo, supra note 51,
at 1572-81.
278. See People v. Kaurish, 802 P.2d 278,315 (Cal. 1990) (prosecutor's argument
to "show courage" was not improper), cert.denied, 112 S. Ct. 121 (1991).
279. See Shaughnessy, supra note 265, at 280 (pointing out that "the law has not
completely ignored the presence of emotion in criminal litigation; rather, the law has
sought to disguise the role and importance of emotion"). But see Spaziano v. Florida,
468 U.S. 447, 469 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (arguing
that capital sentencing must be done by juries because a death judgment is "ultimately
understood only as an expression of the community's outrage").
280. Juror DeMasi described two parts of the trial as especially emotional; the first
was the testimony during the penalty phase of women who were rape victims of the
defendant. "I was able to kind of divorce myself from any emotional involvement until
those ladies testified ... that was hard." After their testimony, "we would have provided
the rope, the tree and hanged that guy." DeMasi Interview, supra note 159. The second
was during deliberations, when he had to pick up the victim's bloodied coat with bullet
holes in order to reach another exhibit. "I told myself about looking at the evidence,
'Alright, I'm looking at all these things, but I'm not involved; I'm able to sit back and
weigh this thing with a clear mind and without prejudice.'" Id.
281. See generally Weisberg, supra note 27, at 379.
282. Boisvert Interview, supra note 78.
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constitute misconduct, which can lead to reversal of a resultant death
sentence.' The Court consistently describes capital punishment law as
unsullied by the taint of emotion. This rhetorical stance is most evident
in the Court's treatment of no-sympathy instructions, its use of the
reasonable juror for appellate review of penalty determinations, and its
assessment of victim-impact evidence.
a. The Question of Sympathy
The feminist call to revalue and reincorporate compassion or mercy
into law' implicates a core concern of penalty adjudication.' The
Court's view of emotion as an enemy to be rooted out and eliminated is
clear in its cases dealing with so-called "no-sympathy" instructions. In
California v. Brown the Court upheld a death sentence imposed by a jury
that had been instructed not to be swayed by "mere sympathy."' The
defense argued that the no-sympathy command prevented the jury from
effectively considering the evidence of mitigation, as required under
Lockett. Justice O'Connor provided a majority to affirm the death
sentence with a concurrence that upheld the no-sympathy instruction
because it enabled the jurors to make their moral decision based on
reason, not emotion: "[T]he sentence imposed . . . should reflect a
reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, character, and
crime rather than mere sympathy or emotion."' Brown counsels that
forbidding the capital jury to rely on sentiment or sympathy increases the
reliability of the sentence that results 8 s
According to Carol Gilligan, "Within a justice construction, care
becomes the mercy that tempers justice."' In his dissent in Brown,
283. See, e.g., Griffin v. State, 557 So. 2d 542, 552-53 (Miss. 1990) (requiring
reversal because of prosecutorial misconduct consisting of recurring and transparent
appeals to the emotions of jurors).
284. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, andAbortion, 77 CAL. L. REv.
1011, 1025-26, 1042 (1989) (calling for compassion and arguing that constitutional
principles of due process and equal protection embody compassion); Lynne Henderson,
Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574 (1987) (describing need for empathy).
285. See, e.g., Paul W. Cobb, Jr., Note, Reviving Mercy in the Structure of
Capital Punishment, 99 YALE L.J. 389 (1989). Indeed, much of the feminist commentary
on capital decisionmaking that does exist has addressed the need for emotion. E.g.,
Shaugnessy, supra note 265 (calling for recognition of emotion as vital part of legal
decisionmaking); West, supra note 181, at 91 ("mhe juror's capacity for empathy and
sympathy, far from being distractions from principled, rational, objective moral
decision-making... is precisely what enables morality."); see also Pillsbury, supra note
229 (suggesting that certain emotions, namely moral outrage and empathy, encourage
moral decisionmaking, and should be encouraged by jury instructions).
286. 479 U.S. 538, 542-43 (1987).
287. id. at 544 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
288. For criticism of Brown suggesting that the contention that jurors would be
able to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate sources of sympathy was "far-
fetched," see Hans, supra note 55, at 164-65.
289. Gilligan, supra note 47, at 24.
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Justice Blackmun took Portia's role of urging justice tempered by mercy:
"In my view, we adhere so strongly to our belief that sentencers should
have the opportunity to spare a capital defendant's life on account of
compassion for the individual because . ..we see in the sentencer's
expression of mercy a distinctive feature of our society that we deeply
value."' Thus, the debate in Brown was not between Gilligan's ethic
of justice and ethic of care; the debate was merely whether capital justice
survives the optional addition of the corrective emotion of mercy.
The Court revisited the no-sympathy issue in Saffle v. Parks,"'1 and
reaffirmed its conception of emotion as dangerous, untrustworthy, and
fundamentally at odds with the goal of reliable death sentences:
Whether a juror feels sympathy for a capital defendant is more
likely to depend on that juror's own emotions than on the actual
evidence regarding the crime and the defendant. It would be
very difficult to reconcile a rule allowing the fate of a defendant
to turn on the vagaries of particular jurors' emotional
sensitivities with our long-standing recognition that, above all,
capital sentencing must be reliable, accurate, and
nonarbitrary.?
Speaking for the Court, Justice Kennedy condemned emotion as based on
whims and caprice of the jurors,' and destructive of the "fairness and
accuracy" of the death sentence.' The no-sympathy decisions'
290. 479 U.S. at 562-63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The feminist impulse to
retrieve emotion has been captured by the use of the image of Shakespeare's Portia. See,
e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 30, at 39, 42 & n.23.
291. 494 U.S. 484 (1990). Brown had raised the issue on direct appeal from a
death judgment; Saffle concerned the no-sympathy instruction in the context of the Court's
complex doctrine limiting availability of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.
292. Id. at 493 (citations omitted). The jury that voted to impose a death sentence
upon Parks was instructed as follows: "You are the judges of the facts. The importance
and worth of the evidence is for you to determine. You must avoid any influence of
sympathy, sentiment, passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor when imposing
sentence." Id. at 487. In Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993), which upheld the
Texas sentencing scheme, the Court brushed aside any concern that "[there might have
been a juror who, on the basis solely of sympathy or mercy, would have opted against the
death penalty had there been a vehicle to do so under the Texas special issues scheme."
Id. at 2671. See generally Note, supra note 285, at 389, 396-98 (proposing revival of
mercy in capital questions; discussing Brown and Parks).
293. 494 U.S. at 493.
294. Id. at 495. The dissent in Parks criticizes the majority's distinction between
morality and emotion. Id. at 513 ( Brennan, J., dissenting).
295. The no-sympathy message of Brown and Parks has led state courts to invite
prosecutorial arguments against sympathy, see, e.g., People v. (Jesse) Gonzales, 800 P.2d
1159, 1181-82 (1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 117 (1991) (no error in prosecutor's
argument to not consider sympathy), and to attempt to eliminate "mercy" from
instructions to jurors, see, e.g., People v. Benson, 802 P.2d 330, 363 (Cal. 1990) (no
error in refusing "mercy" instruction). "Neither statute nor Constitution gives the jury
the riaht to exercise what is essentially godlike power." Id.
1400
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reflect the Court's official position of attempting at all turns to banish
emotion from the moral decision at the heart of capital sentencing. The
especially feminine emotions of sympathy and mercy are especially
condemned.2
b. No Reasonable Juror
A more subtle manifestation of the Court's routine erasure of
emotionality from the jury's decision to impose death is its use of the
"reasonable juror" standard for appellate review of trial court error that
may have contributed to a jury verdict for death.' In Sawyer v.
Whitley,' the Court held that a capital defendant who claims actual
innocence in a successive habeas petition must show by clear and
convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable juror
would have found petitioner eligible for the death penalty under applicable
state law.
The hypothetical "reasonable juror" is, of course, a staple of
appellate oversight of jurors' factfinding abilities throughout civil and
criminal procedure; a directed verdict is proper, for example, if no
reasonable juror could find facts to support an opposite verdict. The
fictional "reasonable jurist" has a recurring leading role in the Court's
intricate habeas corpus doctrine.' The use of the fictional "reasonable
juror" makes the most sense when the part of the penalty jury's task that
relates to factfinding is at issue."
The capital sentence, however, is fundamentally about values and
conscience, not merely facts. The weight of the decision itself imposes
296. Justice Scalia remains the most passionate opponent of female emotion; for
him, "merciful" serves as an almost contemptuous epithet. E.g., Morgan v. Illinois, 112
S. Ct. 2222, 2242 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
297. In Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990)i the Court determined that
the use of potentially misleading instructions to penalty phase jurors would require
reversal of the judgment upon a showing of "a reasonable likelihood that the jury has
applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of
constitutionally relevant evidence." Id. Although the Boyde Court rejected a variety of
formulations that the Court has used related to a "single hypothetical 'reasonable' juror,"
it continues to use hypothetical "reasonable jurors" to apply the Boyde standard of
reasonable likelihood. Id. at 380-81; cf Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 249 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (upholding the Florida statute allowing a judge to override a jury
recommendation for life in part on the basis of the Florida Supreme Court's limitation of
such overrides for death to situations where "the facts suggesting a sentence of death
should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ").
298. 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2517 (1992).
299. See, e.g., Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 898 (1993) (quoting Saie, 494
U.S. at 488) (ruling sought by a habeas corpus petitioner is barred "unless reasonable
jurists hearing petitioner's claim . . .'would have felt compelled by existing precedent' to
rule in his favor"); Richmond v. Lewis, 113 S. Ct. 528, 537 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (using "reasonable jurist" test).
300. See, e.g., Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 781 (1990) (using "rational fact
finder" standard to test whether aggravating circumstance was established).
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emotion on the determination. 1 But the Court's choice of the
"reasonable juror" standard for appellate review of death verdicts
removes the emotion, conscience, and mercy from the determination. 12
By narrowing the "gut-level hunch" to a matter of reason, the Court
cleans the emotion out of the process, and moves further and further away
from the realities of capital decisionmaking.
Even without going so far as to substitute a "compassionate juror"
for the reasonable one,' we would recognize the moral question at the
heart of the decision to impose death by assessing the impact of a penalty
phase error on a hypothetical "conscientious juror." The fact that the
actions of a "conscientious" juror would be much harder to predict could
render harmless error review in capital cases somewhat more honest."
c. Victim Impact
The denial of emotion in capital jurisprudence is also evident in the
series of recent decisions related to victim-impact evidence.' As
discussed above, Booth v. Maryland' and South Carolina v.
Gathers,' which barred the admission of victim-impact evidence
(Booth) or argument (Gathers), were both decided in part on the principle
that the decision to sentence to death must be based on reason, rather than
emotion. The victim-impact evidence corrupted the trial with too much
emotionality, at the expense of reliability and reason. Booth and Gathers
were overruled in 1991 by Payne v. Tennessee.' But Payne contains
not a hint about any positive virtues emotion may contribute to achieving
301. Costanzo and Costanzo note that "[a ] mechanical, dispassionate weighing may
be incompatible with the emotionally charged atmosphere of the jury room." Costanzo
& Costanzo, supra note 32, at 198.
302. Tellingly, in evaluating late claims of "actual innocence" the Court's fictional
"reasonable juror" is concerned only with whether the new evidence takes the petitioner
outside the rules that permit a death sentence, not whether it offers new mitigating
evidence that could militate against an execution. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2522.
Individualized mitigating evidence is much more difficult to assess. Id.; see supra text
accompanying notes 199-201 (discussing removal of individualized discretion from Sawyer
v. Whitley analysis).
303. Costanzo & Costanzo, supra note 32, at 188 ("This 'reasonable juror'
standard is a legal notion founded on untested (and often unstated) assumptions about the
process of jury decision making. Indeed, the available empirical findings impugn the
Court's confidence in the fairness and rationality of the process.").
304. Cf Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J.
LEOAL EDUC. 3 (1989) (critiquing use of reasonable person in tort).
305. See Weisberg, supra note 27, at 346 (conceptual difficulty in applying
harmless error analysis to such an ineffable determination).
306. See supra text accompanying notes 241-49 (discussing role of victim-impact
cases in diminishing distance between decisionmaker and jurors).
307. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
308. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
309. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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a moral decision. 1° The single reference to the role of emotion is made
in Justice O'Connor's concurrence, which suggests that the emotionally
moving nature of the grandmother's testimony about her grandson's cries
for his dead mother and worries for his dead sister was harmlessly
cumulative: that evidence "did not inflame [the jurors'] passions more
than did the facts of the crime ... 311
The dissenters in Payne rework their (previously winning) argument
against emotion,31  but the majority is essentially silent. In fact, the
logic of the Court's stated distrust of emotion requires exclusion of the
victim-impact evidence. The Court wants the emotional evidence to be
included, but, constrained by its anti-emotion principles, cannot claim any
benefit from the emotionality; instead, to the extent that Justice O'Connor
addresses the subject, she falsely minimizes the emotional impact of the
survivors' testimony.31 3  Once emotions-including feminine emotions
such as pity and sympathy and masculine emotions such as anger-are
recognized as a valuable part of moral judging, victim-impact evidence
can be permitted within the sentencing process. But this feminist
argument in favor of this evidence, in favor of emotions, is completely
absent. In this and countless smaller ways, 14 the Court vilifies and
hides the emotion that is present and necessary.
4. EMOTION ACKNOWLEDGED
Capital rhetoric denounces and extinguishes emotion, assumed to be
weak, and said to be contrary to reliability. Thus capital doctrine
pretends to rest on reason, not emotion, while in fact emotions are
holding forth on all sides. Just as elevating emotion from its present
310. Indeed, the majority opinion is exceedingly businesslike, especially in its
justification of overruling such recent precedent. While "considerations in favor of stare
decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance
interests are involved, the opposite is true in cases such as the present one involving
procedural and evidentiary rules." Id. at 2610 (citations omitted).
311. Id. at 2612 (O'Connor, concurring). Justice O'Connor continues: "'Murder
is the ultimate act of depersonalization.' It transforms a living person with hopes, dreams,
and fears into a corpse, thereby taking away all that is special and unique about the
person. The Constitution does not preclude a State from deciding to give some of that
back." id. (quoting Brief of Justice for All Political Committee et al., as amici curiae at
3, Payne (No. 90-5721)).
312. "Evidence that serves no purpose other than to appeal to the sympathies or
emotions of the jurors has never been considered admissible." 501 U.S. at 856-57
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
313. When asked whether victim-impact evidence should be admitted, Juror Stark
said "I don't think you should mix in all these emotional things." Stark Interview, supra
note 41.
314. For example, in Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993), Justice Thomas
condemns the mitigation principles, quoting from Scalia's Penry dissent. "It is an
unguided, emotional 'moral response' that the Court demands be allowed-an outpouring
of personal reaction to all the circumstances of a defendant's life and personality, an
unfocused sympathy." Id. at 912.
1994:1345 1403
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position as a hidden, shameful secret in the law promises increased
honesty and integrity, failure to acknowledge the inevitable emotionality
in capital cases undermines the possibility of justice in innumerable ways.
Hiding the inevitable emotion of the jurors' experience allows judges to
ignore the hidden influence of fear, frustration, or deep sadness on the
task of jurors and judges.315 Pretending emotion is absent does not
make it so; acknowledging that emotion is already deeply at work in
moral decisionmaking can lead to seeing its value in capital sentencing.
None of that is possible until heretofore feminine emotions such as pity
and sadness can be seen as legitimate sources of authority and strength.
D. The Non-Gendered Decision
In all of these ways, the awesome task of conscience that confronts
capital jurors is currently hidden behind a masculine veneer of rules,
distance, and reason. Yet the moral task that we demand of capital jurors
itself demands all of their faculties: their hearts as well as their minds,
closeness to the defendant as well as to the victims, attention to doctrine
as well as acceptance of discretion. Stripping away the falsely gendered
nature of capital decisionmaking promises a deeper moral response.
IV. THE DECISIONMAKERS
Capital jurors receive extraordinary power.316 Not only is capital
sentencing generally the only sentencing task handed to jurors, but this
role is strikingly and fundamentally different from fact-finding, the work
traditionally done by jurors. In all other criminal contexts, jurors
determine guilt and judges sentence. Why use a jury here, for this
especially difficult sentencing decision?317 The choice of a jury severely
undermines at least one purported goal and Eighth Amendment
315. Trina Grillo notes about mediation that "a party may agree to something
because he is nervous, intimidated, exhausted, or frightened." Grillo, supra note 51, at
1598. Surely that is true for jurors, as well. See Victoria Slind-Flor, In Grisly Trials
Counties Begin to Help Jurors Cope Afterward, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 20, 1992, at 3
(describing counselling now being offered to some jurors).
316. For a description of the uniqueness of allowing juries to sentence and the
suggestion that "[]awmakers may have decided that only a defendant's peers should make
a choice so grave as life or death," see Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA.
L. RE v. 1, 15-16 (1980). The powerful role of the capital jury is especially noteworthy
in light of the historic reduction in authority granted to juries described in Albert W.
Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States,
61 U. CHI. L. REv. 867 (1994), and Phoebe A. Haddon, Rethinking the Jury, 3 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 29, 39-49 (1994).
317. See, e.g., Cover, supra note 21, at 1622 ("The questions of whether the death
sentence is constitutionally permissible and, if it is, whether to impose it, are among the
most difficult problems a judge encounters.").
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requirement, that of proportionality between the crime and the
sentence."' Lay jurors confront only one heinous case, which prevents
them from assessing relative blameworthiness within the group of possible
candidates for death.319 The choice of a jury for capital sentencing is
especially intriguing in light of the variety of ways that the jury can be
understood as a feminine institution.
A. The Feminine Jury
Of the key roles in the capital adjudication drama-defendant, judge,
prosecutor, defense attorney, juror-the role of juror is the most inclusive
of women, by percentage and raw numbers.' 2 In fact, although women
are kept off capital juries in a variety of ways,321 jury service is still the
318. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 749 (1990) (upholding appellate
reweighing in part because "state supreme courts in States authorizing the death penalty
may well review many death sentences and ... typical jurors, in contrast, will serve only
one such case during their life-times"); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252-53 (1976)
(i[J]udicial sentencing should lead, if anything, to even greater consistency ... since a
trial judge is more experienced in sentencing than a jury, and therefore is better able to
impose sentences similar to those imposed in analogous cases"); see also California
Supreme Court Conference, 28 SANTA ClARA L. REv. 243, 281 (1988) (discussion by
Edward Panelli, Assoc. Justice on the Cal. Sup. Ct., noting that the disadvantage of
moving capital appeals to various courts of appeal is loss of proportionality from current
practice of single (Supreme) Court reviewing all the cases); Joseph L. Hoffmann, On the
Perils of Line-Drawing: Juveniles and the Death Penalty, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 229, 248-57
(1989) (current capital punishment doctrine requires cardinal and ordinal proportionality).
319. On the other hand, the uniqueness of the experience might enhance the jurors'
sense of the "awesome responsibility" of the task. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S.
320 (1985). One juror told me that a jury was "a far better approach" because "judges,
like... doctors, like anyone in any field that incurs a certain amount of trauma, they will
eventually become inured to it. Whereas a lay jury . . . it's one time or twice in their
lives that they have to do this and they approach it with a fresher approach." Smith
Interview, supra note 159.
320. The access of women to juries is a relatively recent phenomenon. In Hoyt v.
Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), the Supreme Court held that excluding women from jury
service was neither a due process nor an equal protection violation because there was a
sufficient rational basis for it-that women are "still regarded as the center of home and
family life." Id. at 62. In 1975 the Supreme Court recognized that systematically
excluding women from juries violated defendants' Sixth Amendment rights. See Taylor
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 536 (1975). For a description of the relatively recent reform
that allows women to serve on juries, including the facts that 21 states prohibited women
jurors at the time of World War II and that three states still excluded women from juries
in 1962, see Carol Weisbrod, Images of the Woman Juror, 9 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 59,
60-61 (1986). For a discussion of the importance of jury service to those who fought for
women's suffrage, see Barbara Allen Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights
and Jury Service, 61 U. CINN. L. REv. 1139, 1165-72 (1993).
321. In addition to the disproportionate exclusion of women through death
qualification, some are struck from juries simply because they are women. See, e.g.,
Babcock, supra note 320 (discussing constitutionality of gender-based peremptories).
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994), the recent decision holding sex-
based peremptory challenges impermissible, is likely to eliminate the blatant, avowed
challenges to women. For references to misogynous comments about women jurors in
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only role in capital adjudication that is not overwhelmingly male.322
Focusing on the jurors' experience is paying attention to women. 3"
Not only are women found on juries, but deeply imbedded
conventional views of judges and juries replicate the familiar male/female
dichotomy. Carrie Menkel-Meadow asks, "Is the judge 'male,' and the
jury 'female'?"3  Like women, juries are approached with a
combination of condescension and romance.3' Certainly the judge/jury
duality reflects a hierarchy; the real law is imposed by judges, whereas
the jurors are measured by how well they conform to the rule of law
established by the officials." The jury is "particularistic," in Virginia
trial practice manuals, see Anne Rankin Mahoney, Sexism in Voir Dire: The Use of Sex
Stereotypes in Jury Selection, in WOMEN IN THE COURTS 118-21 (Winifred L. Hepperle
& Laura Crites eds., 1978); Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir
Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 153
182 n.113 (1989). Even when on juries, women may participate less than men. See infra
notes 352-55 and accompanying text (discussing gender and racial bias on juries).
Although the constitutional requirement that juries not exclude women had been
recognized in 1975, the first person executed in Georgia after the resumption of capital
punishment was sentenced to death by a jury panel from which women had been
improperly excluded. That defendant's attorney failed to object to the exclusion,
however, so the federal court refused to address the error. Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d
1459, 1476 (11th Cir.) (Hatchett, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983).
The correct objection made by the co-defendant's attorney resulted in a reversal of his
death sentence on appeal, and subsequent life sentence upon resentencing with a jury panel
that included women. Stephen B. Bright, In Defense of Life: Enforcing the Bill of Rights
on Behalf of Poor, Minority and Disadvantaged Persons Facing the Death Penalty, 57
Mo. L. REv. 849, 861 (1992).
322. The vast majority of capital defendants are male. See Victor Streib, Death
Penally for Female Offenders, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 845, 880 (1990) (death penalty for
female offenders is "extremely rare"). In fact, of the 2848 people on death rows in the
Spring of 1994, 44 (or 1.54%) were women. DEATH Row, U.S.A. (NAACP Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Spring 1994, at 1.
323. The choice to focus on the jury can be arrived at by following the women,
or by locating the site of "experiential understanding." Massaro, supra note 91, at 2109
n.50 (noting that experiential understanding may turn attention "to the jury, rather than
the judge").
324. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 30, at 49.
325. See Alschuler, supra note 321, at 161. Alschuler describes the condescension
toward jurors, who are often asked whether they are bigots and otherwise lose privacy and
dignity during voir dire, id. at 155, and are seated "at the side of the courtroom in an area
vaguely resembling the Peanut Gallery on the Howdy Doody Show." Id. Alschuler's
wonderful description of the mixture of condescension and romance with which juries are
described does not explicitly associate juries with women.
326. For a provocative discussion of the way that the jury is evaluated by how well-
it conforms to a standard of "the law of the officials," or judges, assuming that jurors are
somehow outside of and different from the real law, see Marianne Constable, What Books
About Juries Reveal About Social Science and Law, 16 LAW AND SOC. INQUIRY 353
(1991). "Discussions of 'jury nullification' especially point to researchers'
presuppositions that 'law' means the law of the officials, a law that contrasts to the
'beliefs,' 'sentiments,' and 'attitudes,' expressed in jury verdicts." Id. at 359. A'clear
example of Constable's point is expressed in Nagel, supra note 255.
HeinOnline -- 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 1406 1994
Deciding to Kill
Held's terms, rather than universal.' z In fact, the choice of the jury
for capital sentencing is justified in part because the jury embodies
discretionary, personal, and emotional decisionmaking.
1. MYSTERIOUS DECISIONMAKING
Choosing a jury for capital sentencing seems to belie the purported
heightened scrutiny for capital cases, because juror functioning is not
well-understood.3 Perhaps surprisingly, the use of the jury to impose
death sentences has been justified in part because the very inscrutability
of the jury fits well with the discretionary, moral judgment of capital
sentencing:
[Tihe ultimate call is visceral. The decision must occur past the
point to which legalistic reasoning can carry; it necessarily
reflects a gut-level hunch as to what is just. The collective lay
view of the jury, then, is understandably attractive. By nature
the jury's decision is inscrutable. Indeed, the jury is the
blackbox of the judicial system.3"
Thus the jury is valued and chosen in large part because it is not
accountable. Rather, it is inscrutable, like a black-box, neither explained
nor understood. 3 The jury is mysterious and unpredictable. In this
way, the jury is feminine.
2. PERSONAL, EMOTIONAL, COMPASSIONATE DECISIONMAKING
Judges are expected to be distanced decisionmakers;33 the jury
offers close, connected, personal decisionmaking. The very reason for
having a jury is to bring personal values and experiences into
decisionmaking. Handing off the task of capital sentencing to juries is
justified by the benefit from giving this task to people for whom it will
327. Virginia Held, Birth and Death, 99 ETHIcS 362 (1988-1989):
The claim that the family is particularistic while the polis deals with what is
universal is questionable even in terms of existing institutions ....
[Clonsider a paradigm of the "public" sphere: a court of law. Here,
typically, a single defendant is judged by a few individuals, and no case is
quite like any other.
Id. at 397-98.
328. See, e.g., HASTIE, supra note 121, at 4 (suggesting that the law is based on
untested and probably unsound intuitions about juror decisionmaking).
329. Higginbotham, supra note 125, at 1048-49.
330. See Weisberg, supra note 27, at 346 n. 174 (citing People v. Hines, 390 P.2d
398, 402 (Cal. 1964)) (jury's decisionmaking process is an unknowable "dark
ignorance").
331. See NAFFINE, supra note 12, at 37; Resnik, supra note 46, at 191.
1994:1345 1407
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be a personal, not a professional decision?32  Part of personalizing a
decision is bringing emotion to it; using jurors for capital sentencing is
explained in part because jurors are better suited to the emotion of the
task.333 Similarly, jurors are said to bring an appropriate moral
leavening to the law of capital sentencing.'
The personal decisionmaking of the jury promises connection to the
community that may elude the distanced, rule-bound judge. The Court
has found that "the jury... is a significant and reliable objective index
of contemporary values";335 the jury is honored as "the authentic voice
332. E.g., United States v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 776 (2d Cir. 1942) (Judge
Learned Hand points out that "no one is likely to suffer of whose conduct [the jury does]
not morally disapprove.").
333. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468-69 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part) (jury is best able to express community outrage);
id. at 488 n.34 (quoting from HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD (1972) regarding judge's
ability to conquer compassion, to bolster his argument that a jury is required for capital
sentencing because the jury will be more open to compassion, and is required to be
consistent with community values); see also Higginbotham, supra note 125, at 1048-49
(jury is well-suited for capital determination because the choice "is uniquely laden with
expressions of anger and retribution").
334. See Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 468-70 (Stevens, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part) (jury's assessment of moral question less likely to lead to excessive
punishment).
A judge trained to distinguish proof of guilt from questions concerning
sentencing might react quite differently to this case than would a jury. See
[HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD 72 (1972)] ("For the compassion how can
I otherwise than share it. But, mindful of paramount obligations I strive
against scruples that may tend to enervate decision.").
Id. at 488 n.34; see also United States v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1942)
(Judge Learned Hand) (jury "introduces a slack into the enforcement of law, tempering
its rigor by the mollifying influence of current ethical conventions").
335. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976). The jury "maintain[s] a link
between contemporary community values and the penal system-a link without which the
determination of punishment could hardly reflect 'the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.'" Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519
(1968) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
However, the Court has rejected the claim that the Constitution requires jury
sentencing in capital cases, see Spaziano, 468 U.S. 447, while acknowledging that the jury
serves as "a link between the community and the penal system." Id. at 462. In dissent
in Spaziano, Justice Stevens argued (on behalf of himself and Justices Marshall and
Brennan) that jury sentencing is required to ensure that the death judgment is justified.
Id. at 468-70 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
Because it is the one punishment that cannot be prescribed by a rule of law as
judges normally understand such rules, but rather is ultimately understood
only as an expression of the community's outrage-its sense that an individual
has lost his moral entitlement to live-I am convinced that the danger of an
excessive response can only be avoided if the decision to impose the death
penalty is made by a jury rather than by a single governmental official.
Id. at 468-69; see also Higginbotham, supra note 125, at 1048-49 (the jury "better
represents community values").
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of the community." 3' One adamant pro-death penalty juror reflected a
commonplace, dichotomized understanding of judges and jurors in his
explanation of his preference that a jury rather than a judge make the
death penalty decision: "After all, we are the ones who are going to be
subjected to whatever [the defendant] does."'" The actual person who
is a juror is perhaps at no greater risk than the actual person who is a
judge; but the judge is perceived less as an actual person. This perfectly
reflects the dichotomized construction of the judge and jury, revealing the
widespread assumption that jurors are closer to the experience of
victimization than judges. In all of these ways, the jury is feminine."'
3. COLLECTIVE DECISIONMAKING
Jury deliberations require individual judgments to be negotiated and
modified to conform to a group decision. Collective decisionmaking is
often described as an important aspect of feminist methodology. 3'
Although the feminist analysis has focused on the benefit of listening and
shared voices for improved decisionmaking, another potential result is a
loss of individual integrity or responsibility. For a jury to function, each
juror has to be willing to give up a little bit of her own perspective.
Indeed, the premise of accommodation is another way in which the
institution of the jury is feminine. But too much accommodation destroys
autonomy and eliminates responsibility. As Gilligan acknowledges, and
336. Justice Stevens' argument that the Constitution requires ajury in capital cases
was based in part on "a strong community feeling that it is only decent and fair to leave
the life-or-death decision to the authentic voice of the community-the jury-rather than
to a single governmental official." 468 U.S. at 473 (Stevens, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part). Juror researcher Valerie P. Hans suggests that jurors are used to
impose death sentences "to speak as the authentic voice of the community." Hans, supra
note 55, at 149.
337. The juror continued, "[A] judge may not be as reflective of society as the
jury so, I would rather have a jury because you get society more involved." Neider
Interview, supra note 77. Another former capital juror preferred juror sentencing
"because it boils down to whether you want this man in your community. . . ." Quinlan
Interview, supra note 192.
338. See M.E. Lewyn, Men, Women and Crime, 1 SAN DIEOO JUST. J. 57 (1993)
(providing data that men are more at risk from violent crime although women are
perceived to be more at risk).
339. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 146, at 1949 (arguing against leaving power in
the hands of a single judge); Elizabeth Kingdom, Legal Recognition of a Woman's Right
to Choose, in BRoPHY AND SMART, WoMEN IN LAW: EXPLoRATIoNS IN LAw, FAMILY
AND SEXUALITY (1985) (promoting "ideology of solidarity and collective
decisionmaking"); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 30, at 53 (describing Portia as favoring
collectivity over hierarchy); Resnik, supra note 46, at 1952-43 (work improved by
collaboration). One juror told me he preferred a jury determination over a judge's
because "I think when you make a decision like that you need to talk about it." Quinlan
Interview, supra note 192.
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critics of relational feminism remind us, too much relatedness leads to
nothing less than loss of self.'
The problem of jurors abandoning conscience" 1 is quite real in the
context of a capital jury. One juror from a hung jury described how two
other jurors had changed their votes after the jury had given up trying to
reach a unanimous verdict. Once the possibility of unanimity was gone,
two women changed their votes-for the record-from death to life.3' 2
After having gone along with the majority for the benefit of the group (in
achieving its task of reaching a verdict), each reverted to a vote for
herself, against death, once it was clear that no consequences would
flow . ' Submerging individual conscience for the perceived good of
the collective might be feminine,' but it is certainly not feminist
process. Surely the practice of using multiple shooters (each of whom is
likely to be shooting blanks) in a firing squad is not a paradigm of
feminist collective process. The prevalent explanation for the need for
collective decisionmaking in the capital context is that the burden would
be too great for any one person to shoulder.' Does that suggest that
the burden is too great to be shouldered?
The potential loss of individual responsibility and accountability with
use of the jury is multilayered: first, individual jurors are relieved to
share the decision with other jurors; second, judges may use the jury to
justify the death sentence and distance themselves from the moral
340. Gilligan, supra note 47, at 19, 32.
341. A major study of jury decisionmaking asserts that jury deliberation may be
"characterized by the use of heavy-handed social pressure that leads dissenters to publicly
support the jury's verdict, while privately harboring reservations . . . . mhe jury
completes its task unanimous in vote but not in conscience." KAssIN & WitioHsMAN,
supra note 121, at 175.
342., "When we realized that we were going to be a hung jury two people actually
changed their votes away from the death penalty to have it be life in prison without
possibility of parole." The juror interviewed cast a consistent vote for death, and
described the two women who changed their vote to life when they saw that the jury was
hung as "not able to emotionally handle" being on record for death in the hung jury.
Neider Interview, supra note 77.
343. Perhaps similarly, Justice Blackmun's opinion announcing that he would no
longer vote to affirm death sentences came after his decision to retire.
344. See Grillo, supra note 51, at 602-03 (those using the caring mode are more
willing to compromise).
345. Justice Stevens argued that the burden of death sentencing would be too great
for a judge:
mhe responsibility of deciding whether a person convicted of murder should
be sentenced to death or to a lesser punishment is too heavy a burden to
impose on any single individual .... [lit would be wholly inconsistent with
our traditional approach to such issues to lay on the shoulders of the Judge a
responsibility so grave and invidious.
Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 473 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (quoting
REPORT OF ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1949-1953, at 193-94 (1953);
see also Higginbotham, supra note 125, at 1048-49 ("[Rjesponsibility for such a decision
is best shared.").
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questions.' Indeed, the jury is used to explain away and insulate the
judges from responsibility for injustice-such as racial bias-in the
imposition of the death penalty.' 7 Thus jury capital sentencing could
be seen as a paradigm of collectivity as diffusion of and thus escape from
responsibility. Surely feminist collectivity should not mean eliminating
individual responsibility?
This problem of lost accountability in collective decisionmaking can
be clarified by contrasting the jury with the feminist model of collective
process, the consciousness-raising group. "[Consciousness-raising]...
is a methodology that creates knowledge from shared, collective
experience. Communication occurs in a leaderless circle .... There is
a devaluation of expertise; everyone has life experience from which
something might be worth learning."' Although jury decisionmaking
is analogous in some ways to feminist consciousness-raising,. the
differences between the two are even more significant.
Consciousness-raising means much more than people talking
collectively; the exchange is undertaken by people with certain shared
political values, within the structure of careful process. The premise of
consciousness-raising, that women's voices are to be taken seriously,
means, for example, that process develops to ensure equal time,' and
that the quiet voices are not overwhelmed by the others. Neither this
premise nor this process is reflected in the jury room, where, for
example, gender and race-based stereotypes may thrive. I interviewed
jurors from two cases where women served as forepersons; jurors from
both trials reported male resentment about female forepersons." 1
346. "Through the Lockett doctrine, reviewing courts can distancethemselves from
the hard substantive moral choices that must be made in any death penalty case by leaving
those choices to the sentencer." Louis D. Bilionis, Moral Appropriateness, Capital
Punishment, and the Lockett Doctrine, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINoLoGY 283, 287 (1991).
Bilionis cites this as a strength of the Lockett doctrine.
347. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987) ("[It is the jury's
function to make the difficult and uniquely human judgments that defy codification and
'buil[dl discretion, equity, and flexibility into a legal system.'") (quoting HARRY KALVEN
& HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 498 (1966)). Thus the democracy of the jury is
used to justify racial imbalance in death sentences.
348. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 30, at 55. Menkel-Meadow asks, "Does the use
of a jury provide a useful framework for a kind of judging where no single perception of
the truth must prevail, but where a verdict is the product of a mediated consensus?" id.
For discussion of consciousness-raising groups as feminist method, see CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 83-105 (1989); Bartlett, supra
note 31, at 863-67; Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics:
Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589, 601-04 (1986).
349. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 30, at 53.
350. See id. at 53 (noting "attention is paid to equality of presentation time and
rotation of ... tasks" in consciousness-raising groups).
351. "There was some resentment that I sensed from a couple of the guys that I
(a woman) was elected to be the foreman." Boisvert Interview, supra note 78. Another
reported that a "hot shot guy wanted to be foreman but they got a woman to do it who
was much better, but it pissed the guy off. . . ." Dalrymple Interview, supra note 194.
1994:1345 1411
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Women jurors speak much less than men, even today. 2 One reason
for the racial imbalances in capital sentencing arises from the racism of
the decisionmakers, including, we must assume, jurors. The
deliberations of the jury are utterly informal and without structure, in
marked contrast to the care and formality of the courtroom portion of the
case.' We know that bias flourishes in informal settingsp so the
choice to keep jury deliberations completely without structure invites bias.
Even around a kitchen table or in somebody's living room, feminist
consciousness-raising has far more formal procedures than any jury
deliberations, including those in capital sentencing.
Beyond the lack of formal process, juries are very different from
consciousness-raising groups in their relative power. Consciousness-
raising groups increase the power of the participants, in large part because
the participants maintain complete control over the values, procedures,
and purposes of the groups. By comparison, even those jurors deciding
whether someone should live or die are astonishingly powerless.
4. POWERLESSNESS
At first glance, using the jury for this powerful task seems to
comport with the feminist goal of redistributing power to the relatively
powerless, which in legal decisionmaking can mean the jury."
352. Evidence from the 1950s and from 1988 suggests that men talk more than
women at a differential of one and one half to one. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Some Steps
Between Attitudes and Verdicts, in INSIDE THE JUROR 59 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993). Male
jurors speak more than female jurors, and the foreperson, often an active participant, is
usually male. VALERIE HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGINO THE JURY 108 (1986). This
research data was not reflected in a recent study ofjuror self-appraisals in which both men
and women reported that women jurors were more thoughtful and vocal. Women Do Not
Fit Stereotype, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 22, 1993, at S14; cf. IRIS YOUNO, JUSTICE AND THE
POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 184 (1990) (discussing fact that white middle-class professionals
and men participate the most in New England town meetings).
353. See, e.g., Hance v. Zant, 114 S. Ct. 1392 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(discussing racist comments of white jurors about defendant and sole Black juror); see also
Cain, supra note 146; Minow, supra note 263, at 26-29 (discussing McCleskey, noting
that discretion leads to race-based decisions); Pillsbury, supra note 229, at 708 (discussing
"otherness" question in relation to race and McCleskey). "[Dliscretion makes
decisionmaking vulnerable to amoral, here racial, influence." Id. See generaly Charles
R. Lawrence II, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 328-44 (1987) (presenting evidence of unconscious
racism).
354. See Quinlan Interview, supra note 192. The normal extreme formality of a
capital case is not present during deliberations. See, e.g., Sarat, supra note 210.
355. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WiS. L. REV. 1359; Grillo, supra note
51, at 1589-90 (informal nature of mediation setting may make it an environment in which
prejudices thrive).
356. See Alschuler, supra note 321.
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Redirection to "the use of legal sources 'from below'" '37 suggests
choosing jurors over judges.358 In fact, the major traditional argument
against allowing jurors to sentence in capital cases is the elitist,
suggestion that ordinary people cannot be trusted,' leading to the
proposal that a panel of experts be convened to do the job." Not
surprisingly, then, scrutiny of the power given to penalty jurors reveals
it to be extraordinarily constrained. Even though given the ultimate
responsibility, capital juries operate within an institution on the feminine
side of a gendered dichotomy, and thus are prevented from having even
the most basic control over how they exercise their life or death
responsibility.
a. The Either/Or of Life or Death
Jurors sentencing in capital cases are given only two choices,
generally death or life without the possibility of parole.' Like all
"either/or" choices,' this one removes much of the authority of the
357. SMART, supra note 11, at 23 (quoting Norwegian feminist T. Stang Dahl's
WOMEN'S LAW (1987)).
358. Id. Dahl's call for "greater reliance... on custom and public opinion of
what law ought to be" supports the choice of jurors over judges. Id.
359. Feminists attempt goals of nonhierarchism. E.g., Resnik, supra note 46, at
1927. To the extent that lowly jurors are given the most ultimate task, there is some
reversal of the normal hierarchy, especially since the jurors are no longer in their fact-
finding role. But perhaps the devaluation of fact-finding is more privileging of the wrong
thing. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 52, at 200-04 (discussing Gilligan's concern for
contextual detail). But see West, supra note 46, at 79-80 (arguing that mothering is proof
that Unger et al., are wrong in their assertion that oppressive power is a necessary
consequence of inequality and hierarchy, "and that the end of hierarchy is therefore the
necessary root of morality"). West's answer is to infuse hierarchies with care. Id. at 81.
360. See, e.g., 3 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENOLAND 86 (London, MacMillan 1883) ("There is no subject on which the impression
of a knot of unknown and irresponsible persons ... is less to be trusted than the question
whether or not the punishment of death should be inflicted in a given case."); Robert E.
Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PENN. L. REV. 1099,
1131, 1135 (1953) (citing the exemptions of professionals from jury service as
"eliminat[ing] those people most likely to be aware of the basic considerations necessary
to an intelligent choice of punishment" and characterizing the jury as "an inefficient and
arbitrary agency with respect to that issue").
361. Knowlton, supra note 360, at 1133-34. It has been suggested that the board
be composed of "a psychiatrist or psychologist, a socialist and a lawyer." id. at 1133
n.195 (citation omitted).
362. One juror expressly complained about the narrowing down to two choices:
"The whole thing seemed to be so pointed that therm was really no latitude to do much at
all." Dalrymple Interview, supra note 194; cf. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980)
(guilt phase jury must be given option of convicting capital defendant on lesser included
offense).
363. Resnik argues that feminist analysis critiques the false goal of "victory or
defeat" as either/or. Resnik, supra note 46, at 1926. What about the middle? Menkel-
Meadow identifies binary results ("win/lose?") as a basic concept underlying our model
of litigation but also suggests that the "notion that the adversary system requires binary
HeinOnline -- 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 1413 1994
.1414 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
decisionmakers. The limitation is deliberate; jurors are not expected to
be able to handle the usual sentencing task of choosing among a range of
options?"
By eliminating the possibility of compromise or nuanced response to
the capital defendant and his crime, the either/or choice eliminates much
of the benefit of group decisionmaking. Just as empathy or compassion
can help decisionmakers to move beyond either/or choices, the either/or
choice here is probably in place in part to eliminate emotion from the
penalty determination.' Federal judges are rebelling against the
limitations imposed by federal sentencing guidelines,' yet they still
have more than two options. Arguably, more options would increase both
the sense of responsibility of those entrusted with the capital decision and
the vaunted reliability of the result.
b. Jurors Are Silent and Hidden Behind the Verdict
The statement of reasons given by a sentencing judge provides
accountability and accessibility.6 7 Everything about a capital case is
documented meticulously, except for the work of the jury; the only record
of the deliberations is an often one-word verdict.' As with more
results might be somewhat exaggerated given the possibility of compromise in verdicts."
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 30, at 52 n.74.
364. The Court made this point in Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984),
rejecting the claim that juror sentencing is required in capital cases: "We have no
particular quarrel with the proposition that juries, perhaps, are more capable of making
the fife-or-death decision in a capital case than of choosing among the various sentencing
options available in a noncapital case." Id. at 463 n.8 (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 18:1.1, 18:21-18:22 commentary (2d ed. 1980)).
365. See Shaughnessy, supra note 265, at 288. Shaughnessy suggests that the
reason Booth was correctly decided to recognize that victim-impact statements should not
be admissible is that capital jurors are given only two choices. "However, the law offers
the jury only one way to compensate the victim's survivors for the pain that is so
graphically demonstrated before the jury. That way, in the context of a capital sentencing
proceeding, is to choose the death of the defendant over the life of the defendant. It is
not the least bit clear that, if given a full range of remedial power, the jury would be
moved to respond in that way to survivors' emotions." Id. at 288. See generally Ruth
Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1011, 1028 (1989); Lynne
N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574, 1653 (1987).
366. See, e.g., Jim Newton,Judges Voice Anger Over Mandatory U.S. Sentences,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1993, at 1.
367. See, e.g., Minow & Spelman, supra note 209 (arguing in favor of including
statement of reasons for decision). Several jurors told me that a statement of reasons for
the death verdict would have been possible and beneficial. E.g., Boisvert Interview,
supra note 78; Smith Interview, supra note 159.
368. See Weisberg, supra note 27, at 314. When Robert Weisberg attempted to
use "a perspective rarely noted in the literature-the actual conduct of penalty trials, as
revealed in such texts as instructions and closing arguments," the texts available told the
story of the judge's instructions and the attorneys' arguments, but no record remained
from the jurors except the bare (often one-word) verdict. Id. The only documents not
preserved for the appeal are notes taken by the jurors.
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commonplace jury determinations,' the verdict forms used by most
death penalty juries ask for simply the conclusion, without any
opportunity for explanation."
The jury is not inevitably inscrutable; a statement of reasons from the
sentencing jury could eliminate much of the intellectual bog and
corruption in the appellate second-guessing which occurs in the context
of applying the current harmless error doctrine."1 Allowing the jury
to explain itself would provide to the jury some of the authority that
current appellate doctrine falsely ascribes to it. Given the benefit of such
a reform to the purported goal of reliable and accurate death sentences,
the fact that courts have not required any statement of reasons from
capital juries' suggests a preference for a more manipulable paper
tiger."
The silencing of the jury is enforced in a number of ways beyond
the absence of a statement of reasons. For example, a juror's own
impeachment of the verdict, including a juror's sworn declaration related
to impropriety in the decisionmaking process, is often inadmissible to
369. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 321, at 162 ("[W]e do not permit [jurors]
to explain their rulings.").
370. By contrast, the Louisiana statutory scheme provides for a list of statutory
factors found to be true by the jury. The North Carolina capital statute is unusual in that
it requires the jury foreman to list aggravating factors found beyond a reasonable doubt.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(c)(1) (1977). Geimer and Amsterdam have pointed out
that this requirement to "[clheckD the appropriate boxes" can be understood as a
necessary afterthought, rather than a necessarily accurate explanation of the verdict.
Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 124, at 10. Whatever the accuracy of North Carolina's
check-off device, it at least provides more information about the jury's decisionmaking
than the one-word verdict used in most other capital sentencing schemes. Cf. Paul W.
Cobb, Jr., supra note 285, at 406 (suggesting that "[tihe clemency boards should be
required to report the basis for their invoking or disdaining mercy in each case").
371. For a discussion of the disparity between the appellate version of a capital
case and the jurors' actual reasoning, see Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 124, at 19-
21; see also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251 (1976) (upholding Florida provision
allowing judge to override jury recommendation for life in part on grounds that because
the "trial judge must justify the imposition of a death sentence with written findings,
meaningful appellate review of each such sentence is made possible"); cf. Janice Rogers
Brown, The Quality of Mercy, 40 UCLA L. REv. 327, 335 (1992) (noting that Governor
Wilson's detailed statements of reasons for denying clemency to Robert Harris "permitted
the people to judge the quality of his decision").
372. See, e.g., Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989) (Sixth Amendment does
not require that jury specify aggravating factors that permit death sentence); see also
Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 750 (1990) (asserting without authority that
appellate court reweighing does not require written jury findings); Spaziano v. Florida,
468 U.S. 447 (1984); Profit:, 428 U.S. 242 (upholding jury override in Florida even
without written findings); People v. Benson, 802 P.2d 330 (Cal. 1990) (California
Constitution does not require written statement in support of death verdict).
373. Ironically, one repeated explanation for giving this task to jurors is precisely
that they are not expected to supply a statement of reasons. See Higginbothom, supra
note 125.
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impeach the verdict. 7 This preference for the romance of the jury
rather than the reality 75 is especially egregious in the context of a
capital case, in which a juror has made an individualized moral
determination with mortal stakes.
The evidentiary exclusion of actual information about juror
deliberations allows misinformation to flourish.376  Every juror
interviewed who voted for death incorrectly interpreted the alternative
(life without the possibility of parole) as allowing for release. 3" The
374. For a powerful critique of this evidentiary exclusion, which the author
designates "see-no-evil evidentiary doctrines," see Aschuler, supra note 321, at 157,218-
29. Aschuler criticizes Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987), in which the
Court interpreted Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) very broadly in holding that no hearing
was required to investigate juror allegations that other jurors were intoxicated during jury
deliberations from alcohol abuse and illicit drug use. States similarly limit impeachment
with juror statements. See, e.g, CAL. EViD. CODE § 1150 (West 1994). The California
Supreme Court has determined that § 1150 may be violated "not only by the admission
of jurors' testimony describing their own mental processes, but also by permitting
testimony concerning statements made by jurors in the course of their deliberations."
People v. Hedgecock, 759 P.2d 1260, 1274-75 (Cal. 1990); see also People v.
Hutchinson, 455 P.2d 132 (Cal. 1990).
375. See, e.g., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120 (1987) ("There is
little doubt that postverdict investigation into juror misconduct would in some instances
lead to the invalidation of verdicts reached after irresponsible or improper juror behavior.
It is not at all clear, however, that the jury system could survive such efforts to perfect
it.").
376. Psychologists Mark and Sally Costanzo conducted a case study of a California
capital jury in a case that resulted in a verdict of life without possibility of parole. They
found that
[tihe jurors interviewed did not frame the decision in terms of its moral
implications or the appropriateness of a particular penalty. Instead, they
emphasized the importance of reaching consensus and tended to discuss the
deliberation in terms of interpersonal dynamics. Little attempt was made to
weigh aggravating factors against mitigating factors and jurors were uncertain
about how to use the testimony presented. Information considered crucial by
attorneys was not mentioned at all or considered trivial by the jurors.
Costanzo & Costanzo, supra note 32, at 189.
377. All jurors I interviewed made significant substantive errors in their
descriptions of controlling doctrine, particularly about the alternative sentence of life
without possibility of parole. "There is always a possibility that his sentence might be
reduced." Neider Interview, supra note 77. "We had our minds made up what we
wanted (before penalty phase) .... We didn't want to give him life because they keep
letting them out. We did not want him let out. So we were all agreeable on that."
Manchester Interview, supra note 77. "[The judge] was very careful [about life without
possibility of parole]; it gave us the impression that this may not be real but this is what
we had to be told precisely." Quinlan Interview, supra note 192. "We just figured that
he would appeal it and appeal it and appeal it and that he would spend God knows how
many years appealing and nothing would come of [a death verdict] anyway." Stark
Interview, supra note 41. One juror specifically explained that the deliberations finished
as soon as everyone understood that life without possibility of parole meant parole and
that death meant life without parole. Interview with David Marona, Juror in People v.
Poggi, No. A450781 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1982), in Huntington Beach, Cal. (Aug. 2, 1991)
[hereinafter Marona Interview].
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following explanation is typical: "[We voted for death because we]
wanted to ensure that this person is never on the streets again. It wasn't
that important to us whether he was put to death. That really wasn't what
was important." s
Any serious efforts to eliminate bias and fundamental error from jury
sentencing require reconsideration of the isolation and privacy of the jury
room." ' Although most jurors with whom I spoke reported having
taken their task extremely seriously, several described frustration at others
on their panels who were less than serious. After some initial hesitation
about making a disclosure that could undermine the perceived integrity of
the death verdict that had been reached, the foreperson of one jury told
me, "One of the biggest problems was the drinking.... Because some
people look at this as a party. They [do not have to go] to work. This
is the truth and it is sad." 3" The romantic mystery that surrounds the
jury protects all sorts of terrors. 81
c. Enforced Passivity: Jurors as Audience
Jurors are rarely allowed to ask questions during trial, whatever the
type of adjudication. As Albert Alschuler points out, "Like good
children, good jurors are to be seen and not heard." 3" This enforced
378. Boisvert Interview, supra note 78.
379. See Delgado et al., supra note 355, at 1388-89, 1402 (risk of prejudice is
greatest when "there are few rules to constrain conduct" and "the setting is closed and
does not make clear that 'public' values are to preponderate").
380. Boisvert Interview, supra note 78. She explained that the drinking "got ugly,
abusive," and that there were hours during deliberations when jurors were asleep (after
heavy drinking at the free lunch). id. A university research scientist was aghast at his
jury room experience: "I can't believe anyone knows what goes on once we go up.
There are no guidelines, there is no supervision. Only bad things can happen up there.
* * , There is a show on the lower floor then there is the real game upstairs. I have
seen the nuts and bolts of how the decision was made and I don't think it is good...
I would take a jury trial immediately if I was guilty-without question. I would be
scared to death if I were an innocent person and would not hesitate if I was guilty....
We are monitored in the courtroom. We [deliberate] by ourselves, cut off from the rest
of the world." The juror provided an example of what he considered to be one of the
foolish discussions: "I don't understand talking for an hour about whether your left or
right-handed person can put an Egg McMuffin in your left or right pocket." Quinlan
Interview, supra note 192.
Although there are many strong reasons to remove some of the privacy from jury
deliberations, there are equally good reasons to provide some additional privacy to the
flesh and blood jurors. See Babcock, supra note 320, at 1177 n.127 (calling for
confidentiality of juror questionnaires).
381. See Shaughnessy, supra note 265, at 280 (noting that the law's "cloak of
secrecy" around the actual deliberations of the jury allows "the relatively free reign of
emotion in the jury room and perpetrates the illusion that jurors proceed by reasoning
syllogistically from a finding of a particular fact . . .).
382. Alschuler, supra note 321, at 162; cf. Constable, supra note 326, at 371
(criticizing studies of jurors for perpetuating a version where "who the juror really is
remains unknown (since one is not what one does). The juror is an actor whose
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passivity is especially constraining when the jurors have been told to make
the moral decision whether a person should be killed. Jurors are asked
to make a monumental, conscientious decision, but given no control over
what information they receive with which to make it.38
Information received controls the decision reached. 3u The Court's
willingness to cut back on the amount of individualized mitigation
evidence that the capital defendant has a right to present to the
sentencer' also means further restrictions on the information to which
the jurors are entitled prior to exercising their moral choice. Robin West
has suggested that these decisions "implicitly shrank the sphere of jurors'
responsibility." 3M Rather than lessen the responsibility, which exists
regardless of constraints on evidence, these restrictions diminish the
control that the jurors might have over what evidence to take to heart in
their "reasoned moral decision."
agreement with others is of the greatest importance, yet whose speech is not to be trusted
nor taken on its own terms.").
383. Several jurors expressed frustration at not being allowed to ask questions.
E.g., Boisvert Interview, supra note 78; DeMasi Interview, supra note 159; Dalrymple
Interview, supra note 194; see People v. Anderson, 801 P.2d 1107, 1123 (Cal. 1990)
(under proper control by trial court, "there may be a real benefit from allowing jurors to
submit questions" to witnesses). For an excellent discussion of "our patronizing rules of
evidence, that bespeak limited faith in juries," see Alschuler, supra note 321, at 154, 162.
384. Minow and Spelman have noted, for instance, that a "judge who faces a
controversial issue-such as whether a reporter should be forced to disclose to the
prosecutor his source for a story about a murder-may want all the facts first. But what
facts are relevant?... The decisions about what information should be secured before
reaching judgment will influence what judgments remain to be reached." Minow &
Spelman, supra note 209, at 47 (footnote omitted). Further, relational feminists see that
additional information is often needed to respond in a caring mode. E.g., Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 30, at 51 ("Amy sees no reason why she must act as a neutral arbiter
of a dispute and make a decision based only on the information she has.").
385. E.g., Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990); Boyde v. California,
494 U.S. 370 (1990); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990). On occasion the Court's
rhetoric obscures the passive role of the jurors, by inappropriately equating the jurors'
access to information with that of a judge. See, e.g., Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct.
1093, 1097 (1992) (upholding the right of a capital jury to receive some information
about First Amendment protected activity with authority related to a judge's authority to
'conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information
he may consider, or the source from which it may come").
386. West, supra note 181, at 86. "Just as the curtailment of habeas rights shrank
the sphere of judicial responsibility, the restriction on rights in the death penalty cases
implicitly shrank the sphere of jurors' responsibility." Id.
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d. No Regrets Allowed
Much of the power and seriousness of a death sentence comes from
its finality."l Although many stages of appellate and post-conviction
review follow, the jurors' determination is final, for them. But the jurors
do not stop pondering, wondering, and even praying about their decision
after they are sent home: "I have never forgotten.""'8
In the summer of 1990, an Alameda County death penalty juror made
news by contacting the district attorney to say that she had changed her
mind. The prosecutor dismissed this as a simple case of "buyer's
remorse." The vast machinery of capital appellate and habeas review
allows virtually no room for capital juror doubts or changed perspectives.
Yet juror doubts are widespread.'" "More than fourteen years after the
trial, another juror who had switched her vote wept openly during the
interview and prayed that she had done the right thing."' In a case
that received national attention, Warren McCleskey was executed over the
objections of two of the jurors who sentenced him to die. Both jurors
told the clemency board that they never would have sentenced McCleskey
to death if they had known that the chief prosecution witness was a paid
387. See Giarratano, supra note 274, at 1005. For a feminist account of the need
for opportunities for revision, see Resnik, supra note 46, at 1937: "[Wihile it must be
noted that feminism is not an essential prerequisite to a sensitivity about the demands for
reconsideration, feminist approaches might be a useful antidote in an era when pressures
for closure are mounting." Id.
388. Stark Interview, supra note 41. "It was very important. I have since that
time become a Christian which I was not at the time and I have even in retrospect prayed
over it and hoped that I made the right decision." Smith Interview, supra note 159. "[Ilt
stays with you for a long time even though you've been dismissed, you mull over it and
you think about the whole thing for months and months." id. "[lf he did die of natural
causes, a heart attack, I'm glad because I do feel executions are very horrible things
.. .. Id.
389. Geimer and Amsterdam described one capital juror who remained conflicted
about her role:
At first, she stated that, although she voted for life, she was glad the judge
overrode the verdict because Johnson deserved death. Then she said: "But
thinking back, I think everyone should be given a chance to repent and be
forgiven. We should not kill them." The juror was still unsure about a
decision she had made [nine years before the interview]. Was she "wishy-
washy"? Marvin Johnson remains on death row, nearing the end of his
available appeals.
Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 124, at 36. Similarly, a juror in the Spenkelink trial
regretted having been convinced to change his vote to death: "He concluded, after
thinking about the trial over the years, that he had done the wrong thing and should have
stuck with his vote for life. He said he was sorry Spenkelink had been executed when so
many others who deserved it more escaped death." Id. at 46 n. 199. I interviewed only
one juror who acknowledged serious doubts about the sentence imposed; in his case the
sentence was life without possibility of parole, but the juror continued to have serious
doubts about the defendant's guilt. He described the defense as "the poorest show I have
ever seen." Dalrymple Interview, supra note 194.
390. Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 124, at 46.
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informant. 9' Capital defense attorney Stephen Bright describes the case
of a mentally retarded man, Horace Dunkins, who was executed in 1989
in Alabama over the objections of one of his jurors: "A person who had
served as a juror at his trial, upon reading about Dunkins' retardation
immediately before he was to be executed, attempted to contact the
governor of Alabama, saying she would never have voted for the death
penalty if she had known of his mental limitations. " 112
A judge, of course, loses authority upon leaving the bench.' The
situation of the capital juror is different; she has rendered a moral
judgment, the authority for which comes from her conscience, not her
employment. As the case winds its way through appellate and post-
conviction procedures, the actual flesh and blood juror is forgotten. The
prime motivation of jurors who answered my inquiry was intense
curiosity to find out whatever had happened: "You feel as if you have
done something, you've been told 'thank you, you're now excused,' and
then you never know what happens. It's like baking a cake and putting
it in the oven and walking out and never knowing . . . . It's sort of a
half-done job." 3" The actual juror is forgotten and replaced by a
symbolic representation, a fictional reasonable juror, who speaks for the
juror in responding to changed circumstances.395
The actual jurors continue to provide moral grounding for the
sentence, even when the facts or the law on which the juror rested her
decision have been proven erroneous. Herrera v. Collins,' the
Court's recent opinion on whether the Constitution forbids the execution
of an innocent person, reveals that any sense of the continuing moral
weight on the jurors who have rendered a death verdict is absent from
judicial consideration. The Court avoided a direct holding by assuming,
"for the sake of argument,... [that] a truly persuasive demonstration of
391. Stefanie McArdle, Ruling on McCleskey Sent a Chilling Message to Death
Row, STAR TRIBUNE, Nov. 1, 1991, at 21A.
392. Stephen B. Bright, In Defense of Life: Enforcing the Bill of Rights on Behalf
of Poor, Minority and Disadvantaged Persons Facing the Death Penalty, 57 Mo. L. REV.
849, 858-59 (1992) (citing Peter Applebome, Two Electric Jolts in Alabama Execution,
N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1989, at A6).
393. Two significant examples of the regrets of judges after leaving the bench are
former Justice Lewis Powell's widely reported regrets about his vote in Bowers v.
Hardwick and former California Supreme Court Justice Frank Newman's unsuccessful
public efforts for clemency to Robert Alton Harris based on mitigating evidence not
available to the California court (including Newman) when it affirmed Harris' death
sentence. Of course, a sitting judge retains the authority to reach new conclusions. See,
e.g., Calins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("From this
day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death.").
394. Stark Interview, supra note 41.
395. An unintended positive consequence of the Clemons appellate sentencing
doctrine, see supra text accompanying notes 203-09, is that it shifts the moral
responsibility away from the jurors once errors are discovered in the grounds on which
the jurors had reached a decision for death. In a sense, the jurors' moral determination
is erased and appellate responsibility substituted.
396. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
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'actual innocence' made after trial would render the execution of a
defendant unconstitutional,"' but determined that Herrera would not
meet such a burden. Herrera was not legally innocent because the jury's
verdict against him converted him from "presumed innocent to... guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt."3 Herrera was not factually innocent
because the "extraordinarily high"' factual showing necessary to
overturn the jury's verdict was not met by newly discovered evidence that
the wrong brother had been convicted."
Given that the facts presented at trial are the moral anchor for a
juror's decision to impose death, the Court is remarkably breezy about the
problem of changed facts: "[F]ederal habeas courts exist to ensure that
individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution-not to
correct errors of fact."" A capital juror might be taken aback at the
Court's preference for finality over certainty of guilt: "Few rulings would
be more disruptive of our federal system than to provide for federal
habeas review of free-standing claims of actual innocence. " ' Justice
Scalia's certainty of what he characterizes as the "embarrassing"
conclusion that the Constitution does not protect an innocent man from
execution' would be even more disconcerting to the capital juror.
Such judicial insouciance is utterly out of step with the continuing moral
weight expressed by conscientious capital jurors. The sense of moral
responsibility lingers, but once the verdict is rendered, the jurors' power
to impact the execution has disappeared.
These manifestations of limited power are the most tellingly feminine
aspects of the gendered capital jury. The promise of reform comes from
allowing the jury a more authoritative role, thus uncaging the jury from
the limits of its current feminine construction.
B. The Non-Gendered Jury
Martha Minow and Elizabeth Spelman have called upon us to make
judges human.' Certainly judges kept to the male side of the multi-
layered male/female dichotomies have been rendered less than fully
human. Associating the feminine virtues of emotionality, moral
leavening, and personal relatedness with juries prevents us from
acknowledging and indeed insisting that emotionality and moral leavening
397. Id. at 869.
398. Id. at 860.
399. id. at 869.
400. The newly discovered evidence of Herrera's innocence that the Court found
insufficient included affidavits from an attorney and from a former cellmate that Herrera's
brother had confessed to the murder, and an affidavit from the brother's son that he had
seen his father, not Herrera, commit the murder. Id. at 658.
401. Id. at 860.
402. Id. at 861.
403. Id. at 876 (Scalia, J., concurring).
404. Minow & Spelman, supra note 209.
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are inevitable and valuable aspects of judging as well.' Judges have
emotions too, and are no more disabled from using them than lay people.
The gendered constructions of judge and jury also prevent jurors-on
the female, personal side of the dichotomy-from being fully human."
The multiple female sides of the jury are interrelated and reinforcing.
Inscrutability is assumed to flow inevitably from visceral, or emotional,
determinations. But the premise that emotional moral reasoning cannot
be explained, controlled, or trusted is not true. Increased authority for
a juror could replace mystery and romance, without eliminating the power
of emotions or the freedom in discretion that the jurors now enjoy. If we
can trust jurors to choose life or death for a defendant, we can trust them
to exercise some control about how they make that determination. Jurors
do not speak in court at all, and never explain themselves. Jurors are
never allowed to talk directly with the defendant or with the survivors of
the crime.' If ordinary people are to be trusted to make an awesome
moral decision, then perhaps they should be allowed to ask their own
questions, to seek their own information. Show them respect by bringing
some order to the process by which they deliberate.? 8 Let them render
a statement of decision. Consider permitting them to change their
minds.' Breaking down the dichotomy of gender allows the jury to
become more human, and makes the jury determination more worthy of
respect.
Breaking down the dichotomy of gender requires challenging the
surprising claim that benefit is derived from handing capital sentencing to
people who are not accountable for the result.41° We trust the powerful
405. See David Margolick, Is It OKfor a Judge to Weep in Court for the Victim?
(n.p., n.d.) (describing affirmance of judgment where the sentencing judge, a woman,
wept in court in response to the victim's rejection of vengeance).
406. Dichotomized thinking makes the jury less than fully human by assigning to
the judge the human qualities of distance, authority, and reason. Just as importantly, if
more subtly, dualistic categories prevent the jury from being fully emotional, personal,
and contextual because the jury is understood to already embody those qualities simply
by comparison to the judge.
407. See NODDINOS, supra note 16, at 2-3 ("Faced with a hypothetical moral
dilemma, women often ask for more information. We want to know more, I think, in
order to form a picture more nearly resembling real moral situations. Ideally, we need to
talk to the participants, to see their eyes and facial expressions, to receive what they are
feeling.").
408. One juror summarized his frustrations with the chaotic and often nonsensical
deliberations: "It is not simply the decision that it important, it is the decision-making
process." Quinlan Interview, supra note 192.
409. That could be accomplished by allowing jurors standing to challenge death
sentences by way of habeas corpus.
410. Judge Learned Hand on jury trials:
The institution of trial by jury ... has its hold upon public favor chiefly for
two reasons. The individual can forfeit his liberty-to say nothing of his
life-only at the hands of those who, unlike any official, are in no wise
accountable, directly or indirectly, for what they do, and who at once separate
and melt anonymously into the community from which they came.
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who acknowledge their power, rather than hide it.4 Many capital
jurors experience very little power or authority. "[I]t was like you almost
did not need us.""" Giving this decision to such disempowered
decisionmakers insulates and hides the power and violence of the
decision, diffusing the responsibility."' Providing more authority to
jurors offers the promise of making a death penalty jury in fact the
bulwark of democracy that it is already said to be.4 4
United States v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 775-76 (2nd Cir. 1942); cf. JAMES G. COZZENS,
THE JUST AND THE UNJUST (1942) (novel in which character Judge Philander Coates
explains that judges would not be allowed to render the unpopular decisions that juries can
render).
411. Minow and Spelman suggest as one of their guidelines for judges that
the judge should recognize and acknowledge that power he or she has over the
lives of others in the act of judgment, and, if the judge does not experience
such power, the judge should reflect on why not, despite the actual effects of
the decision he or she will make.
Minow & Spelman, supra note 209, at 57-58.
412. Stark Interview, supra note 41. Some jurors denied that they experienced
much power because the appropriateness of a death verdict was so clear-cut to them:
"[The experience] wasn't powerful to me. This man did it. He should be eliminated. He
deserves it." Hofeller Interview, supra note 41. "It was a minor experience." Id.
413. See Cover, supra note 21, at 1626-27 (noting that if judges had to persuade
wardens of the correctness of the execution, "the warden and his men would lose their
capacity to shift to the judge primary moral responsibility for the violence which they
themselves carry out"); see also id. at 1627-28 (asserting that no judge acts alone).
One juror preferred a jury to a judge imposing the sentence in capital cases because
the use of the jury forces members of the public to confront their support for capital
punishment: "[If the judge does it then [the people are] off the hook." Stark Interview,
supra note 41; see also People v. Silva, 754 P.2d 1070, 1091 (Cal. 1988) (trial judge
refused to answer juror question about appeal of death sentence on grounds that it would
"suggest. . . an easy way out to the jury and allow.., them to think in terms of the
Pontius Pilate theory, 'I wash my hands of it.'").
414. The Supreme Court called jury determination of capital penalty a "bulwark
between the accused and the State," Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 462 (1984),
while refusing to hold that such a bulwark was constitutionally required. In dissent,
Justice Stevens argued "that the danger of an excessive response can only be avoided if
the decision to impose the death penalty is made by a jury rather than by a single
governmental official." Id. at 468-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Hans, supra note
55, at 149 (use of jury for capital sentencing is "important limit on state power"); cf. THE
FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (jury trial as protection against corrupt and
arbitrary governmental power); HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN
JURY 5 (rev. ed. 1986) ("[E]nthusiasts of the jury have tended to lapse into sentimentality
and to equate literally the jury with democracy."); Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L.
REv. 837, 849 (1984) ("Giving power to jurors is a decision to democratize the
decisionmaking process, to provide an alternative to the perceived autocracy ofjudges.");
id. at 850 ("Vesting power and authority in identifiable decisionmakers enables the state
to personify its authority, thus making the state more readily understood, accepted and
obeyed. The grant of power to the jury gives meaning to a promise of democracy: the
people are the state.").
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V. CONCLUSION
Capital jurors are ordinary people called upon to decide whether
another person should be killed. Gayle Daniels is one such ordinary
person; Patricia LeMay another. They served together on a capital jury
in Georgia in 1984. Ten years later William Henry Hance was executed
over their objections.415 Daniels, the lone Black on Hance's jury, said
that she had never voted to execute Hance because of his multiple mental
disabilities. Ms. Daniels insisted that she had been a holdout for life,
under pressure to end deliberations before Mothers' Day. Ms. LeMay,
a white woman, corroborated Ms. Daniels' account, and added her own
report of repeated racist comments made by other members of the jury
about both Ms. Daniels and Mr. Hance, also Black. Three members of
the Court voted to stay Hance's execution on the basis of these jurors'
account, but failed to find the requisite fourth.416  The execution
proceeded, for, as the prosecutor reminded the international press, by law
jurors cannot challenge their own verdict. 17
Although scholarly attention to capital punishment is vast, and
seemingly multiplying almost as rapidly as the number of people on death
row, 418 little of that commentary pays attention to the capital juror.
Feminist method redirects the focus to capital jurors, including Ms.
Daniels and Ms. LeMay, and partially explains why they are overlooked
in death penalty commentary and peripheral to post-conviction
proceedings. Recognition of the hidden grip of gender helps to explain
why jurors such as Gayle Daniels and Patricia LeMay are used to make
this moral decision, and how they might be allowed to do a better job.
Feminist theories of gender provide a structure for acknowledging
strength in the discretion, connection, and emotion within jurors' reasoned
moral responses to life or death. Liberating legal doctrine and method
from dichotomies of gender" 9 promises reform for virtually every area
of legal doctrine, even one as well-scrutinized and apparently far-removed
from feminist concerns as death penalty law, the law for deciding to kill.
415. See generally Peter Applebome, Georgia Executes Murderer After Brief Stay
from Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1994, at A14; Bob Herbert, In America: Judicial Coin
Toss, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1994, at D11; Bob Herbert, In America; Jury Room Injustice,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1994, at A15.
416. Hancev. Zant, 114 S. Ct. 1392 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg also dissented from the denial of a stay of execution.
417. Peter Applebome, Stay Lifted; Execution Proceeds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2,
1994, at A6.
418. The comparable increase often seems the main connection between the two
worlds.
419. Cf. Cole & Coultrap-McQuin, supra note 73, at 8 ("We envision an ethic
based on a conception of the person that embraces emotion alongside rationality,
intersubjectivity as well as autonomy, and particularity in addition to abstract human
value.").
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